I co-authored an article with two other members of Lanka Solidarity for Himal Southasian’s special December issue on diasporas. You can find it on the Himal site here: Sri Lanka’s alternatives abroad
We believe members of Sri Lankan diasporas with alternative politics must reassert their claims to space in the conversation about Sri Lanka’s future. For us, this article was one step toward that. We look forward to your feedback, ideas, and yes, arguments–
Cross-posting it here.
Sri Lanka’s alternatives abroad
Are the island’s diasporas to be seen as a source of remittance, a threat, or legitimate sites for political engagement and critique?
By: Kitana Ananda, V V Ganeshananthan & Ashwini Vasanthakumar
There is no such thing as ‘the Sri Lankan diaspora’. Sri Lankan communities exist in the plural. And yet, nearly thirty years of conflict have rendered a nation with multiple minority communities and religions as though it has only two groups. If you generalise about what you read at all (and most people do), you are likely to believe that Sri Lanka’s Sinhalese majority and Tamil minority are pitted against each other, not only inside the country but in diasporas all over the world.
While conflict and geographic dispersal present real challenges to Sri Lankan diasporas, this image of Sinhalese versus Tamil is far from the whole truth. Although the war ended with a decisive victory by government security forces over the LTTE in 2009, the reductive image remains: Sri Lanka, a nation with Sinhalese, Tamil, Muslim and Burgher communities, rarely appears that way. The media is not the only culprit. In the wake of that resounding military victory, both the Sri Lankan government and its critics have failed to engage Sri Lankan diasporas and to understand their complexity. Indeed, their collective actions have excluded diasporic populations.Lankan diaspora histories often begin with 1983, when anti-Tamil violence and the rise of Tamil militancy led to the civil war that displaced hundreds of thousands of Tamils from the island. In fact, a longer and more complicated history of migration is responsible for today’s Lankan diasporas. During the 1930s and 1940s, English-speaking upper-caste Ceylonese who worked in the British Empire’s civil service formed diasporic settlements from Burma to Malaya.
After independence in 1948, new legislation disenfranchised Tamils of Indian origin, who had been brought in to work on colonial plantations during the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Many members of that community were subsequently repatriated to India. An attempt to nationalise government administration with the 1956 Official Language Act–popularly dubbed ‘Sinhala Only’–led to the migration of Ceylonese professionals of all communities who were not proficient in Sinhala. Large numbers of Burghers, the community of mixed Sri Lankan and European descent, migrated to Britain, Canada and Australia; Sinhalese, Tamil and Muslim professionals followed, accompanied by their families.
In these transitional decades, there was no such thing as a Tamil or Sinhalese diaspora; but by the late 1970s this was no longer the case, as factionalism escalated within the country. Three decades of state and economic restructuring had not created a united ‘Sri Lankan’ nation, and tensions mounted between a Sinhalese-dominated government and Tamil political parties. Disaffection with the political status quo gave rise to a 1971 insurrection among predominantly rural Sinhalese youths in the south, and growing militancy among Tamil youths in the north and east by the latter part of the decade. University admissions quotas, among other policies, effectively reduced opportunities for middle-class Tamil students and young professionals, who began to seek employment abroad.
Diasporas today
In July 1983, nearly 3,000 people were killed and thousands more displaced over five days of government-sponsored anti-Tamil violence, creating a new wave of migrants. The scale of destruction and spectacular displays of enmity spurred sympathetic Western governments to create special categories for refugee resettlement. As the country descended from ethnic conflict into full-scale war between the government and Tamil militant groups, the tide of migration continued. In the 1980s, as the LTTE rose to supremacy by brutally eliminating other Tamil militant groups, non-LTTE Tamil militants and their families emigrated. Internally, too, the country saw mass displacement of Muslims and Tamils.
The war with the state intensified through the mid-1980s and 1990s, again prompting hundreds of thousands of Tamils to depart. By some estimates, nearly 900,000–one in three–Tamils from Sri Lanka today live abroad, hailing predominantly from the country’s north and, to a lesser extent, the east. India was often their first stop and, for some, their final destination. Others headed to Canada, the United Kingdom, Australia and the United States, each of which offered the possibility of citizenship. Others remain refugees in India, Southeast Asia and Europe. As the war escalated, the pro-LTTE section of the diaspora became famously militant, pouring money into the Tigers’ movement, while their relatives and friends back home lost children, homes and livelihoods. The Tigers even developed an overseas wing, which managed its propaganda so successfully that other sections of the Tamil diaspora were virtually erased from the public sphere.
Admittedly, the largest Sri Lankan diaspora is a Tamil one, which has commanded considerable attention as a result of post-1983 migration, the war, and visible propaganda and financial support for the LTTE among some of its sections. Some use Sri Lankan diaspora and Tamil diaspora interchangeably, but Sinhalese and Muslim Sri Lankans have also gone to other shores amid political crises and economic uncertainty, and they continue to emigrate, predominantly as temporary migrant workers to West Asia. Sizeable and diverse Sinhalese diaspora communities have formed among workers in Italy, professionals in the United States, and several generations of migrants to the United Kingdom and Canada.
Today, some Sinhalese (and, to a lesser extent, Muslim) groups maintain ties with each other and with Sri Lanka through various associations. For some organisations, ‘Sri Lanka’ becomes a proxy for displays of Sinhalese nationalism that make critiques of the Sri Lankan government difficult. Similarly, prominent diasporic Tamil organisations have long showcased arguments for separatism, sometimes accompanied by endorsements of the LTTE. Those who do not agree with these respective lines face isolation from their own ethnic communities.
In May 2009, the war’s end saw the differing trajectories of these diasporas converge in tense confrontations in Canada, the UK, Australia and elsewhere. Thousands of Tamils around the world protested the war and the suffering it imposed. Those waving LTTE flags monopolised media attention, sidelining the message of ‘peace through negotiations’ emanating from other quarters. In response, smaller Sri Lankan groups with close connections to embassies and missions abroad organised counter-demonstrations. Their predominantly Sinhalese ranks also included anti-LTTE Tamils who cheered the Tigers’ defeat and hailed the soldiers who ended the war through military action.
Just remittances, please
Over the course of the war, the visibility of dominant sections of the Tamil diaspora–and their stunning vocal and financial support for the Tamil Tigers–has helped the Sri Lankan government to project the entire group as a terrorist threat. Post-war, the authorities’ attempts to derail a monolithic ‘Tamil diaspora’ have transformed into interest in that diaspora’s sizable collective wallet. In anticipation of a post-war Lanka, the government handpicked leaders and activists of the Tamil diaspora to attend a March 2009 conference in Colombo. At the meeting, dubbed the Sri Lankan Diaspora Dialogue, many of the invitees expressed dismay with the government’s heavy-handed agenda. Even as the government invited some Tamils to return to the island, it has made the following conflicting claims: The LTTE has been completely decimated; the LTTE could re-emerge at any time, and has powerful supporters abroad; the diaspora is invited to engage with us financially; we are no longer a colony, and those who criticise us from abroad have the mindset of colonisers (or support the LTTE).
The LTTE’s claim to be Tamils’ ‘sole representative’–and its well-known allies abroad–is convenient for the government, which wants remittances, not opinions. If it links all its overseas critics to the Tigers, it can dismiss their concerns. As pro-LTTE activists in the diaspora say they will continue to fight for Eelam from abroad (the most visible iteration being the Transnational Government of Tamil Eelam, formed in May following a diaspora-wide election), their statements fuel Colombo’s ire. In retaliation, the government has announced local and international campaigns to gather intelligence, seize assets and shut down the LTTE’s remaining international network. In such a climate of suspicion, the government has been quick to conflate any criticism with support for the LTTE, leaving no room for serious diasporic engagement with the state.
On the other hand, the government does recognise diasporas’ economic and political power, as well as the effectiveness of pro-LTTE activists overseas who have made it difficult for their critics to speak out. Indeed, since the Diaspora Dialogue, Colombo has learned much from the LTTE’s hegemony in diaspora communities. The government sidesteps political criticism by appealing to the desire of many to aid the war-torn regions of north and east Sri Lanka. To initiate development projects in these areas, it turns to ex-members of the Tigers. Former Tiger arms procurer and international-affairs representative Kumaran Pathmanathan now sits under house arrest in Colombo, dispensing advice to the government; his own public rehabilitation was announced with the launch of the North-East Rehabilitation Development Organization, for which he claimed ‘the Tamil diaspora’ was ready to work with the president. In the Eastern province, former Tigers and current government officials Pillayan and Karuna have their names bandied about as evidence of state engagement with minorities.
The power of foreign exchange as a potent resource for post-war reconstruction is not limited to the Tamil diasporas alone. With the war’s end, Sri Lankan embassies have raised funds (more than USD 690,000 to date), mainly from Sinhalese entrepreneurs and organisations, for Api wenuwen api (Be together for all), a Ministry of Defence campaign to build 50,000 houses for soldiers. Opposition groups also mobilise Sinhalese diaspora communities for their own ends. For example, in September, Sinhalese workers in Italy protested the Colombo government’s continued detention of the former head of the Sri Lankan armed forces, Sarath Fonseka.
The government’s latest statements continue to entreat ‘the Sri Lankan diaspora’ to participate in economic development. At the Asia Security Summit in August 2010, Minister of External Affairs G L Peiris said, ‘Our message to the diaspora in the Western world and elsewhere is that they have a dynamic role to play; we do not want them to distance themselves from the exciting developments which are taking place in Sri Lanka today.’ Such pronouncements are made even as the government cracks down on dissent and political opposition within Sri Lanka, and invokes the spectre of threats to national security to silence activists abroad. Peiris, a chief negotiator during the Oslo peace process, has recently argued that earlier talks and attempts at political reform failed due to a lack of consensus among dominant political interests. This top-down approach has allowed generations of Sri Lankan politicians to suppress debate and dissent while claiming to remain committed to political reform, and the same technique is now being used to mobilise the diaspora communities’ economic power.
This dual approach to (particularly) Tamil diaspora communities dismisses legitimate grievances and criticisms. Simultaneously, it invites potential investors to capitalise on the war’s end and selectively wields former LTTE leaders to collect economic contributions from the former. This not only privileges the economically secure and undermines the political engagement of diaspora communities in general, but also silences the many moderates–in-country and abroad –who did not provide unqualified support to the narrow agendas of successive governments or the LTTE. Such groups could not publicly criticise these agendas before, nor are they able to do so now. Instead, they remain sceptical and watchful of the many projects undertaken in their name.
Discounting nationalism
The government’s dismissal of the Tamil diaspora as being little more than LTTE henchmen is not surprising. It is less encouraging, however, when the same attitude is revealed in progressives’ discussions of, and engagement with, the diaspora. The left has largely disengaged from diasporic politics, preferring to direct its limited energies to the battles to be waged in-country. But this myopia prevents engagement with the considerable resources of moderates within the diaspora.
During the war, progressives from all communities attempted to create space within the diaspora from which exclusivist nationalism could be challenged. Emphasising marginalised histories to refute nationalist narratives, these activists deployed the language of human rights and political pluralism. But they largely engaged with diasporic politics because of its importance to politics in Sri Lanka. Now, in the aftermath of the Tigers’ defeat, this effort has atrophied. And by equating the Tigers’ totalitarian politics with Tamil nationalism and the government’s brutal tactics with Sinhalese nationalism, the left only reaffirms these actors’ respective claims to represent Sinhalese and Tamil peoples.
This cedes important ideological and political ground. Furthermore, by depicting nationalism as static, regressive and exclusivist, the left fails to appreciate the varieties of nationalism, its potential as a source of solidarity, and its importance in forging and transforming identities. Indeed, national identity is what ties those in the diaspora–including progressives who would rather identify themselves as expatriate or exile–to politics in Sri Lanka. But from the diaspora various nationalisms can also emerge, where the multiple identities and affiliations of those in the diaspora can fruitfully inform and expand nationalist politics in Sri Lanka. Many Tamils were privately critical of the LTTE’s tactics; many Sinhalese were critical of the state’s growing authoritarianism. Clearly, between the poles there is space for common ground.
Progressives fashion themselves as exiles who, after years in the ideological hinterlands of the diaspora, can return to Sri Lanka and resume agitating for the transformations they failed to secure thirty years ago–as though those intervening decades did not happen. What this has meant among many leftists in exile is supporting a project of authentic nationalism–for some ethnic, for others, multi-ethnic–from abroad, without engaging the communities living in their midst.
Responsible resource
The Colombo government will not successfully engage diaspora communities in large-scale reconstruction if it continues to approach them in the same manner as it did throughout the war. Without a political process aimed at ending minority grievances on the island, many Tamil expatriates will continue to view the government’s embrace with scepticism. More fundamentally, diasporas should not be engaged only because they are deemed useful to ‘real’ Sri Lankan political actors engaged in the serious business of realpolitik. Rather, diasporas should be recognised as legitimate arenas of Sri Lankan politics. To claim otherwise is to reward regimes that neutralise political opposition and silence dissidents by expelling them.
For their part, members of Sri Lanka’s diasporas need to begin a process of critical reflection regarding the last thirty years of war, something that was discouraged amidst calls for solidarity. Instead of forgetting the so-called ‘tragic decades of nationalism’, communities across the political spectrum need to consider their complicity in its crimes, their complacency in the face of its manifest excesses, and their failures in advancing compelling alternatives. Such efforts might be most effective in Sri Lanka, and have begun in various fora there; but, given the significance of the diaspora in Sri Lankan politics and the relatively greater freedoms enjoyed outside Sri Lanka, it is imperative that these conversations happen outside too, and happen publicly.
This political reflection is especially important as the Sri Lankan government woos overseas communities for economic contributions, and contributions alone. Many are understandably excited by Sri Lanka’s post-war economic prospects. And in some respects, economic involvement can be more tempting than political engagement: its requirements are more discrete, its rewards more apparent, and it can look refreshingly (if deceptively) apolitical. In reality, of course, economic development in post-conflict Sri Lanka is subject to intense contestation, with economic fortunes inevitably linked to political positioning (see Himal Oct-Nov, ‘Capitalism contradictions’). Alternatively, the economic clout of responsible diasporic investors can ensure that the war and its bloody aftermath do not get airbrushed away, as in the glossy picture the government and its uncritical allies are so eager to promote.
The diaspora can also promote reconciliation by mirroring it abroad. In the absence of reliable media coverage from Sri Lanka, youth overseas have been too easily radicalised by incomplete histories and half-truths. This can only be countered by collective action to share stories and political pasts. As those private conversations become public, salient criticisms can gain traction through coalitions of progressive voices. Sinhalese, Tamil, Muslim and Burgher activists forming alliances overseas can become a powerful medium for critique and change. Those critical of diasporic extremists have rightfully called for grounding, and for true accountability to those on the ground in Sri Lanka. With action comes responsibility: if we want to work within Sri Lanka, we must listen to those who live there. Sinhalese and Tamil activists abroad must note that certain populations marginalised inside Sri Lanka–for example, Muslims, Burghers and Up-country Tamils–are correspondingly underrepresented in the diaspora. Their interests are Sri Lanka’s interests, and critique of the country must consider and engage them.
Sri Lankan diasporas are an easy target. They are easily ridiculed, their most vocal members often spouting opinions that seem ignorant. Their memories of grievance and grief are embarrassingly fresh, their suggestions oversimplified and trite, their language loaded. Their physical absence from Sri Lanka seems to preclude their involvement in its political life. Their hyphenated identities and modified accents undermine their authenticity. They are not really Sri Lankan–that is, at least, when they do not serve the interests of the ‘authentic’ political actors in Sri Lanka. But they are also an unrivalled resource, with legitimate claims to space in Sri Lankan politics, and filial and financial ties to the country. They genuinely care about Sri Lanka and, in a world with increasingly porous borders, they have every right to do so. Their transnational politics is a product of the war, and they remain connected to Sri Lanka, even though their homes are abroad. Can the country afford–from a practical or moral standpoint–to turn its back on a million people who could contribute to its future?
Well don’t poor people typically have more kids while wealthy ones have less? Makes sense. I’ve heard the Indian population will rival the Chinese soon enough.
: speaking of Peter Frost, what do you think of his theory of sexual selection of women in northern europe? It kind of makes sense but I don’t know enough about it to form an opinion. Remember briefly skimming some paper of his in Bio Anthro last semester.
i don’t believe in peter’s theory. sexual selection often acts as a deus ex machina. in my interactions with peter i general encounter lots of interesting facts, but am usually unconvinced by the analytic framework he constructs from them.
also, if lighter skin/hair/eye color is really considered “superior” in northwestern south asia, then why aren’t women with those traits considered more attractive there? South Asian beauties are typically Indian. I know many desis naturally consider Indian women the prettiest (I might even agree, tbh). India has won more Miss World competitions than any other country, I believe. So I don’t think colorism is as rampant as you think.
well, i’m not an expert on brown culture. that’s why i read this weblog to be honest. most of the brown ppl not in my family i’ve met through this weblog, or knew prior to this blog and have/had an association with this blog. with that in mind
isn’t there an over-repsentation of punjabi women in south indian film?
isn’t there an over-representation of exceeding light women in indian film in general? they’re certainly not representative of south asians in general from what i can tell. an indian friend (indian indian, not indian american) pointed to bipasha basu as a dark skinned actress, and she doesn’t look dark at all. if anything she’s lighter than the typical south asian.
as for miss world. india has ~1 billion people. and there’s a strong cultural bias in beauty contests. south american countries like venezuela have traditionally invested a lot in these things, just like texas in the USA has, so they tend to win more.
Well don’t poor people typically have more kids while wealthy ones have less? Makes sense. I’ve heard the Indian population will rival the Chinese soon enough.
this is only true in societies which have gone through the demographic transition. this was probably not true for most of human history. in very poor countries it is still often not true. basically, the trend toward smaller family sizes is a feature of bourgeois subcultures. among orthodox jews for example the wealthier ones still have more children, in part because of a pro-natalist ideology. also, in developed societies there is often a “saddle” distribution. the poor and the very rich have the most children, while the middle class have small families. but there aren’t many very rich, so their impact is muted.
Hey, maybe that explains why even though in india fair = lovely, lighter hair and eyes aren’t? I guess it’s the combination of Muslim invasion, British invasion, and poor people being outdoor laborers. I think this is dying out though as south asia modernizes.
I guess it’s the combination of Muslim invasion, British invasion, and poor people being outdoor laborers.
yes. when i contributed to talkislam i wondered what effect the muslim invasion had on the way south asians viewed themselves. many of the muslim converts tried to make up identities as descendants of conquerors. turks and afghans. no one really engaged me. but i think some of the same has impacted non-muslims too. i think it is part of what some scholars call the ‘islamicate culture,’ where muslim and non-muslim elites both emulated turkic and persian models of elite behavior and expression.
some of the consciousness about these things i’ve only learned through sepia mutiny. i never heard the term ‘sharp features’ before reading this weblog. also, i would offer that if you were dark skinned as a woman you would be quite conscious of these sorts of things. i knew a dark skinned pakistani girl once who was quite self-conscious about that within her extended family. i didn’t inquire too deeply about it, but she didn’t want to play outside when we were visiting her family once as a kid cuz her mom said she’d get even darker.
http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2009-06-06-hamas-matchmaking_N.htm
The ideal of beauty in Gaza means tall and fair-skinned with blue or green eyes and light-colored hair — and that’s what men usually ask for. But most Gaza women have dark hair and bronze skin.
Not fair to say when you don’t know what I look like in real life. The good part about online anonymity is we get to judge other people by their ideas and not appearance or income. also, I always thought sharp-featured = pointy nose which is considered kind of masculine, not really something women want. In regards to your paki friend – was she from the sort of family that expected an arranged marriage? that might explain it. There was a joke on Outsourced (yeah I watch that dumb show lol) where a character is getting an arranged marriage and “wheatish complexion” was desired haha.
I guess it varies across cultures. Light brown hair is not uncommon in afghanistan but that’s not considered prettier; neither are blue eyes (but green ones are “lucky” for whatever reason idk). So maybe the Gaza thing is due to European or Israeli exposure.
And I think being tall is desired in most cultures, at least for men – it’s definitely not a desi thing.
Anyway I think the fair=lovely crap is changing in South Asia. Look at Indian models like Lakshmi Menon – the most beautiful women are often from South India. I think India overall is progressing much faster than its neighbors and this is a good thing obviously.
PS – I hope I didn’t offend anyone with my arranged marriage comment. I know plenty of people who have been happy with theirs and I’m not trying to put it down or anything.
also, sorry for monopolizing this thread with questions. Well I have final papers to write so I should probably stop visiting this site frequently now.
thanks for all the links btw 🙂
Not fair to say when you don’t know what I look like in real life.
you have green eyes. the genetic architecture of pigmentation is pretty simple and it’s pleiotropic. so yeah, my inference could be wrong. it is possible to have light eyes and dark skin. but for various reasons it reduces the probability.
I guess it varies across cultures. Light brown hair is not uncommon in afghanistan but that’s not considered prettier; neither are blue eyes (but green ones are “lucky” for whatever reason idk). So maybe the Gaza thing is due to European or Israeli exposure.
i think part of it is media exposure. when i was in bangladesh in 2004 it was clear that poor people who had a fuzzier image of the west had a stronger preference for fat women than the upper middle class, who had shifted their aesthetic standards toward the international media. though my one rich uncle still married a fat woman (though 20 years younger than he is, she’s actually a year younger than i am!), so who knows?
was she from the sort of family that expected an arranged marriage?
i believe her family was like that. i’m willing to bet money that she rebelled though 😉
And I think being tall is desired in most cultures, at least for men – it’s definitely not a desi thing.
yeah, desired for men. it has varied for women. apparently some really tall female teens were given growth stunters in the 1950s in the USA by their family docs. worried they’d get so tall that they couldn’t find a husband.
I hope I didn’t offend anyone with my arranged marriage comment. I know plenty of people who have been happy with theirs and I’m not trying to put it down or anything.
i don’t get offended easy, so no worries. good luck on the paper. need to finish coding myself…. (though i’ve waiting white stuff compiles).
Ok, life’s too short and I’ve got too much going on to get too involved in this, but for the sake of completeness I will finish what I started.
“You need to reread what you wrote because I think you have forgotten. Here it is for you “…and indians (regardless of religion) here in the US at least, seem intent on marrying indians. I’ve encountered some 1st/2nd and even 3rd gen indians here who insist they can only marry other indians, sometimes specifically within the caste (although I think that concept is dying out).”. “No, I don’t need to re-read what I wrote, you need to stop being so paranoid because you misinterpret things and lash out at people not trying to insult you. Obviously I can’t misinterpret my own comment. The 1st sentence is a statistical fact. The 2nd sentence is a personal experience I shared, also backed by statistical fact. So please explain to me specifically what you’re so offended about, because from my point of view you’re coming across as irrational.””
Ok, you clearly highlighted Indians as being unreasonable for wanting to marry other Indians and were amazed that (gasp) even 3 generations in they still wanted to marry other Indians.
“This is not true, you did not use Pakistanis as an example at all, you merely said that Pakis are muslims and marry other muslims. How is that not using them as an example? So I can say Paki Muslims prefer to marry other Paki Muslims and its ok, but the second I say Indians prefer to marry other Indians it’s wrong? LOL.”
Again, you spent much more time and highlighted the fact that Indians particularly were keen on marrying other Indians even three generations in.
“By the way I didn’t google that article – it was right here in the margin of this website. You literally said “Perhaps the non-Indians should get some knocking too” and then cited an article about a British Bengladeshi actress being assaulted by her Bengali British Muslim father in an effort to knock non-Indians. You reinforced my point that 1st/2nd/3rd Gens prefer intermarriage. Again, I don’t see where we disagree.”
No I cited the article before I spoke about knocking anyone and I cited it as a response to your perceived knocking of Indians wanting to marry Indians. The article is available on the home page of this website on the right hand side. I didn’t google it at all.
I would also like to say that the idea that has been espoused that somehow India is not the most modernized, progressive stable state in the South Asian region is a complete falsehood. Only a delusional maniac would argue otherwise. The facts are quite clear. To intimate that this is not the case because some states are poorer than others is again the argument of someone who doesn’t understand economics or anything really. Why don’t you compare states in the US for example? There are effective war zones in LA two miles from where some of the richest people in the country live. Is the US not the largest, most successful economy in the world? The arguments need to take a step up here.
On the Pakistan angle – if Pakistan was smart the first thing they would do is identify and ally with India and by extension the rest of the world. If they dropped this terrorist nonsense and irrational fear of India, they could actually do quite well as a country. It is so blindingly obvious to anyone who even takes a marginal look at the situation that I wonder how the Pakistani people allow this nonsense to continue.
Anyway, that’s me done. These boards can really end up taking up a lot of time, which I don’t really have.
“On the Pakistan angle – if Pakistan was smart the first thing they would do is identify and ally with India and by extension the rest of the world. If they dropped this terrorist nonsense and irrational fear of India, they could actually do quite well as a country. It is so blindingly obvious to anyone who even takes a marginal look at the situation that I wonder how the Pakistani people allow this nonsense to continue.”
To my knowledge India doesn’t have a good relationship with any of her neighbours?
Mr Wry has responded to this. Of course, the eminently reasonable and non-confrontational Pakistani and Chinese governments would be totally blameless in this? Come on, look who/ what India has to deal with.
It is obvious that unity, not enmity would be a massive step forward for Asia, and by extension, the rest of the world. Strategically and economically, the benefits would be enormous. By the way, in the case of Pakistan, these benefits would mostly flow to Pakistan rather than India.
Again, blindingly obvious to anyone who studies the situation.
Just in on email: http://atwar.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/11/24/risque-writing-in-pakistan/?ref=world
Risqué Writing in Pakistan By ADAM B. ELLICK
KARACHI, Pakistan — Sabiho Bano, a wealthy Pakistani socialite with a penchant for martial arts, crawls out of her Mercedes and hops onto a crummy public bus picking up schoolgirls across this sprawl of a city.
Generally Indians DO prefer to marry other Indians and I don’t think there is anything wrong with that. A N N A has even indicated that she only dates brown. People are allowed their preferences, even if they might be informed by culture or family.
Same caste preference also has a lot to do with culture in many cases – everything from eating habits (non-veg vs. veg) to language, customs, traditions, etc.
I don’t see what’s wrong with it.
That is incorrect, Zachary Latif. I say incorrect rather than a falsehood because I do not think you are making the comment in bad faith. However, it is a commonly touted refrain for those with animosity towards India who attempt to justify certain policies of a certain neighbor.
India has exceedingly close relations with Bhutan (which it is treaty bound to defend), which have become even closer following the PRC’s aforementioned bullying of that tiny and peaceful himalayan kingdom. Relations with Bangladesh have been restored and are improving following the reelection of the Awami League (they took a nose dive primarily due to the previous BNP gov and its open agenda to make Bangladesh a subsidiary of Pakistan through support of now famous groups). Relations with the Nepali congress, the Nepali military, the Royals, and the general population remain close. The only real issue is the Maoists who propagandize against india, use their thugs to stuff ballot boxes and come to power through the threat of violence. Given the name of this group, we need not wonder who their primary sponsors are. Relations with Sri Lanka are still warm (hambantota was originally offered to India and Rajapakse flew to Delhi for assurances when there was a coup threat by Gen. Fonseka). The Maldives have a security guarantee from India, which was put into action after a coup attempt took place there. Their government has also been permitted to buy property in India as a back up plan against climate change.
So in sum, is a new EU type bonhomie sweeping the subcontinent? No. But India’s relations with her neighbors are far better than is being propagandized by some quarters. Just wanted to clear that up. Now back to our regularly scheduled program.
Interesting good to know; then I guess the last barriers are Indo-Chin and Indo-Pak relations. Hope we do get a EU-style bonhomie soon in South Asia.
I think this is an interesting point. An Asian Union might be a wonderful idea. The similarities in “Eastern” cultures for want of a better word tend to be stronger than those between East and West. A strong Asian Union would also provide a counterbalance to the power of the west to pretty much do whatever they want, whenever they want. More balance in the world, in my opinion can only be a good thing.
Yes the Oriental Union is a great idea 🙂
We do have a whole lot in common and it is important for us Easterners to strengthen our identity and not be riven by communalism or factionalism or pseudo-Westernism.
I’m British and very proud to be one; however I believe liberalism is a universal human condition, which all cultures can aspire to. Obviously the West has embraced liberalism as a philosophy far more than any other equivalent culture but it doesn’t mean other world cutlures can’t do it (Chinese, Indian, Islamic and African). The Indians have done a pretty good job with it; hopefully the liberal philosophy grows more. By liberalism I don’t mind the politics but more the philosophical undercurrents.
My faith teaches us to aspire to a liberal democratic world so that makes us all quite idealistic 🙂
zach, shouldn’t we grade on a curve?
1) big nations invariably tend to be bullyish to smaller neighbors
2) is there any equivalent of the pakistani attempt at genocide against bengalis, in particular bengali hindus? there are human rights abuses like the bhutanese attitude toward nepalese, or the sinhala attitude toward tamils. but it doesn’t seem that those rise to the same level of quantitative human suffering. what say you? what modi et al. did in gujarat was as evil as what some pakistani brass wanted to do with the bengalis (kill them, rape some of the women to improve their genetic stock), but the magnitude in differences is several orders, is it not?
btw, did you c this? http://accidentalblogger.typepad.com/accidental_blogger/2010/12/colonel-nadir-ali-bangladesh-1971-omar.html
It’s not a good idea to make up BS when anyone can scroll up to read what I actually said. I said “….and indians (regardless of religion) here in the US at least, seem intent on marrying indians.” Please share with me where I “clearly highlighted Indians as being unreasonable” or “was amazed”. If not, I’ll simply ignore you in future, because to me you’re coming across as a hyper-paranoid nutcase trolling for attention online.
…So what you’re upset about is I dedicated 2 sentences to India and only 1 to Pakistan? That’s what led you to perceive an imaginary perceived grand insult in your head? I can’t take you seriously here. But what I find most telling is that as soon as you perceived an insult, you immediately lashed out as muslims. Clearly you have a paranoid tendency to interpret things as some muslim vs hindu debate when the discussion doesn’t even concern religion. You immediately responded with:
I hate it to break it to you – but you know those “uncivlized” muslims you keep rambling about? Your country has more of them than anywhere else in the world but Indonesia. Think about that next time you attempt to instigate an Indian Hindu vs Paki Muslim debate about bigotry, complete with an assaulted British Bengladeshi actress as proof, all to “knock” an American Agnostic over an imaginary insult. Clever. But do consult a map someday.
Hi Razib –
in real life I am organising a symposium on 1971; for the 40th anniversary of liberation war. for virtually all Pakistanis; Bangladesh is a black hole figuratively and literally; something we want to forget. Ever since I learnt about what happened in Bangladesh I believe that a huge part of our national trauma stems from that period. I friended Colonel Nadir Ali on Facebook; very brave of him to do that.
I’m actually meeting some Bangladeshis tomorrow to start planning this out. I’m quoting what they tell me that “because of Pakistan’s disinterest in the matter; in Bangladesh the issue has escalated to a national obsession”.
Anyway we’re diverting from Sri Lanka and I’m conscious of that so I’ve switched to the Accidental Blogger; I didn’t know about them till know. I only follow 4 blogs, perhaps that might be the fifth.
Kind of off-topic here, but it always bothered me the Bengali genocide attempt and Armenian genocide aren’t covered in the world history curriculums in the US. Here in NY at least, all high schoolers take 2 years of world history and while the Holocaust and other genocides are covered extensively, Bengladesh and Armenia get left out.
there are lots of genocides in the world alina. how many people know about the assyrian genocide? these are such complex topics, it seems more feasible to do it one issue at a time. perhaps the armenian genocide is the appropriate next one after that of world war 2 for americans, since we have a large armenian community in this country.
as for bangladesh, as noted elsewhere the genocide was rather selective. the only people who got killed in my family to my knowledge (extended) were prominent creative artists (e.g., people involved in film). but then my family were conventional upper middle class muslims. generally we support the awami league, and my father was broadly sympathetic to socialism, but that political. the genocide targeted hindus disproportionately, though lots of poor muslims and secular muslim political activists were killed as well. because of the communal valence i don’t think that for many, like my family, the genocide is that much of an issue (the exception are the people closely related to those who were murdered on political pretenses, and these are prominent in the awami league too. one of my cousins-in-law is bitter about what happened in his family, because they were heavily involved in the film industry and took a big hit. several of his uncles disappeared). my mother was mistakenly got shot by pakistani soldiers, but some of our closest friends in the 1980s were pakistan. bangladeshis and pakistanis socialized relatively free (we socialized with a lot of indian bengalis too, and sometimes other groups of indians, especially a group of south indians). bangladeshi and pakistani americans routinely marry from what i can tell. i know of several cases. a few years back a half-bangladeshi half irish american harvard student was going to do volunteer work in pakistan. can you imagine anything like that happening with armenians and turks? the analogy doesn’t hold by the way people live and behave.
i think zach is too hard on his fellow pakistanis. many bangladeshis themselves don’t have a strong consciousness of the genocide, as evidenced by how they behave toward pakistanis. if they did, they could raise consciousness and make pakistanis think about what happened. as it is, suspect the only people pakistanis will hear about it from are indians who are refugees from east pakistan or their children, or people who live in west bengal but fled during partition and so have more of a connection to the refugees. but for obvious sectarian reasons these people are probably going to be ignored, dismissed, or cognitively marginalized.
after having said this, i guess i’ll enter it into the record that the next time i meet a pakistani who i do not know i will ask them about the genocide, and what they know. unfortunately, i rarely meet pakistanis, so it’s kind of an empty promise.
p.s. the older generation, like my maternal grandfather, were nostalgic for pakistan ’till their dying day. he lived 100 years, 1896-1996, and his worldview was shaped strongly by his experience as the only muslim medical student at his university. he didn’t have too much empathy for the hindus who he still remembered as the educated elite of colonial bengal, he still spoke bitterly of being the only muslim doctor in some of the places he practiced, and being snubbed/marginalized by the hindu bhadrolok. he was not a hateful person at all when it came to religion. at least no more than a typical religious person.
“p.s. the older generation, like my maternal grandfather, were nostalgic for pakistan ’till their dying day. he lived 100 years, 1896-1996, and his worldview was shaped strongly by his experience as the only muslim medical student at his university.”
My paternal grandfather was born in 1896, graduated from King Edward Medical College Lahore in 1917. He was one of 2 students from Indian minority backgrounds, in his case Muslim.
I think people forget just how economically disadvantaged the Muslim populations of Sindh, Punjab and Bengal were pre-partition. All the Bengalis (Bangladeshis, I’m still getting to grips with the semantics apparently if you’re from Indian Bengal in Bangladesh you can use Bengali otherwise stick to Bangladeshi) I meet all repeat just how enthusiastic the were for Pakistan.
The Partition was good for Muslim intellegentsia argument:
http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2010\06\14\story_14-6-2010_pg3_2
The counter, written by my friend (a liberal agnostic, yup we have those in Pak) after I sent him the article.
http://www.imadahmed.com/728728634/king-edward-medical-college-is-not-the-testimony-that-pakistan-wants/
p.s. i found out about the genocide in 1991. my parents never told me. rather, i was working on a mule ranch for a friend’s mom over the summer (we camped under the high desert stars). one day at breakfast she started asking me about it, because she remembers as a young woman reading all about it in the paper. all about refugees, killings, etc. her day job was as a cop in a small town of 10,000 in oregon. i think it tells you something that my parents told me so little that i was totally unprepared and shocked by the general outlines of what she recounted. and mind you, my parents are not BNP, they are AL, and my dad still talks fondly of mujibur rahman. they favored independence and still resent the fact that pakistanis believe that all muslims in south asia should now urdu. my dad got into multiple arguments about this issue with his pakistani friends, as they kept repeating the old talking points about urdu as if my dad hadn’t lived through that time and had a different experience. but i guarantee that none of my siblings know about the genocide from my parents (one of my brothers read about it randomly on the internet).
“isn’t there an over-repsentation of punjabi women in south indian film?”
No. Can you name at least 5 Punjabi South Indian film actresses?
I can’t even name one, come to think of it.
If you meant “Bollywood” the answer would still be no.
Anyway we’re diverting from Sri Lanka and I’m conscious of that so I’ve switched to the Accidental Blogger; I didn’t know about them till know. I only follow 4 blogs, perhaps that might be the fifth.
@ Zachary Latif: A very good idea 🙂
Anyway we’re diverting from Sri Lanka and I’m conscious of that so I’ve switched to the Accidental Blogger; I didn’t know about them till know. I only follow 4 blogs, perhaps that might be the fifth.
@ Zachary Latif: A very good idea 🙂
My last comment showed up as “anonymous.” Posting it again.
What bothers me isn’t even that it’s not taught in school (or even mentioned in any type of textbook i’ve come across) but that many people simply don’t acknowledge that it actually happened. My Paki grandmother will go on and on about Indians doing this and that back in Desi-land but I don’t think the Bengladeshi genocide has ever been mentioned under my roof. I didn’t even hear about it until college (a couple months ago actually).
I never understood this part. Plenty of Pakis don’t speak Urdu. My grandma’s Urdu is rough at best; she was raised in a Pashto speaking village and learned English by watching American TV lol. Please tell me what the “old talking points about urdu” are cause I can’t think of any. I’m like your brother though, I’ve only read about it on Wikipedia. I don’t know any Bengali folk and my family is clueless to anything that happened outside the Northwest Frontier or in Peshawar so…
Oh, that last anon was me, heh.
Bengali genocide isn’t mentioned in American text-books because US policymakers tacitly approved it at the time as Pakistan was their ally and highlighting it at the time would have strengthened India’s hand who was * perceived* as a Soviet ally.
Bangladeshi Muslims gloss over it because most of the victims were Hindus and the issue is seen as something which divides Muslims. For many Muslims, the unity of the Ummah is number one priority.
thanks @ Ruchira.
considering that we are now hopelessly off-topic. here is an interesting website my friend in dhaka sent through http://www.genocidebangladesh.org/
i find the relationship between pakistanis and bangladeshis to be extraordinarily complex; so many overlapping ties..
Apropos to my earlier comment —
Not only the Bengali genocide being excluded from US textbooks, American Universities are actively encouraging “academicians” like Ms. Sarmila Bose to tout theories which deny that the genocide ever happened ! Pathetic attempts at Historical Negationism in order to consolidate and perpetuate the “US is the beacon of democracy and freedom” narrative.
Hi Anon (Alina?)
Re the “revision” argument; I brought this up today in discussion with some Bengali (Bangladeshi) intellectual for our 40th Liberation War Celebration.
Sarmila Bose’s credibility is hurt by the fact that she relied on Pak army sources but in general the documentation is very scant. I wanted to bring her in for our exploration/studied but apparently she’s just too controversial from a Bdeshi perspective. But for instance one of them was mentioning a fiction writer who was writing a story on Bangladeshi independence and was told that a whole village was wiped out (350 people) except for the local Imam. When my friend asked the writer whether he verified the writer replied that it wasn’t his job to do so but anyway included the narrative in his anecdote; embedding it in the national consciousness.
But another interesting story I was told today is that the Pakistani army officers had lined up Bangladeshi villagers to be shot. As they prepared for death the villagers started reciting the Shahada, which the officers picked up on and freed them. A clear indication who the real targets of Pakistan were (Hindus and Bengali intellectuals); each district in Bdesh have a different Liberation narrative. I believe the communist/Jamaat villages were steered cleared. There are also counter-theories that Indira Gandhi was worried by the high level of Naxalism in East Pakistan, hence one of the reason for Indian intervention (as well the flood of refugees).
Interesting factoid Bangladesh have four holidays commemorating independence from Pak but not one remembering Independence from Britain.
Finally with regards to numbers, I would like to qualify that every life lost is a tragedy and discussing numbers in no way mitigates the evil nature of that time. However there is evidence that the numbers of the Liberation War/genocide have been tampered to be inflated vis. a vis the following the 1974 famine.
My friend, who is a Bangladeshi and very involved in the Bangladeshi community here in London, was telling me that there was a Red Cross study on the events of 1971. Apparently they were nearing completion but the figure they were arriving at was 80,000 but then the study was stopped.
My point being is that this sort of issue cannot be politicised and there is now a counter-trend among Bangladeshis, as far as I can tell (I have yet to meet hyper-nationalists) who are increasingly reacting to 1971 and its manipulation by the current political system in Bangladesh.
I personally find that Bangladeshis and Pakistanis, particularly in London, have so much more in common than they do different; much more so than we say do with the Afghans (no offence; my mom is Persian and I’m a Kakazai so I speak with some knowledge http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kakazai). We are bound by the same historical memory and socio-cultural systems; I get on remarkably well with Dhaka kids. It’s a real tragedy what happened both in 1971 terms of loss of life and the split of Pakistan and West Pakistani arrogance.
Also again this is a personal observation but Bangladeshis on an intellectual and cultural level are just leap and bounds over contemporary Pakistani life. The way my Dhaka friends go on about it; its seems a sort of liberal Muslim Utopia, a must-visit perhaps we Paks could learn a few things.
Please tell me what the “old talking points about urdu” are cause I can’t think of any. I
two general forms
1 – nations need a neutral lingua franca (easy objection: urdu isn’t neutral, but is closer to punjabi than bengali).
2 – urdu is a “clean” muslim language.
@Zach: nope i’m not anon but I found his/her idea about why the genocide isn’t included in our textbooks interesting.
1 – nations need a neutral lingua franca (easy objection: urdu isn’t neutral, but is closer to punjabi than bengali). I’ve never heard Bengali spoken, but how closely is it related to Hindi? I speak Urdu and can understand Hindi very well because they’re almost the same.
All the Bengalis (Bangladeshis, I’m still getting to grips with the semantics
I always thought Bangledeshis = the people, Bengali = the language. And if you’re a tiger you’re just Bengal.
I personally find that Bangladeshis and Pakistanis, particularly in London, have so much more in common than they do different; much more so than we say do with the Afghans (no offence; my mom is Persian and I’m a Kakazai so I speak with some knowledge we have more in common with bangladeshis than with say, tajiks, but if you’re pashtun (i think kakazai are?) naturally you’ll have more in common with your other pashtuns. And I think that in Western nations, naturally all Desi’s will have more common with each other than pardesi’s anyhow, so all the minor differences are negated.
Also again this is a personal observation but Bangladeshis on an intellectual and cultural level are just leap and bounds over contemporary Pakistani life. The way my Dhaka friends go on about it; its seems a sort of liberal Muslim Utopia, a must-visit perhaps we Paks could learn a few things.
I agree with this, their culture is more open-minded and their country is not screwed up like Pak. I think some of this has to do with geography, since Bangladesh benefits by not bordering along iran and talibanstan.
I’ve never heard Bengali spoken, but how closely is it related to Hindi? I speak Urdu and can understand Hindi very well because they’re almost the same.
the relationship between standard bengali, oriya, and assamese, is analogous to hindi, gujarati, and punjabi. i can get the gist of hindi and or urdu with a great deal of effort, but it is not easy. i think a good analogy is that bengali is to hindi as french is to italian and hindi is to punjabi as italian is to spanish. in other words, bengali is recognizably indo-aryan, and it is not exceedingly difficult to learn other north indian languages if you know bengali (though bengali lacks gender, so it is sometimes confusing for us), but it is not really intelligible with hindi, urdu, or punjabi. my personal experience is that oriya and assamese verge on intelligibility with bengali. the main qualifier is that bengali is characterized by some diglossia, and strange dialect differentiation. muslims in bangladesh retain words from the mughal period which have been sanskritized in standard bengali. interestingly, hindi also retains many of these words. so there are sets of words where bangladeshis use the same word as hindi speakers, while west bengalis use a different word.
also, i was in europe last spring. in italy there are a lot of bengalis. i heard a fair amount of bengali in rome and bologna. interestingly, when i was in london i heard bengali, but it was much more difficult to understand. i’m pretty sure this is because 90% of british bangladeshis are of sylhetti origin, and their dialect is very diverged from other bengali dialects. the bangladeshis in italy must be more regionally diverse, and so use a more standard dhaka dialect.
I always thought Bangledeshis = the people, Bengali = the language. And if you’re a tiger you’re just Bengal.
in bengali the language is bangla. the ethnonym is bangali. bangla speakers in india, bangladesh, or any other country, are bangalis. bangladeshi usually means someone who is a citizen of the nation of bangladesh. a small minority of bangladeshis are not ethnic bengalis. they are bihar, chakma, garo, etc.
. I think some of this has to do with geography, since Bangladesh benefits by not bordering along iran and talibanstan.
i think there’s a lot to this. being a geopolitically marginal country can be sometimes useful. also, bangladesh is a more homogeneous nation than pakistan. ~90% of the population are sunni muslim bengalis.
zach, on a minor note of interest, though bengali as a language flourished first under afghan patronage (before the mughals), by the 19th century the muslim cultural, economic and political elite in bengal were urdu speakers. the bengali speaking elite were all hindu. the main social feature of the 19th and early 20th century was the rise of a muslim and bengali speaking bourgeoisie, who challenged both the hindu and muslim upper classes.
“I’m British and very proud to be one; however I believe liberalism is a universal human condition, which all cultures can aspire to. Obviously the West has embraced liberalism as a philosophy far more than any other equivalent culture but it doesn’t mean other world cutlures can’t do it (Chinese, Indian, Islamic and African). The Indians have done a pretty good job with it; hopefully the liberal philosophy grows more. By liberalism I don’t mind the politics but more the philosophical undercurrents.
My faith teaches us to aspire to a liberal democratic world so that makes us all quite idealistic :)”
Zach, in my research the West has not “embraced” liberalism but rather invented it. The East is slow to adopt it because the very foundations of “Eastern” or (gasp) “Oriental” cultures go against the grain of liberalism. Having travelled throughout South Asia frequently over the period of the last 20 years I see how concepts like “autonomy of the individual” are being grappled with and what a struggle it is for most people to accept. Indeed, it’s a foreign concept in such structured, organized societies. Organized not in a civic sense, but rather in a familial sense, where each family member is indoctrinated with a strong sense of “familial duty” according to the step on the family ladder you find yourself.
Liberalism is something of an outside imposition upon such cultures.
Just as the West created, invented or evolved towards liberalism in an organic way, perhaps it’s best to just let the East evolve naturally it’s own “ism” in the new millenium.
“My faith teaches us to aspire to a liberal democratic world so that makes us all quite idealistic”
Are you a Bahai?
In addtion to the above points, it’s interesting how you say, ”Obviously the West has embraced liberalism as a philosophy far more than any other equivalent culture but it doesn’t mean other world cutlures can’t do it (Chinese, Indian, Islamic and African).”
China is a nation/country. India is a nation/country. Africa is a continet. These are all geographical and political entities. Yet Islam is a religion.
I feel I am holding Court on the Sri Lanka thread; this is why I generally don’t comment much any more since I naturally draw back to my interests (pakistan, iran, islam). Thankfully these topics tend to be in vogue at the moment.
@ Razib did not know Bengali flourished under the Afghans; one of my friends was mentioning about descending from the Bauris (?) who resisted the Mughals. It came about as I waxing on about the Mughals and realised my Bangladeshi friends weren’t necessarily so keen on them. Mughalism being a key ideology for Pakistan; I can see some of the differences.
@ Alina I like the word “Pardesi”; really makes sense. I’d classify Parsis at that 🙂
@relationship the benefits would go both way; Pakistan is a key strategic conduit for any major power.
@Maryam you guessed it but please don’t take my views as representing anything other than my own rather than my faith.
I don’t see why the Global South should have to reinvent the wheel; why not borrow the positive elements of other cultures and graft it on to my own?
The Islamic world remains for me a civilisation, as much as China does for East Asia, India or Africa.
Being half Persian its so funny to see how Pakistanis and Persians consider themselves to be so “extremely different” when in fact our societies and socio-cultural systems are structured in almost exactly the same way.
The biggest issue in the Muslim world is not the religion but class; you guessed it Maryam, its all about how we fit in “society”.
As always I remain an optimist and deeply believe in reform over revolution.
“Being half Persian its so funny to see how Pakistanis and Persians consider themselves to be so “extremely different” when in fact our societies and socio-cultural systems are structured in almost exactly the same way.”
Then by extension Persian culture must be similar to Indian culture because Pakistani and Indian societies and socio-cultural systems are structured in the same way.
I have a few Bahais in my family and find them to be overly-idealistic in a naive way with a rose-colored-glasses view of the world and humanity at large.
They are also quite proselytory.
“Then by extension Persian culture must be similar to Indian culture because Pakistani and Indian societies and socio-cultural systems are structured in the same way.”
Can’t comment I’m half Persian not half Indian 🙂 From what I’ve seen I guess there are some similarities here and there; after all Persian language culture did hold sway there for a few centuries or more.
“I have a few Bahais in my family and find them to be overly-idealistic in a naive way with a rose-colored-glasses view of the world and humanity at large.”
What’s so wrong with being idealistic; its all about positive thinking in the end isn’t it?
“They are also quite proselytory.”
I guess the new ones can be quite “enthusiastic” but I’m fifth generation, you mellow out after a while.
“I guess the new ones can be quite “enthusiastic” but I’m fifth generation, you mellow out after a while.”
At the Bahai Center here it’s the middle-aged Iranian Bahais who are the most “enthusiastic” (read: cult-like and proselytory).
You are Persian and Pakistani? That means you are Desi. Indians are also Desi. If you accept that Persians and Pakistanis are culturally similar then you must also accept that Pakistanis and Indians are culturally similar, and by extension Persians and Indians must have some cultural commonalities as well.
I’m not a “Hindu Nationalist” but don’t most Pakistanis express some pride in their pre-Abrahamic history and culture?
“At the Bahai Center here it’s the middle-aged Iranian Bahais who are the most “enthusiastic” (read: cult-like and proselytory).”
Proselytisation is explicitly forbidden in the Baha’i faith (its a fundamental and basic law) if some do violate this commandment that is their conscience particularly those of us who should know better. Also after 5 generations of experience in various Baha’i communities; the affixation cult-like is heavily misleading, we’re not even allowed to become Baha’is until the age of maturity and after a full exploration of faith. This is again a basic law.
“You are Persian and Pakistani? That means you are Desi. Indians are also Desi. If you accept that Persians and Pakistanis are culturally similar then you must also accept that Pakistanis and Indians are culturally similar, and by extension Persians and Indians must have some cultural commonalities as well”
Earlier you mention and I quote “Having travelled throughout South Asia frequently over the period of the last 20 years I see how concepts like “autonomy of the individual” are being grappled with and what a struggle it is for most people to accept.”
Yet you are insisting on defining me and categorising; perhaps I’m desi perhaps I’m not.
My prerogative no?
“I’m not a “Hindu Nationalist” but don’t most Pakistanis express some pride in their pre-Abrahamic history and culture?”
Pakistan is a complex society and isn’t simply reducible to catchphrases. I’m assuming you’re not Pakistani then but have been defining our culture and nation for us during your last few post? thanks. Nationalist or not you seem to know us better than we know ourselves 🙂
I find when it comes to Pakistan everyone has an opinion about who we are (Indian, Afghan, Arab, Persian etc etc) and some desis are fanatic in insisting that we belong to South Asia. The fact remains Pakistan is an extraordinarily mixed society and we’re lucky enough to be defined by several influences, including those I’ve just mentioned. Furthermore there is this insistence that Pakistan isn’t entitled to a separate identity or narrative, unless its somehow a negative one (Taliban, Afghanistan, fanaticism).
Sometimes we are “Indic” sometimes we’re not. Its a mixed country for heaven’s sake we’re sitting on sitting different continent plates yet this is frequently ignored to fit some angle here or there.
Incidentally I’m adapting Devdas (a Hindu Bengali epic) with an all-Muslim cast and crew (that’s incidental btw). Its called a “Devdas Valentine Day” going to mark Valentine Day and Bangladesh Language day, which is a week later. We expect most of our audience to be Pakistani; we sold out the last time. No complaints so far just overwhelming and maddening supporting from the community.
A bit of nuance always helps a debate I find.
”A bit of nuance always helps a debate I find.”
Where’s the debate?
I simply asked if you were half-Pakistani and you affirmed that.
Having a pre-Abrahamic history and culture is nothing to be ashamed of.
Proselytizing IS a part of the Bahai faith, otherwise it would not accept converts.
Proselytization does not have to be aggressive, but spreading the teachings of one’s faith IS proselytizing.
Bahais are always inviting me to their functions and “Fire Sides” – that’s prosyletizing, isn’t it?
Maryam (is it even Maryam) I don’t know where to begin 🙂
“Where’s the debate? I simply asked if you were half-Pakistani and you affirmed that.”
If you followed up through the comment thread I’ve repeatedly stated that I’m Pakistani. Seriously you make “desiness” sounds like a prison sentence, with that attitude no wonder we Pakistanis are beginning to identify away from it.
What I find so funny is that your condescending patronising attitude is exactly what switches off so many Pakistanis from South Asia and anything “Indic”. I am the Pakistani who actually insists on celebrating Basant and avidly acknowledging its Hindu origins. But I find this constant “demand” that we accept this narrative that we are nothing more than “converted Hindus” to be extremely insulting and a negation of our extremely rich and unique identity and history. No wonder we’ve started reacting by tilting entirely to the other side by claiming history starts with Muhammad Bin Qasim.
By the way Islamabad’s new airport is going to be called “Gandhara” interesting name for a nation that somehow despises its pre-Islamic past? Please can we add a little nuance again.
“Having a pre-Abrahamic history and culture is nothing to be ashamed of.”
Where exactly have I expressed shame in that? In fact Pakistan and Pakistanis have this extreme pride in our Indus identity (5 pillars of Pakistan – Mughalism, Independence, Indo-Islam, Indus, Urdu simples really); particularly after 1971. Pakistanis may claim foreign origins (how exactly is that different to upper caste Hindus who happily discuss their Aryan origins) but they love the land with an intense patriotism. Also in the Punjab and Sindh it is very clear which tribes are native and which are foreign; also which genealogies have been cooked up and which haven’t (same in Khyber Pakthunkwa where among the Pathan tribes; there is a distinction between which are Pashtun proper and those that underwent Pashtunisation). Also Pakistanis of all stripes very happily will discuss whether they were converts or not; there is no shame in it (the surnames and tribes tell the narrative anyway; those who claim foreign origins will have a Shirja authenticating them or some sort of tribal lore, which is historically substantiated).
“Proselytizing IS a part of the Bahai faith, otherwise it would not accept converts. Proselytization does not have to be aggressive, but spreading the teachings of one’s faith IS proselytizing. Bahais are always inviting me to their functions and “Fire Sides” – that’s prosyletizing, isn’t it?”
Invites = Proselytization? Proselytization is explicitly forbidden; there is a difference between being invited and being coerced. Just because they are hospitable does not mean anything; dont read more than you have to just decline politely and leave it at that?
I’m not a “Hindu Nationalist” but don’t most Pakistanis express some pride in their pre-Abrahamic history and culture?
Honestly, i’ve never heard any paks do this at all. Not here in the US, nor back in pakistan either. It could be many do but I’m not just familiar enough with their society to have noticed (I haven’t travelled extensively over South Asia as you have, I’ve only visited the same 3 parts of Pakistan a few times). But for many Pakis I’ve encountered, history of the “Islamic Republic of Pakistan” begins with the Islamic influence that swept in from the West. A possible explanation might be that some muslim paks look down on the hindu religion because they associate it with paganism and so they like to pretend their ancestors weren’t mostly hindus.
Yes Alina, I’ve come across the attitude you describe above too, and was always baffled by it. Come to think of it, the Pakistanis that have expressed affiliation with their pre-Abrahamic roots to me were agnostic liberals and I imagine they make up a small minority in Pakistan. However, many Pakistanis are proud of Mohenjo Daro and Harrapa. Surely they don’t believe those civilizations were built upon the foundations of an Abrahamic religion?!
i believe that the ambivalent or negative attitudes that many south asian muslims have with the indian past is due to conflicts between hindus and muslims, and indian and pakistan (and to a lesser extent india and bangladesh). if all south asians were muslim then india would probably stretch from iran and burma, as it historically did. as it is, the term ‘indian’ has no become nationally associated with the republic of india, instead of the people of south asia as it was for most of history. non-fundamentalist iranians and egyptians do take pride in their antiquities. even ferdowsi expresses pride in pre-islamic persia in the 10th century in the shahnameh. there is historical scholarship which shows that as persians were converting to islam they tended to have very arab names. only when zoroastrianism became a minority religion did persian names start reappearing among muslim persians (i have heard that many bengali muslims have more arab names than persian or turkish in part to make their islam more unambiguous to those who would question their bonafides).
i’ve been a participant on this weblog since 2004. most of the ppl of muslim origin people who post regularly are/were irreligious. those who were religious, like najib, were religious liberals from what i can tell (someone like ikram saed stays totally ambivalent about the details of his religious belief, though he identifies as a muslim).
u can compare attitudes between nations here:
http://www.wvsevsdb.com/wvs/WVSAnalize.jsp
I wonder if a “United South Asia” would result in a complete Islamization of the region?
Anyone remember that “Dalitistan” webiste that was up and running some years ago? The webmasters divided India up into “stans” – 2 of which where Dalitistan and Mughalistan. Mughalistan was partially comprised of what is known in India as the “cow belt”, a Hindu majority region. However the authors at the website claimed that India is NOT even a Hindu majority country when you add up all the Parsees, Jains, Buddhists, Christains, Muslims, and account for the tribals, dalits and scheduled castes whom the webmasters said did not identify as mainstream Hindu.
nice way to get my attention despite being anon maryam 🙂 as for your question, thank god, but i doubt it. i’d be willing to put money that it wouldn’t. hindu nationalists tend to overemphasize birth rate differentials and conversion rates.
Merry Christmas to all from here in London.
But I find this constant “demand” that we accept this narrative that we are nothing more than “converted Hindus” to be extremely insulting and a negation of our extremely rich and unique identity and history. No wonder we’ve started reacting by tilting entirely to the other side by claiming history starts with Muhammad Bin Qasim.I mean, Islam started in a city in Saudi Arabia amongst a handful of people and from there it spread to the rest of the world. So yeah, paks are the descendants of converted hindus, just like arabs/persians are the descendants of converted pagans/zoroastrians and so on…so I don’t see what’s wrong with the narrative that we’re “converted hindus”. I don’t think Maryam was intending to be offensive in that regard, especially since I’m guessing by her name, she herself is of muslim heritage.
In regards to acknowledging pre-abramamic history: I think paks do this in some ways. Like you said, they will take pride in mohenjo daro, harrapa, etc. Also I know amongst pashtuns (at least the non-urbanized ones) there is the ancient “pashtunwali” code that I’m almost positive precedes islamic influence in the area (although the pashtunwali ethics are not at odds with islam, except maybe with the more violent parts concerning revenge…actually I think that combo of pashtun violent culture + islamic influence was a bad combo and is partly responsible for the shithole that is the modern day afghan/pak border, but I’m sooo off topic now hah)
, just like arabs/persians are the descendants of converted pagans/zoroastrians and so on.
a minor note for the purposes of historical accuracy: the vast majority of people who are today arabs were once christians, not pagans. at the time most were not arabs, though many were semitic speakers (west or east aramaic). but even at the time of the birth of muhammad it is likely that the majority of ethnic arabs were not pagan, as the numberous arabs of the levantine fringe were christians, and the south arabians were most jews and christians as well.
Pakistanis may claim foreign origins (how exactly is that different to upper caste Hindus who happily discuss their Aryan origins) but they love the land with an intense patriotism.
i agree there is a good analogy, but remember zach that many, though not all, hindu nationalists claim that the aryans were indigenous to india. though you might find this amusing
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chitpavan#Anthropological_origin
merry xmas!
I blogged my responses to Alina and Razib because it started filling a whole page 🙂 http://latif.blogspot.com/2010/12/sepia-blog.html
The “converted Hindu” narrative reduces the story of Pakistan to a one-dimensional theme when that’s not the case at all. It is one variant but often not the determining one. The Indus wasn’t even Hindu at the time of Islamic invasions but Buddhist and Zoroastrians.
Also the converted Hindu analysis basically means Hindu = Indian = Bharat Republic.
I would very very happily use term “Indian” but then how do we differentiate that we don’t belong to the Bharat Republic?
If Pakistan must be reduced to simple reducible theories; it is this 2-nation theory until 1971 following that weak 2-nationism in the West coupled with local nationalism emerging from Muslim-majority regionalism.
Pakistan = Muslim majority regions of the Indus Valley Bangladesh = Muslim majority regions of the Bengal region
Simples.
Any other narrative obscures the full and correct picture prevalent at the time and of Pakistanis.
That is a bullshit demand since Hinduism is not the original religion of desis. The Indus Valley civilization predates Vedic Hinduism by a millenium. The authentic desi religion is shramanism/yoga/meditation/pantheism which finds expression in Buddhism, Jainism, Sufism, Advaita etc, not in casteism, Vedic sacrifices etc which define mainstream Hinduism.
Ashoka wrote:
First of all, Ashoka is Prema. Second of all, she probably doesn’t know very much about the actual religious practices of the Indus Valley Civilization. There is evidence that both animal and human sacrifice were practiced there. From page 173 of A History of Ancient and Early Medieval India by Upinder Singh: