Wajiha Ahmed: A Second Take on Last Week’s “Long March” in Pakistan

In addition to regular comments to blog posts, I often get emails from readers expressing all manner of opinions. This week, following my recent post on the protests in Pakistan, I received a note from a graduate student in Boston named Wajiha Ahmed that was intelligent enough to provoke me to spend a little time replying. Wajiha had also, a few days earlier, published an Op-Ed in the Atlanta Journal-Constitution (it was written while the protests were just beginning). Wajiha’s response to my response was essentially a full-fledged essay. I asked her if she would slightly revise her comments in defense of the Long March protests into something for Sepia Mutiny, as a sort of one-off guest post. She agreed, and the following is a one-time guest post by Wajiha Ahmed.

The comment Wajiha most objected to was actually made by me in the comments of the original post. I said, “I think there are some people looking at this that are thinking that what is happening is not simply the expression of free speech, but a rather naked attempt at a power-grab by Nawaz and Shahbaz Sharif. Given the security crisis in the country, a protest movement like this could be seen as irresponsible.” In my first email to Wajiha, I also wrote:

What prompted me to suggest that Sharif was acting irresponsibly was a personal conversation with a friend here in Pennsylvania named [KC], who comes originally from Lahore. [KC] said to me last week that the attack on the Sri Lankan cricket team in particular left him feeling extremely depressed, since it’s beginning to seem that the militants are increasingly coming down out of the hills, and their kind of Islam is increasingly driving the agenda of the country. Given what has happened in Swat and NWFP in the past few months, it may be that the real cultural-political undercurrent that needs to be addressed is the growth of that militancy. Not because of *America’s* war on terror, but actually for Pakistan’s own internal security and stability.

Below is Wajiha’s response to those points.

Guest Post by Wajiha Ahmed

I’m writing this post in response to Sepia Mutiny’s reporting on the second Pakistani Long March to restore a deposed independent judiciary and Chief Justice. The sentiment has been that a) it was irresponsible and could have possibly destabilized Pakistan, and b) energy should have instead focused on the ‘real’ problem Pakistan faces: growing ‘sympathy’ for militants. As I see it, however, we just witnessed one of the largest broad-based, secular, non-violent movements for the rule of law and democracy in Pakistan’s history. Of course, one event is not going to change everything. But democracy is not an event, it is a process. Therefore, rather than being reported with cynicism, this important civil disobedience movement should instead have been encouraged and celebrated. In the past year, Pakistanis have successfully forced out a military dictator (Musharraf) AND compelled an authoritarian leader (Zardari) to listen to their voices – a rare, uplifting story in these trying days.

[Wajiha continued] I’ll try to address the above-stated points, starting with the latter.

1) As far as the security situation, Pakistanis will agree that it’s a major problem. Almost half of the worldwide victims of terrorist attacks last year were Pakistani! And of course, the recent attack on the Sri Lankan cricket team and the subsequent death of eight Pakistani police officers triggered deep anger, shame, and sadness. While this threat is very real, I think we may have missed a few fundamental points.

First, some media outlets reported that terrorist groups took part in the march – this is false. Militant al-Qaeda and neo-Taliban elements who crossed the border after US-led strikes in Afghanistan are not ‘religious extremists.’ Rather, they are terrorists with an Islamic veneer. Why is this important? Because there is a common misperception that Pakistanis are sympathetic to these so-called militants—but those leaving in militant-occupied areas, whether FATA or SWAT, have left if they have been able to afford to do so. Those who lack the means are living under constant fear. During my time in Peshawar, Rawalpindi and Lahore this past summer, I met not a single Pakistani sympathetic to these terrorists –- and rightly so, since they are the ones suffering the most from these attacks. So why is the perception of popular Pakistani support for terrorism so prevalent? This belief may be due, in part, to an overall emphasis by policy-makers and media outlets alike, on linking the notion of “Muslim terrorists” or “Islamic violence” with religious and cultural explanations about Islam and Muslim culture, and thereby sidelining political ones. Implicit in this view is that every Muslim has the potential to become an ‘extremist’ or a terrorist—”moderate” Muslims have chosen to ignore this call to warfare, while ‘extremist’ Muslims have simply succumbed. A more accurate and responsible explanation of the recently conceived notion of “Islamic violence,” however, lies in an analysis of recent historical and political conflicts (see Mahmood Mamdani’s Good Muslim, Bad Muslim). There are dangers in being unaware of our possible biases – in this case, misinterpreting the Long March, and perhaps even Pakistanis themselves.

The ‘solution’ to the militancy problem most probably involves a regional effort to resolve the war in Afghanistan (see Rashid and Rubin’s article in Foreign Affairs) and a concerted effort inside Pakistan to reclaim militant-ridden areas. I won’t even try to pretend to have an answer to this dilemma– counterinsurgency is extremely difficult.

Second, many have pointed out that the involvement (probably opportunistic) of the JI and other right-of-center elements like the PML-N ‘prove’ that the Long March really wasn’t a liberal movement but one that incorporates ‘militant’ elements. But Pakistani religious parties (JI, JUI) are more similar to some factions of the BJP or Shiv Sena in India than they are to any militant terrorists in FATA and Swat. And just to emphasis, they have never received more than 14% of the vote and lost the 2008 elections.

Also, the PML-N is not a religious party. Yes, it is right-of-center and sometimes panders to religious conservatives, but so does the BJP in India. So does the Republican Party in the US. While Sharif has steadfastly supported the Lawyer’s Movement, personally, I think he needs to prove that he isn’t merely being opportunistic — but that’s up to the Pakistani people to decide. Since they quickly saw through Zardari, I’ll opt to trust their judgment.

Finally, and most importantly, we can’t forget that this movement is really about the vast majority who took part in the Long March — lawyers, human rights activists, students, and concerned citizens who risked personal injury and incarceration to stand up for justice. My friend, Ammar, who took part in the now famous GPO chowk protest recalls:

As the police started shelling tear-gas indiscriminately, many activists started falling unconscious. A man who must have been in his 70s started yelling to the fleeing crowd (which included me as I could no longer breathe) that this was not a time to run but to fight… We resisted the police for over two hours, pushing them back many times…
The most memorable part of the evening for me was when Aitzaz Ahsan [prominent leader of the Lawyer’s Movement] defiantly entered the High Court building despite orders for his house arrest and the police officers stood in line to salute him. This meant a complete victory for the movement …
On one side, [what we witnessed] represented despair, state brutality and police repression. On the other, it reflected hope, resistance, and the passions and dreams of many Pakistanis. We had won not because of the generosity of the country’s leadership, but because of the countless sacrifices of lawyers and activists for the past 2 years with 15th March 2009 becoming the grand finale in Lahore.
[Ammar Ali Jan’s complete account of his experience has been posted here]


Ammar’s words speak for themselves.

2) Now we move-on to the point that the Long March was somehow irresponsible.

If similar terrorist attacks occurred in another country, we would not ask its citizens to halt all activity for fear of ‘instability.’ The Lawyers Movement initiated the second march because Zardari broke the promises he made after the first one. If we agree that Zardari’s actions are undemocratic, then why are protests to demand accountability irresponsible? To be sure, Pakistani politicians rely on ‘micro rationality’ – a short-term view of political behavior – instead of ‘macro rationality.’ This tendency is partly an outgrowth of a structural reality: prolonged military rule (for more, read Ayesha Siddiqa’s Military Inc or Ayesha Jalal’s Democracy and Authoritarianism). The political system is authoritarian, and the Long March fought to change to this very tendency of the system.

The Lawyers/Civil Society movement has another responsible and important goal — reasserting and ensuring civilian control. For decades, Pakistan’s army and its powerful ISI intelligence agency defined domestic priorities. They prioritized the defense budget over badly needed infrastructure and education reform. They leveraged militant groups for their rivalries with India. They supported the Taliban in Afghanistan. Many of these same groups are the ones wreaking havoc in Pakistan today. Mitigating the power of the military is directly related to making sure that Pakistan’s establishment never supports militants again. I was thrilled that during this Long March, the military did not intervene or attempt to take control.

Pakistanis now know that the next time they are dissatisfied with anything, they can use civil disobedience to demand justice. Pakistan’s burgeoning news media revolution — dozens of independent 24-hour news channels have opened up recently — has further ensured sustained awareness.

Now that the judges have been restored, many have valid concerns about Zardari, Sharif’s intentions, and the future of Pakistan. I am sure most Pakistanis do as well. While the Movement is no magic bullet, it is an important step towards increasing the likelihood that Pakistan’s government will start to address problems of poverty, education reform, and democracy. I wish the Movement and its supporters best of luck -– they have an important struggle ahead of them. The movement is for democracy not a movement of violence.

I’ve put in bold some of the points I thought might be particularly key in Wajiha’s statement. Please respond respectfully to what she’s saying, even if you disagree.

164 thoughts on “Wajiha Ahmed: A Second Take on Last Week’s “Long March” in Pakistan

  1. I agree that Pakistan has Extremists and I think pakistanis know that too. Please dont forget that India has its own problems. Its naive to blame everything on “Muslims” and just carry on. India definitely has a much bigger separation of church and state than pakistan but there have been countless occassion where politicians have used differences in religion to bring out the worst in people both In India and Pakistan.

    and Obviously, if you blame somebody for something , he will blame you for two other things and the ball keeps on rolling (think about this, its a metaphor).

    As of right now, my honest opinion is that Pakistan is a sinking boat and everybody has to chip in to make sure that the boat does not sink.

  2. Pakistan gets never ending amounts of money from the US to fight against militants, and also is in cahoots with the very same militants to continue their proxy wars in Afghanistan and India, including against US forces in Afghanistan as so many news reports have explained, some referred to in this thread. Pakistan is running the most successful racket in the world with the ISI as the middle man in order to give the Pakistani government deniability in front of the US and others. This would not be possible only with extremists involved, you need more levels of society and government to sustain it for all these decades, and for those jihadi training centers to be run out in the open. If extremists have misunderstood Islam or not is not important when the supposed non-extremist find working with extremists of mutual benefit. Both the “moderates” and “extremists” want proxy forces fighting in Afghanistan and India, carrying out a war without making it official. The militants can do for the Pakistani government and army what they cannot do openly, which is fight the Indian military in India and the US military and Afghans in Afghanistan. Pakistan not only trains its own Pakistani extremists to fight across its borders, but also trains jihadists from other countries including the US and Europe to fight in South Asia or somewhere else. These Pakistani militants and non-Pakistani militants trained in Pakistan are an international problem and that did not happen over night and by extremists alone.

  3. That is they are a problem to other countries. For Pakistan the militants are the solution – the main reason why so much $ is spent by the US in Pakistan which it depends so much on, and the means to wage war covertly.

  4. Folks get back on topic or I will delete your comments and ban you from posting. No more Pakistan vs. India tit for tat comments. Thanks

  5. I am not going to burden this blog posting with my “extremism” any further. I would like to congratulate the pakistani people on the success of the lawyers movement and the re-instatement of the CJ. I am also impressed by the increasing open-ness of the pakistani media over the past five years, and the diversity of voices found online and in newspapers. For example, I think that http://www.dailytimes.com.pk is a excellent newspaper and I cannot think of an indian equivalent that is quite so clear-headed and frank in its assessments.

    At the same time, statements like “pakistanis do not support terrorism” are obvious lies and contradicted by the sources I mention above. Use of violence for “just causes” – kashmir, shia vs. sunni, assorted islamist and other grievances is deeply embedded in pakistani society and until this is honestly discussed openly, we arent going to make much progress.

  6. Ikram – Any idea who owns the Geo TV? I don’t much watch TV due to so many clowns even in western media too, just plain waste of time but I do keep in touch with online news and try to find constructive and impartial sources.

  7. Since it seems a pre-requisite for any Pakistani leader to have Washington’s blessing [as per the Times article linked above by Neena], why doesn’t Pakistan just become an American protectorate/Colony?

    Think of all the money the poor Pakistani tax payer will save, if instead of flying to DC, their rulers will get an audience with the U.S. Viceroy right there in Islamabad.

  8. Swami – Yup this is the real problem but what can you expect from a country which ruled more by Army than anyone else? There is almost no economic development took place there. We got “one” non US and Army supported PM Zulfi Bhutto but then he was hanged by a our Judiciary system (maybe impartial CJ reopen the case ;). The only thing which can save Pakistan if she able to go for educational reforms and economic independence. This not only neccessary for Pakistan but on the whole for all sub continent, having stronger trade ties with regional nations like Russia, India, China and Iran is essential. I’m glad our governments are working towards it.

  9. On the intersection of U.S. policy and Pakistani politics, I was particularly surprised to read this link off a Pakistani news twitter feed:

    Obama calls Zardari, discusses mutual cooperation Pakistan News.Net / Friday 27th March, 2009 (ANI) Islamabad, Mar. 27 : US President Barack Obama telephoned President Asif Ali Zardari on Thursday to discuss mutual cooperation and the situation in the South Asian region. Obama and Zardari spoke about the “Friends of Democratic Pakistan” forum initiative, aimed at promoting and strengthening democracy in Pakistan, The Nation reports… …Zardari, who launched the initiative of ‘Friends of Democratic Pakistan’ (FODP) in New York in September 2008, will chair the Friends’ Ministerial meeting being held in Tokyo on April 17. The forum consists of 25 countries and multilateral institutions including US, UK, China, EU, Japan, Germany, France, Italy, Canada, Republic of Korea, Spain, the Netherlands, Nordic countries, UN, World Bank, Asian Development Bank and Islamic Development Bank.

    What is the “Friends of Democratic Pakistan” forum, and why is Zardari chairing it? Given that Zardari was opposed to an independent judiciary, and given that Zardari had to step back from a repressive attempt to shut down the recent Long March, I’m surprised to read that U.S. President Obama was actually chatting with him about this forum.

    On the one hand, I can understand that if one is to channel development aid into Pakistan (which the U.S. apparently is going to start emphasizing), one needs to do that through that nation’s head of state. And Zardari is still the president. But on the other hand, given his obvious anti-democratic actions, it is disappointing that the Obama Administration appears to be lending its implicit support to him by talking to him in the context of his “Friends of Democratic Pakistan” forum.

    This appears to be related to the “concerns” from Washington about Nawaz Sharif as an effective “partner” for dealing with the Taliban. My fear is that the U.S. may be indirectly attempting to boost the legitimacy of Zardari, even though large numbers of Pakistanis came into the streets to oppose him.

    This approach might help the U.S. get a more pliant “partner” for dealing with the Taliban in the short term, but it’s not helpful to Pakistan’s democracy in the long run.

  10. “…it’s beginning to seem that the militants are increasingly coming down out of the hills, and their kind of Islam is increasingly driving the agenda of the country. Given what has happened in Swat and NWFP in the past few months, it may be that the real cultural-political undercurrent that needs to be addressed is the growth of that militancy. Not because of America’s war on terror, but actually for Pakistan’s own internal security and stability….Militant al-Qaeda and neo-Taliban elements who crossed the border after US-led strikes in Afghanistan are not ‘religious extremists.’ Rather, they are terrorists with an Islamic veneer. Why is this important? Because there is a common misperception that Pakistanis are sympathetic to these so-called militants…The ‘solution’ to the militancy problem most probably involves a regional effort to resolve the war in Afghanistan (see Rashid and Rubin’s article in Foreign Affairs) and a concerted effort inside Pakistan to reclaim militant-ridden areas. I won’t even try to pretend to have an answer to this dilemma— counterinsurgency is extremely difficult.”

    Pakistan has Pakistan to thank for creation and continued support of the militants in their midst. Pakistan created “their kind of Islam” to drive “the agenda of the country” of Afghanistan. Chickens have come home to roost. Counterinsurgency is extremely difficult when you are supporting the insurgents to begin with. Hard to resolve the war in Afghanistan when you are working with militants you created to intensify attacks there.

    “….The deals come in the wake of three operations carried out by the Pakistani military against the Taliban in the last three years – operations in which the military conspicuously refrained from causing the movement significant harm or from killing its leaders.

    The apparent capitulation of the Pakistani authorities to the demands of the Taliban is actually a part of a long-standing alliance between them. The Pakistani military – which actually formed the Taliban in the 1990s – has long been using this movement to control Afghanistan and as a tool in its confrontation with the West. The Taliban, for its part, uses the support and protection of Pakistan to consolidate its strength and gain control over increasingly large areas in Pakistan and Afghanistan….Moreover, the cooperation of the Pakistani military is not only with the Pakistani Taliban, but with the Taliban as a whole, i.e., also with the Taliban in Afghanistan. This is evident from the recent interactions between the Taliban in Pakistan and Mullah Omar, leader of the Taliban in Afghanistan. In the beginning of 2009, three Taliban groups in Pakistan’s Waziristan district formed a joint organization called Shura Ittihad Al-Mujahideen, under the command of three key figures in Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan, namely Baitullah Mehsud, Maulvi Nazir and Maulvi Hafiz Gul Bahadur (the latter two are considered “pro-government”).(23) The significant point is that, upon its establishment, the group pledged its allegiance to Mullah Omar, stating: “We regard Mullah Omar as our Amir-ul-Mumineen [i.e., Leader of the Faithful].”(24) This refutes the opinion, often expressed by political analysis, that Mullah Omar does not represent the Taliban in Pakistan. Moreover, in a recent letter to the leaders of the Taliban in Waziristan, Mullah Omar ordered them not to attack the Pakistani security forces, because fighting Muslims could not be considered jihad. He added that the attacks on the Pakistani military were harming the Taliban movement, and that, if the Taliban fighters wanted to wage jihad, they should come to Afghanistan.(25) As a matter of fact, the Afghan website http://www.taand.com reports that the Taliban and its “supporters” – meaning the Pakistani authorities – have reorganized their forces and are intensifying their attacks in Afghanistan. (26)

    The interaction between Mullah Omar and the Taliban in Pakistan belies the distinction sometimes made between Taliban-Pakistan and Taliban-Afghanistan. It implies that they constitute a single movement led by Mullah Omar – a movement which is currently inclined to cooperate with the Pakistani authorities.

    The re-emergence of the Pakistan-Taliban alliance at this time may be linked to the advent of the Obama administration and to the changing strategic situation in the Pakistan-Afghanistan region. Realizing that Obama means to step up the U.S. campaign against the Taliban and Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and in Pakistan, the Pakistani military has recalibrated its strategic position and brought the Taliban into its fold, to serve as its proxy in a confrontation with the U.S. forces.…” April 1, 2009 http://www.memri.org/bin/latestnews.cgi?ID=IA50809