Sri Lanka’s alternatives abroad

I co-authored an article with two other members of Lanka Solidarity for Himal Southasian’s special December issue on diasporas. You can find it on the Himal site here: Sri Lanka’s alternatives abroad

We believe members of Sri Lankan diasporas with alternative politics must reassert their claims to space in the conversation about Sri Lanka’s future. For us, this article was one step toward that. We look forward to your feedback, ideas, and yes, arguments–

Cross-posting it here.

Sri Lanka’s alternatives abroad

Are the island’s diasporas to be seen as a source of remittance, a threat, or legitimate sites for political engagement and critique?

By: Kitana Ananda, V V Ganeshananthan & Ashwini Vasanthakumar

There is no such thing as ‘the Sri Lankan diaspora’. Sri Lankan communities exist in the plural. And yet, nearly thirty years of conflict have rendered a nation with multiple minority communities and religions as though it has only two groups. If you generalise about what you read at all (and most people do), you are likely to believe that Sri Lanka’s Sinhalese majority and Tamil minority are pitted against each other, not only inside the country but in diasporas all over the world.

While conflict and geographic dispersal present real challenges to Sri Lankan diasporas, this image of Sinhalese versus Tamil is far from the whole truth. Although the war ended with a decisive victory by government security forces over the LTTE in 2009, the reductive image remains: Sri Lanka, a nation with Sinhalese, Tamil, Muslim and Burgher communities, rarely appears that way. The media is not the only culprit. In the wake of that resounding military victory, both the Sri Lankan government and its critics have failed to engage Sri Lankan diasporas and to understand their complexity. Indeed, their collective actions have excluded diasporic populations.Lankan diaspora histories often begin with 1983, when anti-Tamil violence and the rise of Tamil militancy led to the civil war that displaced hundreds of thousands of Tamils from the island. In fact, a longer and more complicated history of migration is responsible for today’s Lankan diasporas. During the 1930s and 1940s, English-speaking upper-caste Ceylonese who worked in the British Empire’s civil service formed diasporic settlements from Burma to Malaya.

After independence in 1948, new legislation disenfranchised Tamils of Indian origin, who had been brought in to work on colonial plantations during the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Many members of that community were subsequently repatriated to India. An attempt to nationalise government administration with the 1956 Official Language Act–popularly dubbed ‘Sinhala Only’–led to the migration of Ceylonese professionals of all communities who were not proficient in Sinhala. Large numbers of Burghers, the community of mixed Sri Lankan and European descent, migrated to Britain, Canada and Australia; Sinhalese, Tamil and Muslim professionals followed, accompanied by their families.

In these transitional decades, there was no such thing as a Tamil or Sinhalese diaspora; but by the late 1970s this was no longer the case, as factionalism escalated within the country. Three decades of state and economic restructuring had not created a united ‘Sri Lankan’ nation, and tensions mounted between a Sinhalese-dominated government and Tamil political parties. Disaffection with the political status quo gave rise to a 1971 insurrection among predominantly rural Sinhalese youths in the south, and growing militancy among Tamil youths in the north and east by the latter part of the decade. University admissions quotas, among other policies, effectively reduced opportunities for middle-class Tamil students and young professionals, who began to seek employment abroad.

Diasporas today

In July 1983, nearly 3,000 people were killed and thousands more displaced over five days of government-sponsored anti-Tamil violence, creating a new wave of migrants. The scale of destruction and spectacular displays of enmity spurred sympathetic Western governments to create special categories for refugee resettlement. As the country descended from ethnic conflict into full-scale war between the government and Tamil militant groups, the tide of migration continued. In the 1980s, as the LTTE rose to supremacy by brutally eliminating other Tamil militant groups, non-LTTE Tamil militants and their families emigrated. Internally, too, the country saw mass displacement of Muslims and Tamils.

The war with the state intensified through the mid-1980s and 1990s, again prompting hundreds of thousands of Tamils to depart. By some estimates, nearly 900,000–one in three–Tamils from Sri Lanka today live abroad, hailing predominantly from the country’s north and, to a lesser extent, the east. India was often their first stop and, for some, their final destination. Others headed to Canada, the United Kingdom, Australia and the United States, each of which offered the possibility of citizenship. Others remain refugees in India, Southeast Asia and Europe. As the war escalated, the pro-LTTE section of the diaspora became famously militant, pouring money into the Tigers’ movement, while their relatives and friends back home lost children, homes and livelihoods. The Tigers even developed an overseas wing, which managed its propaganda so successfully that other sections of the Tamil diaspora were virtually erased from the public sphere.

Admittedly, the largest Sri Lankan diaspora is a Tamil one, which has commanded considerable attention as a result of post-1983 migration, the war, and visible propaganda and financial support for the LTTE among some of its sections. Some use Sri Lankan diaspora and Tamil diaspora interchangeably, but Sinhalese and Muslim Sri Lankans have also gone to other shores amid political crises and economic uncertainty, and they continue to emigrate, predominantly as temporary migrant workers to West Asia. Sizeable and diverse Sinhalese diaspora communities have formed among workers in Italy, professionals in the United States, and several generations of migrants to the United Kingdom and Canada.

Today, some Sinhalese (and, to a lesser extent, Muslim) groups maintain ties with each other and with Sri Lanka through various associations. For some organisations, ‘Sri Lanka’ becomes a proxy for displays of Sinhalese nationalism that make critiques of the Sri Lankan government difficult. Similarly, prominent diasporic Tamil organisations have long showcased arguments for separatism, sometimes accompanied by endorsements of the LTTE. Those who do not agree with these respective lines face isolation from their own ethnic communities.

In May 2009, the war’s end saw the differing trajectories of these diasporas converge in tense confrontations in Canada, the UK, Australia and elsewhere. Thousands of Tamils around the world protested the war and the suffering it imposed. Those waving LTTE flags monopolised media attention, sidelining the message of ‘peace through negotiations’ emanating from other quarters. In response, smaller Sri Lankan groups with close connections to embassies and missions abroad organised counter-demonstrations. Their predominantly Sinhalese ranks also included anti-LTTE Tamils who cheered the Tigers’ defeat and hailed the soldiers who ended the war through military action.

Just remittances, please

Over the course of the war, the visibility of dominant sections of the Tamil diaspora–and their stunning vocal and financial support for the Tamil Tigers–has helped the Sri Lankan government to project the entire group as a terrorist threat. Post-war, the authorities’ attempts to derail a monolithic ‘Tamil diaspora’ have transformed into interest in that diaspora’s sizable collective wallet. In anticipation of a post-war Lanka, the government handpicked leaders and activists of the Tamil diaspora to attend a March 2009 conference in Colombo. At the meeting, dubbed the Sri Lankan Diaspora Dialogue, many of the invitees expressed dismay with the government’s heavy-handed agenda. Even as the government invited some Tamils to return to the island, it has made the following conflicting claims: The LTTE has been completely decimated; the LTTE could re-emerge at any time, and has powerful supporters abroad; the diaspora is invited to engage with us financially; we are no longer a colony, and those who criticise us from abroad have the mindset of colonisers (or support the LTTE).

The LTTE’s claim to be Tamils’ ‘sole representative’–and its well-known allies abroad–is convenient for the government, which wants remittances, not opinions. If it links all its overseas critics to the Tigers, it can dismiss their concerns. As pro-LTTE activists in the diaspora say they will continue to fight for Eelam from abroad (the most visible iteration being the Transnational Government of Tamil Eelam, formed in May following a diaspora-wide election), their statements fuel Colombo’s ire. In retaliation, the government has announced local and international campaigns to gather intelligence, seize assets and shut down the LTTE’s remaining international network. In such a climate of suspicion, the government has been quick to conflate any criticism with support for the LTTE, leaving no room for serious diasporic engagement with the state.

On the other hand, the government does recognise diasporas’ economic and political power, as well as the effectiveness of pro-LTTE activists overseas who have made it difficult for their critics to speak out. Indeed, since the Diaspora Dialogue, Colombo has learned much from the LTTE’s hegemony in diaspora communities. The government sidesteps political criticism by appealing to the desire of many to aid the war-torn regions of north and east Sri Lanka. To initiate development projects in these areas, it turns to ex-members of the Tigers. Former Tiger arms procurer and international-affairs representative Kumaran Pathmanathan now sits under house arrest in Colombo, dispensing advice to the government; his own public rehabilitation was announced with the launch of the North-East Rehabilitation Development Organization, for which he claimed ‘the Tamil diaspora’ was ready to work with the president. In the Eastern province, former Tigers and current government officials Pillayan and Karuna have their names bandied about as evidence of state engagement with minorities.

The power of foreign exchange as a potent resource for post-war reconstruction is not limited to the Tamil diasporas alone. With the war’s end, Sri Lankan embassies have raised funds (more than USD 690,000 to date), mainly from Sinhalese entrepreneurs and organisations, for Api wenuwen api (Be together for all), a Ministry of Defence campaign to build 50,000 houses for soldiers. Opposition groups also mobilise Sinhalese diaspora communities for their own ends. For example, in September, Sinhalese workers in Italy protested the Colombo government’s continued detention of the former head of the Sri Lankan armed forces, Sarath Fonseka.

The government’s latest statements continue to entreat ‘the Sri Lankan diaspora’ to participate in economic development. At the Asia Security Summit in August 2010, Minister of External Affairs G L Peiris said, ‘Our message to the diaspora in the Western world and elsewhere is that they have a dynamic role to play; we do not want them to distance themselves from the exciting developments which are taking place in Sri Lanka today.’ Such pronouncements are made even as the government cracks down on dissent and political opposition within Sri Lanka, and invokes the spectre of threats to national security to silence activists abroad. Peiris, a chief negotiator during the Oslo peace process, has recently argued that earlier talks and attempts at political reform failed due to a lack of consensus among dominant political interests. This top-down approach has allowed generations of Sri Lankan politicians to suppress debate and dissent while claiming to remain committed to political reform, and the same technique is now being used to mobilise the diaspora communities’ economic power.

This dual approach to (particularly) Tamil diaspora communities dismisses legitimate grievances and criticisms. Simultaneously, it invites potential investors to capitalise on the war’s end and selectively wields former LTTE leaders to collect economic contributions from the former. This not only privileges the economically secure and undermines the political engagement of diaspora communities in general, but also silences the many moderates–in-country and abroad –who did not provide unqualified support to the narrow agendas of successive governments or the LTTE. Such groups could not publicly criticise these agendas before, nor are they able to do so now. Instead, they remain sceptical and watchful of the many projects undertaken in their name.

Discounting nationalism

The government’s dismissal of the Tamil diaspora as being little more than LTTE henchmen is not surprising. It is less encouraging, however, when the same attitude is revealed in progressives’ discussions of, and engagement with, the diaspora. The left has largely disengaged from diasporic politics, preferring to direct its limited energies to the battles to be waged in-country. But this myopia prevents engagement with the considerable resources of moderates within the diaspora.

During the war, progressives from all communities attempted to create space within the diaspora from which exclusivist nationalism could be challenged. Emphasising marginalised histories to refute nationalist narratives, these activists deployed the language of human rights and political pluralism. But they largely engaged with diasporic politics because of its importance to politics in Sri Lanka. Now, in the aftermath of the Tigers’ defeat, this effort has atrophied. And by equating the Tigers’ totalitarian politics with Tamil nationalism and the government’s brutal tactics with Sinhalese nationalism, the left only reaffirms these actors’ respective claims to represent Sinhalese and Tamil peoples.

This cedes important ideological and political ground. Furthermore, by depicting nationalism as static, regressive and exclusivist, the left fails to appreciate the varieties of nationalism, its potential as a source of solidarity, and its importance in forging and transforming identities. Indeed, national identity is what ties those in the diaspora–including progressives who would rather identify themselves as expatriate or exile–to politics in Sri Lanka. But from the diaspora various nationalisms can also emerge, where the multiple identities and affiliations of those in the diaspora can fruitfully inform and expand nationalist politics in Sri Lanka. Many Tamils were privately critical of the LTTE’s tactics; many Sinhalese were critical of the state’s growing authoritarianism. Clearly, between the poles there is space for common ground.

Progressives fashion themselves as exiles who, after years in the ideological hinterlands of the diaspora, can return to Sri Lanka and resume agitating for the transformations they failed to secure thirty years ago–as though those intervening decades did not happen. What this has meant among many leftists in exile is supporting a project of authentic nationalism–for some ethnic, for others, multi-ethnic–from abroad, without engaging the communities living in their midst.

Responsible resource

The Colombo government will not successfully engage diaspora communities in large-scale reconstruction if it continues to approach them in the same manner as it did throughout the war. Without a political process aimed at ending minority grievances on the island, many Tamil expatriates will continue to view the government’s embrace with scepticism. More fundamentally, diasporas should not be engaged only because they are deemed useful to ‘real’ Sri Lankan political actors engaged in the serious business of realpolitik. Rather, diasporas should be recognised as legitimate arenas of Sri Lankan politics. To claim otherwise is to reward regimes that neutralise political opposition and silence dissidents by expelling them.

For their part, members of Sri Lanka’s diasporas need to begin a process of critical reflection regarding the last thirty years of war, something that was discouraged amidst calls for solidarity. Instead of forgetting the so-called ‘tragic decades of nationalism’, communities across the political spectrum need to consider their complicity in its crimes, their complacency in the face of its manifest excesses, and their failures in advancing compelling alternatives. Such efforts might be most effective in Sri Lanka, and have begun in various fora there; but, given the significance of the diaspora in Sri Lankan politics and the relatively greater freedoms enjoyed outside Sri Lanka, it is imperative that these conversations happen outside too, and happen publicly.

This political reflection is especially important as the Sri Lankan government woos overseas communities for economic contributions, and contributions alone. Many are understandably excited by Sri Lanka’s post-war economic prospects. And in some respects, economic involvement can be more tempting than political engagement: its requirements are more discrete, its rewards more apparent, and it can look refreshingly (if deceptively) apolitical. In reality, of course, economic development in post-conflict Sri Lanka is subject to intense contestation, with economic fortunes inevitably linked to political positioning (see Himal Oct-Nov, ‘Capitalism contradictions’). Alternatively, the economic clout of responsible diasporic investors can ensure that the war and its bloody aftermath do not get airbrushed away, as in the glossy picture the government and its uncritical allies are so eager to promote.

The diaspora can also promote reconciliation by mirroring it abroad. In the absence of reliable media coverage from Sri Lanka, youth overseas have been too easily radicalised by incomplete histories and half-truths. This can only be countered by collective action to share stories and political pasts. As those private conversations become public, salient criticisms can gain traction through coalitions of progressive voices. Sinhalese, Tamil, Muslim and Burgher activists forming alliances overseas can become a powerful medium for critique and change. Those critical of diasporic extremists have rightfully called for grounding, and for true accountability to those on the ground in Sri Lanka. With action comes responsibility: if we want to work within Sri Lanka, we must listen to those who live there. Sinhalese and Tamil activists abroad must note that certain populations marginalised inside Sri Lanka–for example, Muslims, Burghers and Up-country Tamils–are correspondingly underrepresented in the diaspora. Their interests are Sri Lanka’s interests, and critique of the country must consider and engage them.

Sri Lankan diasporas are an easy target. They are easily ridiculed, their most vocal members often spouting opinions that seem ignorant. Their memories of grievance and grief are embarrassingly fresh, their suggestions oversimplified and trite, their language loaded. Their physical absence from Sri Lanka seems to preclude their involvement in its political life. Their hyphenated identities and modified accents undermine their authenticity. They are not really Sri Lankan–that is, at least, when they do not serve the interests of the ‘authentic’ political actors in Sri Lanka. But they are also an unrivalled resource, with legitimate claims to space in Sri Lankan politics, and filial and financial ties to the country. They genuinely care about Sri Lanka and, in a world with increasingly porous borders, they have every right to do so. Their transnational politics is a product of the war, and they remain connected to Sri Lanka, even though their homes are abroad. Can the country afford–from a practical or moral standpoint–to turn its back on a million people who could contribute to its future?

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268 thoughts on “Sri Lanka’s alternatives abroad

  1. i’m interested in the history of sri lanka. can you guys recommend a good introductory book? i think the last book i read on sri lanka was the ‘country study’ from the late 1980s. i’m not interested in long-term political and cultural history, not so much contemporary events.

    • Razib (if i read your comment right, you’re not looking for contemporary events),

      early history is a heavily politicized field. A book i’ve finally finished reading, “Tamils in Sri Lanka: A comprehensive history (300bc-2000ad)” (by a Dr. Murugar Gunasignam) is written from a tamil nationalist perspective (easily spotted) but has tons of very good primary document research–portuguese, dutch and english. There is also Dr. K. Indrapala who i’ve been told writes in a more temperate tone on the same subject (Tamils in SL).

      I’m just as curious as you are, however, about the ‘whole’ treatment though I think that may not be the most edifying way to think about it.

      I grew up with E.F.C Ludowyk’s “A Short History of Ceylon” in the bookcase but haven’t read through it recently.

      I’ve always gotten some details from books that seem unconnected like Michael Carrithers’, “The Buddha” and “The Forest Monks of Sri Lanka” but I doubt you have the time.

  2. Shorter VV: the Left is finally recognizing that its disdain for nationalism has sidelined it into irrelevance; it needs to start to rethink how to regain relevance.

  3. Any chance of India staying out of Sri Lankan affairs and minding its own affairs?


    Tigre raises a fair point–India can’t afford to just sit back and let its enemies surround/choke it. Maybe India needs to do joint military exercises with Taiwan & Japan to remind the ChiComs what’s what and who’s who.

  4. Seema | December 17, 2010 11:33 PM | Reply Any chance of India staying out of Sri Lankan affairs and minding its own affairs?


    Tigre raises a fair point–India can’t afford to just sit back and let its enemies surround/choke it. Maybe India needs to do joint military exercises with Taiwan & Japan to remind the ChiComs what’s what and who’s who.

    India already has enemies within it (look up and a bit to the northeast). China already knows “what’s what and who’s who” in 1962.

    VV, Tamil and its diaspora should first stop supporting terrorists. Then we can talk about moving forward.

  5. “Tigre raises a fair point–India can’t afford to just sit back and let its enemies surround/choke it”

    Same with Pakistan and China – they can’t afford to sit back and let their enemies surround/choke them.

    If India tries to interfere in Sri Lanka, I think Sri Lanka should cosy up to China even further.

    Afterall, unlike India, China did not arm, train and fund a terrorist organisation.

  6. Zamindar, Your much-vaunted Chinese state is itself nothing more than a criminal gang–its tentacles need to be kept out of South Asia.

  7. “Your much-vaunted Chinese state is itself nothing more than a criminal gang”

    Oh really? And India is the poster child I suppose?

    China is welcome in South Asia and should expand its influence across Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and Nepal.

    India has had more than enough time to build friendly relations with its neighbours. But it hasn’t. And it doesn’t seem interested in doing so.

  8. “If India tries to interfere in Sri Lanka, I think Sri Lanka should cosy up to China even further.”

    …hmm, yes, brilliant advice, because China has been so friendly, kind and genteel to its smaller neighbors. it’s precisely why the vietnamese love them and ethnic chinese dominated singapore isn’t looking for powers to balance out an aggressive jingoistic autocracy, and why SK and japan trust the PRC like family. so naturally, if india is out of the way, god only knows how kind, gentle, fair and generous the PRC will be to sri lanka, nepal, bhutan, and bangladesh…the aggressive border incursions to bully tiny and peaceful bhutan only show what’s in store for the short-sighted.

    “Afterall, unlike India, China did not arm, train and fund a terrorist organisation. “

    except for the maoists and the myriad of north eastern groups. however, unlike china (to whom pakistan owes its n technology and missiles), India does not proliferate.

    anyhow, this post is about Sri Lanka and not India-Pakistan issues (judging by the telling of tall tales “as high as the himalayas”). IR no doubt informs this issue, but this specific post is about Sri Lankan reconciliation. Though I’m obviously in the thick of most comments regarding India and its plethora of issues, if there are ethnic sinhalas and other lankan ethnicities who wish to comment, let us, for once, cede the space for them to talk. It is an important issue for all those who want peace on the indian subcontinent and its littoral. I know this will likely fall on deaf ears, but it is worth a shot.

  9. China is welcome in South Asia and should expand its influence across Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and Nepal.


    Yes, call it non-democratic, totalitarian-a-palooza!!

  10. As to the post, the conceit of the TGTE and Api Wenuwen Api fundraisers does not seem absent. The diaspora is not rendered un-Sri Lankan by how extreme their views or fresh their memories are–they are not Sri Lankan because they do not live there anymore. They are no longer familiar with and accepting of the equilibrium which constitutes SL society today–the barbarism which makes so many ‘real’ Sri Lankans wish to be a part of that diaspora–even at risk of torture and execution in the medieval religious courts of the middle east–and which makes internet-accessing folks double down on defending the prosecution of the war against the LTTE. Turd sandwich it may be but it’s not the diaspora’s to fix.

  11. And if i may, the LTTE phenomenon was made possible (but not executed–that needed guns and violence) by the rigidly hierarchical nature of Tamil society–something which migrated with the diaspora just as surely as the ever-fresh memories of pain and suffering. Even the silver-tongued Anton Balasingham and his despicable wife Adele had to check their Marxism at the door of Tamil cultural norms. Are you all proposing that the family structures and culturally-designated vectors of power in the north and east be radically changed?

  12. Why should the dispora not have a role? They are still citizens of SL, their heart is there, they have brought up their children with as much SL culture as they can in a foreign country, and their remittances are important to SL.

    A side note: The SL Tamil diaspora were important to the Tamil film industry in India, too.

  13. Talking about the “diaspora” in the abstract is meaningless–the brute facts are that the Tamil diaspora is a lot more successful and wealthy than the Sinhalese diaspora (and, the “Muslim” and “Burgher” diasporas simply aren’t too important–sorry). Sure, there are poor Tamils, like those on Staten Island, in Tamil Nadu, etc., but the fact is that, en masse, the Tamils have the $$. The Rajapaksa family regime doesn’t want to face up to this fact; but they will pay in terms of world influence until they do (b/c the Tamil $$ speaks in terms of Western influence). Sri Lanka can be a poor satrapy of China led by Sinhalese chauvinists, or it can open itself up to its own people and be an entrepot for South Asia. Sadly, I’m betting on continued immersion by Sinhalese militant villagers who are half-educated at best. . . .

  14. “Talking about the “diaspora” in the abstract is meaningless–the brute facts are that the Tamil diaspora is a *lot* more successful and wealthy than the Sinhalese diaspora (and, the “Muslim” and “Burgher” diasporas simply aren’t too important–sorry).”

    Sorry — to clarify, which diaspora are we talking about exactly? While the Indian Tamil diaspora is quite well-off, especially in the US (and Canada), I don’t know if the same can be said for Sri Lankan tamil diaspora.

    In Toronto for example, which probably has more Sri Lankan tamils than any other city (including any in Sri Lanka most likely), the tamil community as a whole isn’t that wealthy, and for the most part occupy chiefly low-income areas. And while they are moving up quickly, I don’t think one could really characterize them as having $$$. The Indian punjabis of Toronto, on the other hand, and chock full of money and quite politically influential too.

    I know Toronto can’t be taken as representative of the whole diaspora, but as one of its most significant parts it does hold weight. But from my experience in the UK the Sri Lankan tamils there do not seem to be any wealthier as a whole either.

  15. This is anecdotal but in Britain I have met so many half Sri Lankans half Brits its really surprising (I was reflecting on this the other day). Is there something in Sri Lankan diaspora culture that is more amenable to interracial marriage than say in traditional Indian/Pakistani culture. I can think of 4 half Sri Lankan mixes off the top of my head and I don’t know that many Sri Lankans. Whereas I will have to think hard to think of half Indian half English or half Pakistani half English mixtures though I know so many more from those communities.

    Also another anecdotal observation half Sri Lankans they tend to act and look “more white” (I can’t tell that they’re desi at all if hard-pressed I’d guess they had some Middle Eastern or Med influence) than say mixtures of Indians & Pakistanis with the natives. This could be specific to a British context where the British Asian community basically self-identifies as a Indo-Pakistani construct while other South Asian ethnicities are given much more of a short shrift. Its rapidly changing now for the better thankfully.

  16. Its an interesting article again speaking from anecdote I find when I chat to Singhalese and their ideas on the Tamil minority; they don’t seem very willing to entertain any notions of a separate identity.

    The idea of Sri Lanka as a unitary states really needs to be revised when so many national communities live there. Unfortunately the idea of a unitary state persists from our colonial heritage when South Asia’s diversity simply can’t handle it; after all Bangladesh is the only ethnically homogeneous state in the region.

    I liked the article however I think the idea of “Diasporas” not constituting the real Sri Lanka is not entirely spot on. I think Diasporas are a key constituency of the nation state and as authentic as the “homeland”. I calculated offhand (had to make a few assumptions here and there) that the Pakistani diaspora in Britain constitutes ~1% of the global Pakistani population but 15% of the economy! That’s why the politicians always come here.

    Has anyone done a similar calculation for the Sri Lankan diaspora and its economic weight in relation to Sri Lanka?

  17. his is anecdotal but in Britain I have met so many half Sri Lankans half Brits its really surprising (I was reflecting on this the other day). Is there something in Sri Lankan diaspora culture that is more amenable to interracial marriage than say in traditional Indian/Pakistani culture. I can think of 4 half Sri Lankan mixes off the top of my head and I don’t know that many Sri Lankans. Whereas I will have to think hard to think of half Indian half English or half Pakistani half English mixtures though I know so many more from those communities.

    Hmm maybe since most Sri Lankans are Buddhists (according to wiki anyhow) whereas most pakis are muslim and marry other muslims, and indians (regardless of religion) here in the US at least, seem intent on marrying indians. I’ve encountered some 1st/2nd and even 3rd gen indians here who insist they can only marry other indians, sometimes specifically within the caste (although I think that concept is dying out).

    • Those Indians and their crazy wish to marry other Indians. Makes you feel glad there are sensible people about like Pakistani muslims and their willingness to marry anyone they like. As long as they are muslim, of course, or they convert. Otherwise get ready to face the consequences:

      http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1340222/Harry-Potter-actress-beaten-branded-prostitute-brother-dating-man-Muslim.html#ixzz18fWQXgdF

      Indians may be keen on marrying other Indians (so are Jews by the way), but the manner in which it is done is generally more civilized than threatening to kill/ beat/ maim someone as are the stories you often hear about muslim (attempted) mixed marriages. Let’s not get it twisted – if you want to talk about bigotry, I would look at Pakistani muslims or muslims in general alot closer than Indians/ Hindus. Again, an obvious fact to anyone who has interacted with both types of people.

      The willingness to knock Indians on this board is quite interesting, or maybe not, since it seems to come from the non-Indians mostly. Perhaps the non-Indians should get some knocking too just to balance it out.

  18. The SL diaspora does not have adequate critical mass on any one issue to be effective. It seems advisable that each element of the SL diaspora—the Muslims, the Burghers, the Tamils, …—set up an NGO for the causes that are dear to it.

  19. re: intermarriage, usually when the minority is at VERY SMALL numbers it will marry out more than when it has critical mass. thanks for the book recs above.

  20. @caste: Funny how you intepreted that as an insult…no, i’m not “knocking” the desire of any ethnic group to marry its own kind, which most of them do. Whites typically marry Whites, Blacks other Blacks, Koreans other Koreans, Jews with Jews, Indians with other Indians, etc. Nothing wrong with that. One person pointed out Sri Lankans abroad seem to outmarry more so we were discussing possible reasons why.

    What’s interesting though is how you took a simple comment and interpreted as some kind of “Indian Vs Paki” debate in your head and starting citing articles and rambling about barbaric muslims maiming people etc…literally all I said is 1st/2nd/3rd gens seem to prefer marrying into their own culture, giving Pakis and Indians as an example. Funny how you defensive you are. Now, before you go storming Kashmir next, take a deep breath and realize not every innocuous comment is some kind of great insult to India.

    The willingness to knock Indians on this board is quite interesting, or maybe not, since it seems to come from the non-Indians mostly. Perhaps the non-Indians should get some knocking too just to balance it out.

    Haha yes, I’m sure in your paranoid head you interpret every other thing as some kind of grand insult to your forefathers. Feel free to spend the rest of your afternoon googling articles and citing sources to win an imaginary argument in your head. Or you could simply join our discussion, just sayin’

    @Zachary Latif: your comment made me think of Nigel Barker (C list celebrity lol) he is British and half Anglo and half Sri Lankan and in fact, does look and “act” very white, I wouldn’t have guessed he had any desi in him. I suppose it’s like Razib said, such a small minority would be more likely to outmarry.

    • No offence but don’t try and take the high ground and attempt to condescend to me. The discussion here is for anyone and everyone – you don’t run it and it can go in any direction it wants – it is not up to you.

      You said – “What’s interesting though is how you took a simple comment and interpreted as some kind of “Indian Vs Paki” debate in your head and starting citing articles and rambling about barbaric muslims maiming people etc…literally all I said is 1st/2nd/3rd gens seem to prefer marrying into their own culture, giving Pakis and Indians as an example. Funny how you defensive you are. Now, before you go storming Kashmir next, take a deep breath and realize not every innocuous comment is some kind of great insult to India.”

      This is not true, you did not use Pakistanis as an example at all, you merely said that Pakis are muslims and marry other muslims. You then gave a full two sentences to highlight how Indians, specifically, are apparently so unhinged that even a third generation in they still want to marry other Indians. You need to reread what you wrote because I think you have forgotten. Here it is for you “…and indians (regardless of religion) here in the US at least, seem intent on marrying indians. I’ve encountered some 1st/2nd and even 3rd gen indians here who insist they can only marry other indians, sometimes specifically within the caste (although I think that concept is dying out).”.

      I’m not paranoid, and just because you think it’s funny it doesn’t mean that I do, or anyone else does for that matter. By the way I didn’t google that article – it was right here in the margin of this website.

  21. PS – Afshan Azad is Bengali, not Paki…one is to the west of your border, the other to the east, keep ’em straight ๐Ÿ™‚

  22. your comment made me think of Nigel Barker (C list celebrity lol) he is British and half Anglo and half Sri Lankan and in fact, does look and “act” very white, I wouldn’t have guessed he had any desi in him. I suppose it’s like Razib said, such a small minority would be more likely to outmarry.

    there are two dynamics:

    1) population size of the minority

    2) assimilation/identification of the minority with the majority

    UK has good census data on this. e.g., http://www.statistics.gov.uk/articles/nojournal/Mixed_ethnic_groups_pdf.pdf

    The numbers of inter-ethnic marriages in some ways reflect the relative sizes of the Mixed ethnic groups. For example, in 2001, marriages between a White person and a Black Caribbean person (26,800) far exceeded marriages between a White person and a Black African person (12,900). Analysis of inter-ethnic marriages also provides some clues to the parentage of people in the Mixed White and Asian group. Marriages between a White person and an Indian person (24,500) far exceeded marriages between a White person and Pakistani person (8,400) and those between a White person and Bangladeshi person (1,900)9. This suggests that a large proportion of people identifying as Mixed White and Asian may have one White parent and one Indian parent.

    also, see, http://www.statistics.gov.uk/cci/nugget.asp?id=1090

    People from South Asian backgrounds were the least likely of the minority ethnic groups to be married to someone from a different ethnic group. Only 6 per cent of Indians, 4 per cent of Pakistanis, and 3 per cent of Bangladeshis had married someone outside the Asian group. As well as cultural and racial differences, people from South Asian backgrounds generally have different religions to people from other ethnic groups which may explain their relatively low inter-marriage rate. People who described their ethnicity as รขโ‚ฌหœOther Asianรขโ‚ฌโ„ข were more likely to have married a non-Asian person (18 per cent).

    the enumerated asian groups are indian, bangladeshi, pakistani, and chinese. so sri lankans would be in in ‘other asian.’

    What’s interesting though is how you took a simple comment and interpreted as some kind of “Indian Vs Paki” debate in your head and starting citing articles and rambling about barbaric muslims maiming people etc

    some people here will view you as a muslim/pak no matter your experience/identification. it probably has to do with the gap between american and south asian attitudes. that is why i added ‘the atheist’ to my handle. these people have a hard time comprehending that american brownz may not easily identify with their own tribal-communal identities. ‘multicultural’ is too often interpreted as different races and religions. but in many ways an identified hindu gujarati raised in the USA has more in common with other americans (though not in all ways) than a hindu gujarati raised in gujarat. this is difficult for many to grok. it’s not just an indian thing. i encountered europeans who reflexively laugh when i referred to myself without self-consciousness as ‘western.’ ppl weren’t being rude, just hard for them to conceptualize a colored person identifying as western.

  23. p.s. last i dug into the scholarly literature, there are differences in the ‘indian’ outmarriage even within the indian community in the UK. rank order is east african indians > non-sikh non-east african indians > sikhs.

    • There is scholarly literature on this topic? Do share some of this with us. Any articles you would care to mention?

  24. You need to reread what you wrote because I think you have forgotten. Here it is for you “…and indians (regardless of religion) here in the US at least, seem intent on marrying indians. I’ve encountered some 1st/2nd and even 3rd gen indians here who insist they can only marry other indians, sometimes specifically within the caste (although I think that concept is dying out).”.

    No, I don’t need to re-read what I wrote, you need to stop being so paranoid because you misinterpret things and lash out at people not trying to insult you. Obviously I can’t misinterpret my own comment. The 1st sentence is a statistical fact. The 2nd sentence is a personal experience I shared, also backed by statistical fact. So please explain to me specifically what you’re so offended about, because from my point of view you’re coming across as irrational.

    This is not true, you did not use Pakistanis as an example at all, you merely said that Pakis are muslims and marry other muslims.

    How is that not using them as an example? So I can say Paki Muslims prefer to marry other Paki Muslims and its ok, but the second I say Indians prefer to marry other Indians it’s wrong? LOL

    By the way I didn’t google that article – it was right here in the margin of this website.

    You literally said “Perhaps the non-Indians should get some knocking too” and then cited an article about a British Bengladeshi actress being assaulted by her Bengali British Muslim father in an effort to knock non-Indians. You reinforced my point that 1st/2nd/3rd Gens prefer intermarriage. Again, I don’t see where we disagree.

    @Razib Khan: You know, I never even thought of it like that – I’m a 3rd Gen American with Afghan and Paki roots, and in America, Desi’s naturally lump ourselves together by culture – Bengali, Gujurat, Sindhi, Paki, Punjabi, etc – we’re all Desi’s. Yet this site is a reminder that back in Desi-land, the natives are still busy hating each other, so even when I post an innocuous comment, it’s interpreted as some kind of Paki Muslim assault on Indian Hindus. That’s why I was baffled when Caste started rambling about Paki Muslims doing this and that – I don’t identify as Muslim or Paki primarily.

    Maybe I should change my username from Alina Mehmoor to Alina the American Agnostic? Haha ๐Ÿ™‚

  25. People from South Asian backgrounds were the least likely of the minority ethnic groups to be married to someone from a different ethnic group

    I bet that’s true here in America as well. It’s pretty common to see Hispanic/White couples here in NY. As for East Asians, it seems there’s a gender divide; white guy/asian girl couples are very common, but not the reverse. And I wouldn’t be surprised if there were more Indian outmarriages than Paki/Bengali, although that’s probably divided along religious lines too, with muslim indians going for other muslims and hindus being more open to outmarriage – this is the general attitude I’ve noticed anyhow. Haven’t read any statistics on this in the US at least.

    One thing I’ve noticed is it often comes down to religion over ethnicity. I think that’s why Irish/Italian is such a common ethnic mix for White Americans – that catholic background. For example, I wouldn’t be surprised if Indian Christians outmarry a lot (I know Lebanese/Syrian/Jordanian Christians do often).

  26. I bet that’s true here in America as well. It’s pretty common to see Hispanic/White couples here in NY. As for East Asians, it seems there’s a gender divide; white guy/asian girl couples are very common, but not the reverse. And I wouldn’t be surprised if there were more Indian outmarriages than Paki/Bengali, although that’s probably divided along religious lines too, with muslim indians going for other muslims and hindus being more open to outmarriage – this is the general attitude I’ve noticed anyhow. Haven’t read any statistics on this in the US at least.

    you’re a newbie to this ๐Ÿ˜‰ i’ve been discussing this with ppl who run this weblog (or did run) since back in 2003. yeah, i’m old. anyway, the issue is 1st gen vs. 1.5-2nd gen. asian indians (excludes paks & bangs) have very low outmarriage rates compared to other asian groups, but, that’s because it is mostly an immigrant community. 1.5+2nd gen have ~40% outmarriage rates.

    http://www.asian-nation.org/interracial2.shtml

    there seem three strands in the american brown community

    • replicate old world marriage patterns. ismaili gujarati + ismaili gujarati, kashmiri pandit + kashmiri pandit, patel + patel

    • a more pan-brown identity. bengali muslim + pakistan muslim, syrian christian + punjabi hindu, etc. (this is overrepresented among american born readers of this weblog)

    • brown + non-brown

    i think it is important to distinguish the first two.

    One thing I’ve noticed is it often comes down to religion over ethnicity. I think that’s why Irish/Italian is such a common ethnic mix for White Americans – that catholic background. For example, I wouldn’t be surprised if Indian Christians outmarry a lot (I know Lebanese/Syrian/Jordanian Christians do often).

    yeah, i agree. this was a common pattern among ‘white ethnics.’ people would marry across catholic ethnic lines, or protestant ethnic lines, but not across religion. that is simply not true anymore. in 1960 5-10% of jews married now. today the figure is 30-50% depending on who you believe.

  27. hah yeah i’ve noticed asian guys having angst over this. I’m a fan of the gnxp blog btw – came across it last semester when I was looking up something for biological anthro class.

    Btw, I figured you or someone here might know: Are Hazara people Desi? My friend and I were arguing over this. My logic is: Pashtuns (largest ethnic group in afghanistan and 2nd largest in pak) are definitely Desi, but what about Hazara people (another afghani group, some also live in pakistan)? My reasoning is they live in South Asia so they’re desi, her reasoning is no because they’re closer to iranians than indians ethnically. Linguistically they speak Farsi but so do many Pashtuns, on the afghani side anyhow.

  28. Btw, I figured you or someone here might know: Are Hazara people Desi? My friend and I were arguing over this. My logic is: Pashtuns (largest ethnic group in afghanistan and 2nd largest in pak) are definitely Desi, but what about Hazara people (another afghani group, some also live in pakistan)? My reasoning is they live in South Asia so they’re desi, her reasoning is no because they’re closer to iranians than indians ethnically. Linguistically they speak Farsi but so do many Pashtuns, on the afghani side anyhow.

    well, there’s no pope of desiness. but if you want to know genetics, look:

    http://www.sciencemag.org/content/319/5866/1100/F1.large.jpg

  29. btw, the rule of thumb i have heard is that pashtuns are culturally south asian, but tajiks, uzbeks and hazaras are central asian/persian. but who draws such lines?

  30. @Alina yes it was an interesting observation on the Sri Lankans as one thinks about it more.

    The Hazaras of Pakistan are different to the ones of Afghanistan. They are Punjabi speakers whereas the ones in Afghanistan have Mongol ancestry and farsi speakers.

    Desi is a complex word and can mean many things. Commonly accepted are that Afghanistan and Burma are “South Asian” but not desi.

    Personally i think desiness is concentric waves emanating from UP; centre of pan-Indian culture.”desi” = Hindustani culture & language, which basically means north India (hindi belt) + Pakistan. South India, Sri Lanka, Nepal and Bangladesh constitute the next wave of desiness; they are culturally desi but also have very separate identities primarily because of language. Then finally you have Burma and Afghanistan which have ties of history and geography but are equally bound to their neighbours.

    An Afghan Pashtun and a Pakistani Pathan differ in desiness because outside of Pashto the former resorts to Farsi and the latter switch to Urdu/English. Even though most Afghans understand, at the very least, a smattering of Urdu they will equally be as versed in Irani culture. Its just a totally different orientation; Peshawar ultimately is drawn toward Lahore-Delhi and Kabul-Herat veers toward Mashad-Tehran.

    I know this can be quite controversial and I’ve tried very hard not to be offensive to anyone; but this is again my “observations”..

  31. I know this can be quite controversial and I’ve tried very hard not to be offensive to anyone; but this is again my “observations”..

    and yet it seems about right. cab drivers sometimes check to see if i can speak hindi, never feeling it to be presumptuous. and i don’t think it is, over half the brown people they run into have some facility with the language. if they were tamil or bengali they wouldn’t try that, because those are local parochial identities. i think the cog sci concept of prototypes are helpful:

    http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Prototype_theory#Cognitive_representation_of_semantic_categories

    i do disagree though that pakistan can be included at this time. many pakistanis emphasize their islamic identity, and have racist attitudes toward people to their east, who they feel to be inferior. and to be honest, this was palpable even among the secular westernized pakistanis who my family socialized with. they looked to the west for their exemplars, iran. this was have been delusional false consciousness. these people would sometimes socialize with bangladeshis and indians if they didn’t socialize with pakistanis (albeit, usually muslims), never iranians. but how one defines oneself matters.additionally, pakistanis no longer use an indic script, and so don’t share a common literature with co-ethnics across the border in india. this is not true of bangladesh.

    the “prototype” desi is hindu, hindustani-speaking, from aryavarta, and brown-skinned. if you deny the desi-ness of such a person, you deny the coherency or utility of the concept. on the other hand, a woman of french descent raised in chennai as a roman catholic who is bilingual in tamil and french may be a liminal case, but if she identifies as desi, who is to deny her? there are white-looking indian people without recent european ancestry, rare as they are. many brown indians are catholic. many tamils do not know hindi. and indians from pondicherry may know french. similarly, an adoptee in minnesota may be lutheran, be monolingual in english, and not have much cultural interest or affinity in things south asian, but her physical appearance would make her recognizable as ‘desi’ whether she wants to be recognized as such.

    anyway, i’ve elaborated on this theory before. in a set theory sense we should view such identities as unions of many sets. OTOH, something like being a kashmiri pandit is better understood as an intersection of sets. muslims of pandit (e.g., the prime minister of kashmir, or ) descent are no longer pandits.

  32. this is a great article to what you’re referring to: http://www.dawn.com/wps/wcm/connect/dawn-content-library/dawn/the-newspaper/columnists/nadeem-f-paracha-camel-talk-300

    desiness after all is a subjective term and is subject to a myriad of interpretation understandably. i was just referring to the fact that there are different levels of desiness, which ultimately encompass as far as Afghanistan and Burma, so it is a pretty broad term (Afghan more desi than Burma)..

    i do find it funny that so many threads revert somehow back to indo-pak and i was conscientiously trying to avoid that. i guess one can’t avoid the inevitable ..

    or perhap its a bang-pak muslim conspiracy by razib the atheist, alina the agnostic and zach the baha’i ๐Ÿ™‚ but seriously though it could be that having Muslim heritage coupled with a liberal secular outlook gives us the ability to traverse both worlds fairly easily compared to others?

  33. An Afghan Pashtun and a Pakistani Pathan differ in desiness because outside of Pashto the former resorts to Farsi and the latter switch to Urdu/English. Even though most Afghans understand, at the very least, a smattering of Urdu they will equally be as versed in Irani culture. Its just a totally different orientation; Peshawar ultimately is drawn toward Lahore-Delhi and Kabul-Herat veers toward Mashad-Tehran.

    I disagree – Paki and Afghani Pashtuns are like Indian/Paki Punjabi’s – separated by a man-made border, but same ethnic group, same language, same culture. A Paki Pathan would identify more with an Afghani Pashtun than a Paki Punjabi, Sindhi etc. An Afghani Pashtun would identify more with a Paki Pathan than with an Afghani Hazara or Taljik.

    All 4 of my grandparents are Pashtun, btw – the Afghani ones speak Farsi and Pashto, the Paki ones Urdu and Pashto – all 4 speak English and at family gatherings they fluctuate between Pashto and English.

    I definitely consider us Desi – and we don’t identify with Irani culture much at all, although my siblings and I all speak Farsi as well as Urdu. Iranian’s aren’t South Asian, we are.

  34. burmese don’t consider themselves desi. they perceive south asians as ugly blacks (a recent burmese official referenced the bengali speaking rohingya as black trolls). obviously this attitude is true of many afghans and pakistanis (and darker skinned south asians also internalize this, perceiving pakistanis to be better looking because they look more west asian and are lighter skinned), but the physical resemblance between themselves and other south asians is great enough that they can go only so far with such racism.

    as for including pakistan, obviously many south asians perceive pakistan as desi, but pakistan is amputating itself from south asia consciously since 1947. pakistanis look west, not east, in their mythology. bangladesh has a more ambivalent attitude. it just seems ludicrous that you’d include pakistan as part of the prototype when most pakistanis who deal with ideas would probably dissent from association with such an identity (also, pakistan is sometimes included in part of the ‘greater middle east’, so others accept this self-identification). i do think btw that the utilization of a different script, and so the fractioning off of pakistani elites from non-pakistani punjabi literature, is a major issue which distinguishes it from the bangladeshi case, where there’s more connection across religious lines because you can’t pretend that you don’t share the same literary corpus with hindu bengalis when tagore is one of your national poets.

    but seriously though it could be that having Muslim heritage coupled with a liberal secular outlook gives us the ability to traverse both worlds fairly easily compared to others?

    it is fair to say my outlook is liberal. but let me enter into the record that i consider myself center-right (i did vote for the republican in 2010).

  35. i do disagree though that pakistan can be included at this time. many pakistanis emphasize their islamic identity, and have racist attitudes toward people to their east, who they feel to be inferior.

    Whoa since when? I agree they emphasize islamic identity, but I’ve never gotten the perception they feel superior at all. I always thought it was the other way around. India is the most modernized, stable, and progressive nation in South Asia, the world’s largest democracy. Pakistan and Afghanistan in comparison are hell-holes. Pakis watch Indian TV, not the other way around. Pakis are very influenced by Bollywood culture too and try to emulate some aspects. It doesn’t seem unusual in America for Muslim Paks/Indians to marry either. Punjabi’s are the largest Paki ethnic group and they make up a huge bulk of India as well.

  36. Whoa since when? I agree they emphasize islamic identity, but I’ve never gotten the perception they feel superior at all. I always thought it was the other way around. India is the most modernized, stable, and progressive nation in South Asia, the world’s largest democracy. Pakistan and Afghanistan in comparison are hell-holes. Pakis watch Indian TV, not the other way around. Pakis are very influenced by Bollywood culture too and try to emulate some aspects. It doesn’t seem unusual in America for Muslim Paks/Indians to marry either. Punjabi’s are the largest Paki ethnic group and they make up a huge bulk of India as well.

    right, there’s two issues here:

    1) the fake we’re-arab/persian-aspect

    2) the concrete reality that they have a lot of south asian aspects to their culture which can’t be denied

    as for the superior part, part of it is the generalized racism of lighter-skinned northwest south asians toward other groups. i have read that pakistanis thought they had a shot against indians in the wars they fought because the assumption was that one pakistani muslim soldiers was far superior to hindu and sikh soldiers (in light of the military history of the subcontinent between 1000 and 1700). though i have also been in the room while pakistanis explain that pashtuns and the light from higher altitudes are physiologically more fit than other south asians. is it also note true that muslims in pakistan who are from hyderabad and the small number from kerala are mocked in a stereotypical fashion? (my minimal experience of bollywood suggests that that’s a general south asian trend, whereby the darker characters offer comedic relief).

    it is also true that in the persian gulf pakistanis try and emphasize their distinction from indians and bangladeshis. this is not usually religious since a disproportionate number of indians in the gulf are muslim, often from kerala. they naturally cater to the racism of arabs and persians toward south asians as a whole.

    btw, something that’s always interested in me: does the boundary between iranian and indo-aryan languages tracjk genes? it does not seem like it does

    http://3.bp.blogspot.com/_Ish7688voT0/TRCqAreq3xI/AAAAAAAADEs/HoKzH9RfHLI/s1600/ADMIXTURE_15.png

    pashtuns are much more similar to sindhis and gujus than they are to iranians! i have long had hints of this, but now it’s out there.

  37. “1) the fake we’re-arab/persian-aspect”

    Dude, my whole family’s pashtun and half speak farsi, and we still don’t identify as persian/arab, at all. Not sure we’re you’re getting this from. Most Pakis seem to identify with Indians more so than any other group – Urdu and Hindi are almost the same language after all.

    I won’t deny that the South Asian mentality unfortunately leans toward light skin = superior. I’m not trying to deny the validity of your experiences here! BUT you are bengladeshi American I believe and not Paki or Afghani so you are really relaying your observations from an outside point of view – you have probably never been to Pakistan and spoken to natives in Pashto or Urdu, have you? I have, and I never picked up on any superiority complex. All my 2nd cousins in Pak are obsessed with Indian cinema, fashions, bollywood culture, etc. How can they consider themselves superior to a neighbor that is rapidly surpassing them in every positive way? Indians are progressing rapidly while Pathans live in tents in pastoral villages.

    Also – and please don’t get offended if I’m out of line here, I’m merely speaking from personal observations/experience – but imo I think Indians/Bengalis’ buy more into the fair = lovely myth, simply because in India they have a greater diversity of skin tones, were colonized by Europeans, and a caste system. Whereas if you’re from a Pashtun village where most people have a lighter skin tone and blue/green eyes are not uncommon, you’re not gonna buy into that crap as much, especially if you’re dirt-poor.

  38. Dude, my whole family’s pashtun and half speak farsi, and we still don’t identify as persian/arab, at all. Not sure we’re you’re getting this from. Most Pakis seem to identify with Indians more so than any other group – Urdu and Hindi are almost the same language after all.

    it’s not an issue with pakistanis, muslim south asians generally have an unfortunate complex of making up fake arab/persian ancestry. it’s also common among some lighter-skinned non-muslims. the chitpavan and kashmiris come to mind. nice to know your family are enlightened ๐Ÿ˜‰

    but imo I think Indians/Bengalis’ buy more into the fair = lovely myth, simply because in India they have a greater diversity of skin tones, were colonized by Europeans, and a caste system.

    it pre-dates europeans actually. the skin color terms common in south asia now date back to the muslim period at least. the turco-persian elite distinguished themselves as white muslims as opposed to black muslims (the convert masses). pashtuns were among these white muslims i’m assuming. i think the colorism can be dated back some further, but it is vague before the muslim period.

    i don’t think you’re right that indians and bangladeshis are more colorist than pakistanis. though you might be right about pashtuns. this is off-topic, but our punjabi or mohajjir acquaintances would say a lot of racist stuff about pashtuns too. and my dad studied in pakistan (west pakistan at the time), and he has plenty of funny stories about ‘crazy’ pashtuns, though i get the impression that he simply reflected prejudices that his west pakistani classmates had (i assume some of them had pashtun ancestry, i don’t know). so in this case you have colorism confounded with the fact that pashtuns are perceived to be more ‘backward.’

    but colorism isn’t limited to dark skinned people. at least as dark skinned as south asians. it exists in lighter people like japanese, chinese, vietnamese, persians, arabs, etc. it was found in pre-columbian peru; girls were stolen from amazonian tribes for the inca harem because of their lightness. to be called ‘black’ as the same harsh negative connotation in chinese apparently as in south asian languages. i’m pretty sure it has to do with stratification. elites don’t spend time in the sun, so they are lighter skinned relative to the population. if the pashtuns don’t have this prejudice, it may be because they are relatively egalitarian in their segmented society.

    if you’re interested in exploring the topic, Fair Women, Dark Men: The Forgotten Roots of Color Prejudice. i don’t accept the author’s thesis personally, but the citations are useful.

    note: sometimes, east asians, arabs, and greeks, have all commented negatively on the excessive paleness of northern europeans as being deviated from the norm to be attractive. so it seems that the preference was to be lighter than the norm of the population.

  39. though i have also been in the room while pakistanis explain that pashtuns and the light from higher altitudes are physiologically more fit than other south asians

    hah seriously? well the only plausible explanation that I can think of to explain this is pashtuns are particularly poor, don’t have great access to modern medicine, and live in high altitudes, so it’s like natural selection, you know? But India also has a high rate of poverty and while it’s rapidly modernizing, low income groups in India exposed to disease and gritty life would go through the same thing. So I can’t see any basis for anyone claiming pashtuns are “physiologically more fit”

    PS – if you do every encounter some kind of laughable paki superiority complex, I do hope you call them out on their BS.

  40. PS – if you do every encounter some kind of laughable paki superiority complex, I do hope you call them out on their BS.

    most of the stuff i’m telling you is when i was a kid. i wasn’t in a position to disagree. i did try to correct factual misimpressions once when i was nine, and it didn’t go over well ๐Ÿ™‚ (most of these were doctoral candidates in the hard sciences, so they weren’t used to being called on bullshit obviously)

  41. this is off-topic, but our punjabi or mohajjir acquaintances would say a lot of racist stuff about pashtuns too. and my dad studied in pakistan (west pakistan at the time), and he has plenty of funny stories about ‘crazy’ pashtuns, though i get the impression that he simply reflected prejudices that his west pakistani classmates had (i assume some of them had pashtun ancestry, i don’t know). so in this case you have colorism confounded with the fact that pashtuns are perceived to be more ‘backward.’

    Haha let me be blunt – pashtuns are a little crazy. There’s a saying in Urdu that roughly translates to “they’re only at peace when they’re at war”. In general they have a history of being a tribal, war-like people – many lived in refugee camps until fairly recently. Definitely not as well-off as Punjabi folks or Indians. Indians are the most successful and educated group in South Asia so it makes no sense for other desis to think of them as “inferior”, that’s ridiculous.

    i don’t think you’re right that indians and bangladeshis are more colorist than pakistanis. though you might be right about pashtuns.

    honestly, from my personal observations the fair = lovely myth is more common in cultures where there is more variety of skin tone (like India which is SO diverse or the Phillipines). I think it comes down to social status – in India the lower castes are typically darker, right? For pashtuns, being light-skinned doesn’t = wealthy, it means you probably live in a shitty village in the mountains somewhere and herd goats.

    To give an example other than skin tone – eye color. I’ve noticed bollywood actresses often have colored contacts (they look fake) in films. So maybe blue/green eyes are considered more attractive in Indian culture, I don’t know. Possibly it’s just done for fun, like make-up. But I havent noticed this trend in pakis at all. The only pakis i really interact with are pathans though.

  42. honestly, from my personal observations the fair = lovely myth is more common in cultures where there is more variety of skin tone (like India which is SO diverse or the Phillipines). I think it comes down to social status – in India the lower castes are typically darker, right? For pashtuns, being light-skinned doesn’t = wealthy, it means you probably live in a shitty village in the mountains somewhere and herd goats.

    this sounds plausible. but the same trend has historically been very strong in china and japan as well. why do you think japanese women wear that bizarre white face paint? additionally, fairness was prized in europe too before the tanning craze of the 20th century. this is one reason women would walk around with umbrellas to protect themselves from the sun even if they weren’t redheads who burned. the term “blue blood” comes from the fact that spanish christians with ‘pure’ ancestry were pale enough that you could seen their veins, as opposed to swarthy moors.

    with modernization there has been some inversion of the trend. tanning became popular when wealthy people started spending winters in sunny vacation locales, and paleness was associated with drudgery in factories. there is a mild tanning boom in japan and taiwan right now which is totally against the traditions of that culture. i don’t think american south asians are that concerned about color either. most of the people i know don’t seem particularly sun shy.

    To give an example other than skin tone – eye color. I’ve noticed bollywood actresses often have colored contacts (they look fake) in films. So maybe blue/green eyes are considered more attractive in Indian culture, I don’t know. Possibly it’s just done for fun, like make-up. But I havent noticed this trend in pakis at all. The only pakis i really interact with are pathans though.

    i think that this is a function of white supremacy. in china witches traditionally had green eyes and red hair,* and in pre-modern japan women that had brown hair would dye it black. from what i am to understand the distinctive northern european coloration was not considered attractive as such in much of the world where white/light skin was prized. that is not true today.

  43. Indians are the most successful and educated group in South Asia so it makes no sense for other desis to think of them as “inferior”, that’s ridiculous.

    no, this is complicated. there’s a lot of regional and community variation. in many ways UP is as socially backward as pakistan:

    http://blogs.discovermagazine.com/gnxp/2010/08/indias-deep-north/

    the fertility rate in UP is similar to pakistan for example.

  44. btw alina, if you’re curious, compare pakistan, bangladesh, and india, on google data explorer. pretty interesting. pakistan is definitely dragging. but india is not doing as well as you’d think, probably because the most populous and fertile states are not doing so well, while the less populous and less fecund states are.

    http://www.google.com/publicdata/directory

  45. @Razib: speaking of Peter Frost, what do you think of his theory of sexual selection of women in northern europe? It kind of makes sense but I don’t know enough about it to form an opinion. Remember briefly skimming some paper of his in Bio Anthro last semester.

    also, if lighter skin/hair/eye color is really considered “superior” in northwestern south asia, then why aren’t women with those traits considered more attractive there? South Asian beauties are typically Indian. I know many desis naturally consider Indian women the prettiest (I might even agree, tbh). India has won more Miss World competitions than any other country, I believe. So I don’t think colorism is as rampant as you think.

    in afghanistan I occasionally saw blonde children but that hair color certainly isn’t considered more attractive there. nor did I notice any preference for blue eyes. I know some pathans consider green eyes “lucky” though. I remember some distant auntie gushing over my sister’s green eyes – she didn’t say that about my blue-gray eyes or my other sister’s brown ones. That’s the only bit of colorism I encountered. And many pakis would agree Indian women are the prettiest.