[Part of an ongoing series on Ramachandra Guha’s India After Gandhi. Last week’s entry can be found here. Next week we will look at Chapter 9, “Redrawing the Boundaries,” on the Language Movements of the 1950s]
With 20-20 hindsight, many people criticize Nehru today for pursuing a foreign policy oriented to “nonalignment” — that is, independence from both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. Here is one of Nehru’s most famous statements articulating that policy, from a speech given at Columbia University:
“The main objectives of that policy are: the pursuit of peace, not through alignment with any major power or group of powers but through an independent approach to each controversial or disputed issue, the liberation of subject peoples, the maintenance of freedom, both national and individual, the elimination of racial discrimination and the elimination of want, disease and ignorance, which afflict the greater part of the world’s population.”
The idealism in that statement is admirable, and still worth thinking about, even if the world order has changed dramatically since Nehru first uttered these words. The idea of taking an “independent approach to each controversial or disputed issue” is one I personally strive for as a writer, and could serve as a helpful corrective to many partisan ideologues — on both the left and the right — who tend to only see the world through one particular ideological filter or the other.
Ideals aside, Nehru’s government did make some serious mistakes in foreign policy in the first few years. One of the significant failures Guha mentions in this chapter involved an inconsistency in the response to two international crises: 1) Anglo-French military action in response to Egypt’s nationalization of the Suez Canal in 1956 (the Suez Crisis), and 2) the Soviet invasion of Hungary following an anti-Communist uprising, also in 1956 (the Hungarian Revolution). India publicly condemned the first act of aggression by western powers, but not the second, which today seems like a clear indication that India was leaning towards the Soviets more than it let on.
Guha suggests there were some internal differences between Nehru and the famous leftist Krishna Menon, who represented India at the U.N., over the Hungary question. Nehru publicly defended Menon’s abstention at the U.N. on the resolution condemning the Soviet invasion of Hungary, but privately he was deeply upset about the invasion. Part of the problem here might have been Nehru’s lack of clarity over the correct course to take, but certainly Krishna Menon’s independent streak must have been a factor as well.
A similar kind of diplomatic confusion was present in India’s relationship with China starting in 1950. Here, the Indian ambassador to China, K.N. Panikkar (who is also very well-known as a historian), seems to have fatally misread Mao Zedong and the personality of Chinese communism: Continue reading