StrategyPage has always had great coverage of all things military in South Asia. With all the ink and pixels being spilled about all the things going wrong on Pakistan’s unruly border with Afghanistan, Stratpage has this report of one of the tactics that’s working relatively well –
The army can defeat the tribesmen in battle, but it’s guerilla warfare where the tribes have always had an edge. But that edge as disappeared as the tribes became more dependent on outside goods, moved by truck over a few roads. For thousands of years in the past, the tribes were self-sufficient in their mountain valleys. Now, the tribes suffer when the army sets up checkpoints on those roads, and forces the tribesmen to attack the better armed and disciplined soldiers…
Pakistani soliders are faced with suicide attackers who “love death more than you love your 5,000-rupee salary, nude pictures of Indian actresses and liquor.” [link]; But that’s part of the plan.
When Thomas Friedman turned the memorable phrase, The World is Flat, he was popularizing trends in globalization that many have observed for decades. First, that in modern capitalism, economic transactions now span a larger and larger portion of the world – Pakistani tribals might not be able to place Finland or Korea on a map but they are probably getting accustomed to the convenience of a cellphone. Second – and to the consternation of the Arundhati Roy’s, Naomi Kleins, et. al., the mutually beneficial, non-violent, uncompelled transaction inherent to economic exchange necessarily impacts the cultures on both sides. Certain shared cultural norms are necessary to support a transaction and it’s nearly impossible in the long run to get the benefits of a transaction without being at least partially infected by the new culture.
Thomas Barnett, in analyzing the 21st century faultlines, placed them not between Civilizations but rather between those successfully Integrating and those Not Integrating into the global rule set – namely economics & globalziation. The activities of the Pakistani military along this faultline thus paint a great picture of what multifaceted war can / should look like. Trade has clearly run through the region for centuries but only recently does it involve such day to day pedestrian and yet inherently global goods like AA batteries, gasoline, and the like…
i haven’t read t. friedman’s book, so i won’t attempt to caricature it. though i do believe in the power of free trade in generating world wide economic productivity, and believe the roy’s & klein’s of the world are shortsighted (it is rather easy to wonder about proximate downsides of development as a member of the privileged class who can afford misallocation of capital), i think that trade is going to have far less of an impact on flattening cultural differences than some of its boosters think. there are signs in the social literature than upwardly mobility for the broad masses can lead toward more hostility toward the west and its culture, and a reconstructed ‘traditionalism,’ as opposed to the economic man.
true that. I (like you, Razib) am a big fan of Amy Chua’s World on Fire….
One more thought before I head into a conf call… World on Fire is one take at the “left behinds” in globalization, but there’s no question that the same tools / techniques used to spread trade are also used by traditionalists to fight back — Jihadi websites, etc. for ex. SO, alas, we aren’t able to sit back on autopilot and let globalization run its course turning us all into Homo Economicus..
The real point of contention isn’t really whether the people entering into global exchange are forced to find common customs and norms, but WHAT those norms turn out to be, and HOW they affect the gains from trade for each side.
I don’t see how demarcating the line of conflict as between those integrating and those not integrating into the global rule set addresses the sad fact that those integrated (for instance, jihadists with western graduate degrees who can run circles around a lot of westerners in the technology and online department) carry the same, if not more, hatred to the west. In other words, do you think Barnett has incorporated the power of deep-seated ideology and the immutability of certain cultures (as well as the I Can Be You, Yet Better Than You mentality) into this rule set? The more they change, the more they stay the same.
Maitri — I think Barnett, moreso than many others, is actually quite specific w.r.t. “cultures” rather than particular “individuals” / “organizations” / or “countries” as the agents of modern conflict. In other words, you can have individuals within a given country who buy into & act on totally different cultural narratives
Perhaps the most relevant example being that Al Qaeda clearly has folks who live next door to readily-globalizing members of society (and, as Razib & you duly note – to a large extent AQ needs this disparity to really thrive). While those particular AQ individuals live in an “integrating” country but their “cultural root” comes from a non-integrating one….
While those particular AQ individuals live in an “integrating” country but their “cultural root” comes from a non-integrating one….
the tension or conflict is the issue. a disproportionate number of salafist terrorists have advanced technical degrees. even by western standards they are often quite educated, so what you have here are frankly the cream of sub-standard societies. they are the nexus point. the revolutionary vanguard is invariably these sorts of elements driven toward social anomie by modernization. i have some data on my weblog.
Well, if there is one thing I have always been able to count on, it is for Strategypage, and by defintion “How to Make War” Jim Dunnigan, to get the facts somewhat right, and the conclusion 100% wrong.
Razib, as far as AQ fighters holding advanced degrees and being the “cream of the crop” of the their respective Gulf Arab societies, it means nothing in relation to their alleged combat prowess and effectiveness. A good illustration of the utter uselessness of these Arab “proto-AQ” fighters in the 1979-89 Soviet-Afghan war can be best summarized in this book:
http://www.amazon.com/Afghan-Guerrilla-Warfare-Mujahideen-Fighters/dp/0760313229
It is more or less a case by case, battle by battle compilation of the conflict, and the Arabs get mentioned perhaps ONCE in all of these accounts. In that single account I can remember, they are criticized for NOT wanting to engage in combat with Soviet-Afghan Government forces, despite requests by local Afghan Mujahideen for urgent reinforcement.
No, this is really a fight between Afghan mountain men, and Pakistan government forces, and I expect the results, regardless of U.S pressure, to be exactly the same as it has always been before. The Pakistani Army will pull out after a few weeks of engagement in the region with a bloody noise, and declare “victory”. It is not a question of “self-sufficiency” or the like, since those same tribesmen are for all intents and purposes rather self-sufficient at arms. Last I checked, an hand-made AK-47 clone goes for about $50 U.S in the NWFP.
Razib: so what you have here are frankly the cream of sub-standard societies. they are the nexus point. the revolutionary vanguard is invariably these sorts of elements driven toward social anomie by modernization
In that case, western knowledge is not anathema to these fighters, but western culture is. By what logic the separation, and what about western culture is the source of noxiousness? Or, is it simply frustration and aggressiveness based on an inability for their nations to develop because of (perceived) western global domination of the rule set?
“The army can defeat the tribesmen in battle, but it’s guerilla warfare where the tribes have always had an edge. But that edge as disappeared as the tribes became more dependent on outside goods, moved by truck over a few roads. For thousands of years in the past, the tribes were self-sufficient in their mountain valleys. Now, the tribes suffer when the army sets up checkpoints on those roads, and forces the tribesmen to attack the better armed and disciplined soldiers…”
Okay yes, I just have to say it. That is the most naive and downright stupid conclusion one could possibly draw. Without a doubt, a notion that will only lead to failure in the NWFP for the Pakistani military.
Will someone please explain to me how roadblocks somehow relate to globalization, and how setting up “checkpoints” is such a novel idea that nobody fighting against guerrilla fighters has ever thought of before in the last 1,000 years?
What is this supposed to be? The “New Economy” approach to combating interdiction hit-and-run attacks in mountain desert terrain?
About the only thing those “brilliant roadblocks”, staffed by supposedly “well equipped” Pakistani soldiers(do they have night vision, body armor, and most importantly Air and Arty support that in organized efficiently and effectually, aka TOT delivery? What are there own supply lines like? What is their reserve, and how quickly will that reserve be made available? To they have effective transport, such as large scale helicopter movements in the area?) will accomplish, is they themselves getting ambushed and killed. Nothing more…
Reading this nonsense makes my blood boil!!!
From the context of a political conflict, I have never understood the Taliban and the Afghanistan problem clearly. Pakistan aided by the CIA propped up & funded all those warlord and Talibans to fight and drive the Russians out. What was the phase transition or reason in history that those very Talibans and warlords turned against USA and Pakistan leading to 9/11 and the present mess.
An interesting interactive map of the troubled region
There was no phase transition with respect to the US. They’ve always had the same opinion vis a vis what they regarded as the degenerate Western or Indianized (i hear the Mujahideen used to taunt the residents of Kabul as being “Hindu”)culture of Afghan elites. American interests coincided with those of the Mujahideen during the cold war, that’s it. If they hadn’t played host to AQ they would still be merrily executing women in soccer stadiums without American interference. Pakistan’s army still views the Taliban as important asset against what they view as an Indian puppet state run by Karzai which is why our “ally” in the WoT is less than enthusiastic about their new mission.
Well actually the Taliban as an organization did not exist during the Soviet time. Once the USSR withdrew and civil war ensued between the various groups, Pakistan saw an opportunity to help a small faction (pro Pakistani) to help take control and stabilize the region (securing trade routes, too). Instead of having an India sympathetic Afghanistan on its borders, it had a client state with significant input/control. Many of those who fought the soviets wound up in the Taliban, but they never really existed as a group then.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Taliban
Priya – “Pakistan aided by the CIA propped up & funded all those warlord and Talibans to fight and drive the Russians out.”
It is important to note that the Taliban did not exist in the 1980’s, and what was latter to become the Taliban, under both ISI and more importantly “Afghan Arab” influence, had little to do with the actual defeat/pullout of Soviet forces in 1989.
Pakistani influence/organization of Afghan “Mujahideen” was largely regulated to the Pashtun tribes and areas, and many Pashtuns became the backbone of the Taliban in the 1990’s.
The Taliban was truly a different organization unto itself, from the leadership on down, and behaved accordingly.
louiecypher – “They’ve always had the same opinion vis a vis what they regarded as the degenerate Western or Indianized (i hear the Mujahideen used to taunt the residents of Kabul as being “Hindu”)culture of Afghan elites.”
Utter nonsense, and pure fantasy on your part.
I especially like how you managed to combine “Westernized”, “Indianized” and “Afghan Elites” all within one sentence, as though any of that meant a damn to your average Afghan fighter in the 1980’s, who probably would not know what those terms stood for anyways.
As though the “Afghan Elites of Kabul”, some of whom fought the Soviets as Mujahideen, are somehow striving to be “Indianized”…Sheesh!!!
You obviously know SQUAT about Afghanistan.
Busted! I’ll stop purveying these myths of Indian educated elites like Karzai and bans on Bollywood fare. And I’ll assume that the Afghan taxi drivers who routinely pick me up from the airport who seem to be happy to find out that I am Indian (instead of you know…) are just angling for a better tip
But you could say that about us Americans, too.
Afew thing here:
1) Hamid “The Metrosexual Pashtun” Karzai is about as representative of Afghanistan, as Musharraf is of Pakistan, or Mubarak is of Egypt. In fact, even less so. A great dresser and all, but not in touch with Afghanistan, me thinks.
2) Bollywood? Popular with Afghans? Maybe in a strictly comical sense. Bollywood is fun to watch, because it is FUNNY to watch. At least it was, back in my day. Always a good laugh, and hence popular.
3) Why would any Afghans not “like” Indians? Afghans are a rather warm and friendly lot, regardless of their ethnic-tribal affinity, and I never detected any dislike, or even negative understanding, of Indians. Indians were simply different people from a different place, speaking a different language. Now, if you were from…Well, you already hinted it.
4) It was the notion of Afghans seeing “Kabulis” as Indianized back in the 1980’s, that I find lacking in fact. It simply makes no sense.
5) So you took a few cabs in Kabul, eh? Look on the bright side. If I do recall, if they actually painted lanes in Kabul, nobody would respect them anyways. I would imagine it has not changed much this decade? 🙂
Cyrus, the culture and environment of Kabul in the pre-Soviet invasion days was relatively liberal…in some ways markedly so…especially when compared to conservative bastions like Kandahar. The young, educated circles at least were rapidly throwing off many traditions. In fact in most cinema houses in Kabul apparently, there was a (western) dress code, and people dressed like old-school Pashtuns from the countryside were often denied admission (not that this is was a good policy or anything). Dating was common. Men and women could mingle and socialise. These trends were not found in all social strata, but there was an educated, youthful demographic (probably would have formed the seeds of an eventual middle class had things gone differently for Afghanistan) who embraced many Western mores, if not fully then at least to an extent which seems hard to imagine now. Anyway, all this liberalism was restricted ONLY to (some) people in Kabul, and was wiped out by developments after the Soviet invasion.
I think Afghan warlords / warriors are over rated in the press for their “exploits” against the Brits in the late 1800s (made famous by Kipling) and their “Stinger” missile induced victory against the Soviets. Without getting backed by bigger military powers (like China / Russia and Pakistan) their battle against US/NATO is lost.
There were no hell-fire missiles or aerial attacking machines in the 1800s and that’s the reason for the British military defeats. That’s not true anymore. The much anticipated Afghan Taliban spring offensive turned out to be a damp squib with their leader Mullah Dadullah being taken out..
OK Cyrus, I see you are actually from Afghanistan. OK then, you can let me know if my claims are accurate. They are based on various things I’ve read, a documentary I saw once, and also talking with Afghans of my acquaintance. I’d be interested in your comments.
Amitabh, you hit the nail on the head with that post.
Afghanistan, at least in Kabul, was rapidly “westernizing” in the 1970’s, just like another country right next door to it, Iran. In fact, the manor was VERY similar between the two, with the exception that Iran was RICH, RICH, RICH with oil, by comparison. And yes, the “outsiders” to this rapid development and modernization in both Afghanistan and Iran, were the masses of “country folk”. The modernization was the focus on the “elites” of the cities, especially the capital cities, in this case. The ordinary people, those of the country, were being not just left behind, but viewed with utter contempt as backward and primitive.
Hell, it was mini-skirt heaven in Tehran in the 70’s…Now look at it!
Yeh, Iraq was much the same during that period. Its hard to remember now, after all the coverage of Islamization, that Nasser’s Pan Arabism, the Shah’s rule, and Afghan politics were all western looking. Being westernized was not seen as necessarily a bad thing, except perhaps in Gandhian India.
Cyrus – please chill on the anger towards the commmentors… trying to keep it civil here without resorting to petty namecalling…
This to me describes current day India pretty well (except that India has a significant and expanding middle-class, which is actually a major difference I guess). The other main difference though, is that Indian rural people by and large are so accustomed to ‘the way things are’ that they just accept whatever is going on around them. Plus the majority are not Muslim so they don’t have that ideologic force driving them, like people in Iran or Afghanistan did.
One thing that always confused me…I’ve known a lot of Iranians in my time…both Jews and Muslims…and to me, Iranian culture just doesn’t seem compatible with fundamentalism or fanaticism (I know that current reality for the past 30 years proves me wrong). They seem like fun-loving, cultured people, who enjoy life, partying, music, socialising, dressing well, good food, etc. and seem pretty liberal. I just have trouble grasping how Islamic (or Shiite) fundamentalism ever took hold amongst them.
It seems a little simple minded to equate economic exchange with political stability. “Integrating with the global rule set”-good. Not integrated-bad. Whose rules? who is making them? what is the history of these rules?
the other zinger in the comment thread was “sub-standard societies”….
27 Amitabh:
Well, I’m betting that the liberal Iranians you know are the one who were driven out of Iran by the ’79 revolution. I think I recall seeing the ’79 Revolution described as the “revenge of the rural villagers on the urban elites”–you’re meeting the latter, I think.
Ponniyin Selvan, I must disagree with you on, bigtime:
Well ignoring the British experience in Afghanistan in the 19th century, the Afghan resistance to direct Soviet military backing of Kabul is far more complex than simply being a case of U.S/Pakistani and Chinese(and even some Iranian) aid to the “Mujahideen”. After all, the first two or three years of conflict saw virtually no outside support for the anti-communist Afghan fighters. The Stinger “MANPADS” you speak of, did note even arrive in use for the Afghans until 1985 or so. Or other various modern weapon systems were non-existent on the battle field until 1983 or 1984, and even then in very limited amounts. For all intents and purposes, the Soviets has already decided to “pack it up” by the time the Stingers were on hand, and it only served to make their experiences that much worse until withdrawal.
HAH! Dadullah! That cracks me up! You must know a little Farsi/Dari/Persian or whatever the hell they call it now. I completely disagree with your assertion, though. The British may not have had “Hellfire Missiles” or the like, but then the Afghans also lacked recoilless rifles, MANPADS, ATGM’s, assault rifles, MMG’s, RPG’s, auto-cannons, magnetically activated land mines, etc, etc, etc. Afghans, when successful, used “hit and run tactics”, just as they did in the 80’s. They used knowledge of the terrain, surprise and stealth, avoiding direct pitched battles. You made contact, you broke contact. That was and is the rule. Direct open-field style offensives against prepared British positions where about as deadly then, as they would have been to an attacker in the America Civil War, and even WWI. After all, a 12 pounder British smoothbore firing double canister at 150 yards will each your flesh as bad as any modern weapon system fired 40,000 feet above you. A .British 577mm rifled “mini ball” kills at 300 yards, just as good as a modern .223mm.
Afghanistan is a destroyed land, and the people reflect it. They have been through hell for 3 decades, and their society is destroyed. The fact that the Afghans are offering the least bit of “idealogical” resistance to the limited number of NATO troops in country, should not be as a surprise. After all, what is their to resist? Who knows who is planting the occasional I.E.D, and to what is the purpose? The average Afghan probably doesn’t even give it a second thought, until they are actually affected by it. It is not because of modern “Hellfire” missiles that resistance is so limited. It is a dangerous fallacy for a modern military planner to think in such a manor, and in America, they still do. After all, the Soviet Mi-24’s had something just as bad as the “Hellfire”, and it did them little good.
Technological superiority(and even supremacy) did not stop the Chinese in 1950, Algerians in the early 60’s, the VC, the Chechens, and now the various Iraqi groups present day. Last summers war between Israel and Hezbollah, with poor Lebanon caught in the Middle, is the ultimate example of this approach. Guerrilla warfare has always been, and will always be part of conflict. It will adapt with technology and the times, just as conventional warfare does.
30 Cyrus:
Your posted reminded me of the old line “whatever happens, we have got, the Maxim gun, and they have not.”
Of course, I’m not “we”–still relevant, I think. . . .
yo
What Vinod said. Just because a person owns, borrows or handles a cellphone with Arabic numerals on it doesn’t make that person part of the culture that invented and produced cellphones– rather, it make them part of a new culture that’s using cellphones for sometimes different purposes. Cultural markers of a more traditional kind are just handy rallying points for organizing activism of any kind, East or West. The Pashtuns/Pathans clearly believe the Pakistani Govt. is a quisling, or a bunch of quislings, and who can argue with that? And why are all these maps being drawn with the Durand Line representing the Pako-Afghani border? It is a dead line; it < ahref=”http://www.afghanistans.com/Information/History/Durandline.htm”>expired fourteen years ago, any way you look at it.
I meant makes them. Also, I didn’t mean to say, “Yo, U cn have individuals” etc…
Vinod, why are you saying the world is flattening anyway? It seems to me it’s getting bumpier/
#28 Sreshu — Thank you for not making me the only one who raised an eyebrow at “sub-standard societies.”
#1 Razib_the_athiest — Are the Roy’s and Kleins of the world the short-sighted ones? You do understand that a finite world with finite resources cannot handle “development” on the scale that the Friedman’s et al. champion.
I wish that all Neo-Liberal trade and structural reforms were “mutually beneficial, non-violent, and uncompelled,” but I’ve seen much of them to be beneficial to elites (in both the Global North and the Global South), murderous and coerced. Short-sighted, indeed.
From when I was in school, there was much that I read on how “modernization” in India was fueling the ethnic and gender tensions of the region. What exactly is this modernization? If it is technology and consumerism that we are calling “modern” than in India, I have read how this “modernity” can exacerbate tensions not only between ethnic/religious/caste groups but also between men and women. Take for instance the dowry burnings that have become rampant and are related to the more consumer society India has become.
I have read in India, India’s growing consumerism and commercialization of consumer goods, exacerbates the issue of dowry – even as families are buying more consumer goods, it hasn’t changed the attitude of people toward women as property who should solely benefit their men, b/c wanting the consumer goods has led more men and their families to burn wives to acquire more goods. Just b/c these men and their families are integrated in the globalized market, it doesn’t seem in anyway to hinder their misogyny.
Cyrus, if you don’t mind telling us, how long did you live in Afghanistan? I have just finished reading “my forbidden face” – have you read/heard of the book. Describes a Kabul young woman’s experience during that about 5 year period the Taliban ruled Afghanistan. From her uppermiddleclass educated Kabul viewpoint, bollywood was hugely popular among that group. Before the Taliban, she spoke about how her father and her would go jogging in the morning together…I’m just amazed by that.
@Amitabh
Thats is absolutely fascinating. I actually never thought of Indian society in such terms, and it very much reflects my lack of knowledge of South Asian civilization as a whole. You description does raise the issue of the “Islamic” cultural element to the equation, since both India and Iran are very old cultures, but one being Hindu, and the other not just Muslim, but Shia Muslim. Do you think that perhaps Indian civilization, under the realm of Hinduism, holds a more patient approach in the mindset of society, when related to various kinds of change? I have know idea, and I ask out of curiosity. By comparison, I would argue the Iranians have a uniquely flavored form of idealogical “religion”, and one that relishes in the concept of revolution and reactionary tendencies in the face of a notion of persecution, regardless of it being real or imagined. This exists in a manor that is even foreign to the rest of the “Islamic World”, for whatever that means.
Growing up in America around rather educated and “elite” Indian transplants, you start to think that everyone in India has the initials M.D right after their name. 🙂
Thats a very keen observation, on your part. I am assuming most of the Iranians you are talking about live in LA, eh? I.E the “Persians”. 🙂
In all fairness, the majority of Iranians that immigrated the U.S in the years after the 1979 revolution were either the initial wealthy and western educated “Shahi” connected elitists, or in subsequent years, those escaping the repercussions of the Iran-Iraq War. Obviously, those fleeing the war were not very inclined to serve within it, and thus are the elements that can been seen as not sharing any idealogical fervor with the newly installed Islamic regime(Even if they are still “religious”). This second element very much represented Iran’s then newly emerged Middle Class. The wave of Iranians that came to the U.S in the 1990’s, to the present day, represent a group that still is considerably educated and professional “city folk” by the standards of their homeland, hold views and opinions that can contrast sharply with those that came earlier. After all, they grew up in the decades following the revolution, and its resulting ramifications, and tend to see things in a very different light, from say the earlier “Shahis” especially.
In my own personal experience in recent years, I can best describe modern Iran as a strange “Oxymoron”. Iran is an “Islamically” run country, but hardly anything like Saudi Arabia, or the madness of the Taliban(they are actually idealogical enemies in both cases). Iranians in Tehran, though technically Islamic in the cultural sense, very much exhibit in private tendencies towards agnosticism or atheism, perhaps in majority. They are very much the “fun loving types” one might meet in LA, especially in Iran’s upper middle classes. This can be contrasted very sharply with the religious views of the “country folk”, who largely still support the revolution, and saw to it the presidency of Ahmedinejad in 2005 and his pseudo-socialist policies. Ironically, and in my own personal experiences, the view of Tehranis in modern Iran VERY MUCH reflects the attitude of “elitism” that so permeated the dictatorship of the Shah towards the poor rural populations. I personally watched Iranian police treat “country folk” in the same less-than-human manor that one would have expected 30 years ago during the Shah’s reign. The current Iranian government actively supports the movement of rural populations to city centers, and has nearly the same contempt for their existence that one would expect from elitists in any rapidly developing nation. The irony being that this same government was brought to power by the people they now view with such contempt and disdain.
Its like some Islamocommie(as opposed to the ever favorite American slang “Islamofacist”) version of the Soviet Union, in a strange and smaller way…George Orwell’s Animal Farm, anyone? 🙂
SM Intern – “Cyrus – please chill on the anger towards the commmentors… trying to keep it civil here without resorting to petty namecalling…”
Sorry, I must have thought I was Razib for a second… 🙂
Amitabh #27
Indeed it does. Yay “development!”
Maitri @ #11 asked:
I have this provocative hypothesis that after the enforced interaction of cultures that WWII engendered, and which has been accelerated by modern media, conservatism (I’m using the word in the older, British sense) has essentially turned into a series of bitterly fought retreats. The awareness (or suspicion) that conservatism is going to be on the losing side is what imbues these battles with such bitterness. How “bitter” these scrimmages are might be governed by the effectiveness and the coherence of the rule of law that the potential malcontents have experienced in their lifetimes. So yes, I view the militancy of the Christian Right as a deeply-felt struggle against a value-system against which — in the long run — resistance is basically futile. However, but for the exception of the abortion-clinic-bombing subculture, the Christian Right’s battle-manual is tempered by its perceptions of the efficacy of American law and order.
To return to Maitri’s question: no, I don’t think that too many salafist fighters are thinking in such progressive terms as the inability of their nations to develop, or even in terms of jihad –although the term jihad is a great recruiting tool. They are thinking in much more gut-level terms such as “our way of life”.
These two assertions, taken together, suggest that there is a certain inherent poverty in the attempts to explain this type of ultra-conservative/traditionalist angst in purely trade-and-globalisation terms. (But Vinod’s post is understandable; you lean towards economics being a theory of everything, Vinod, don’t you 🙂 ?) But I will grant that the degree of extremism of a disaffected group — shaped as it is by its experiences of the rule of law — is amenable to economic explanations (which is still logically different from Barnett’s position).
Cyrus:
your long reply at #30 is not convincing. Even if Brits had superior guns in the late 1800s they did not have the air power to just shoot from the top and go back to the base. And their land based movements are vulnerable to hit and run attacks.
Even the Soviets were successful in their air attacks and you should offer the proof that pre-Stinger they have decided to “cut and run” because of the “military failures”. Whatever I have read doesn’t point me in that direction. They are quite successful in using their military helicopters, pre-Stinger and before the massive financial and military backing of the US/Saudi/Pak alliance.
I’d take any claim of “Afghan warriors’ valour” to beat back others with a pinch of salt. With the current military position and the solid backing of the “Northern Alliance” there is no chance of a Taliban revival. We could see that in the lack of “effective Taliban offensive movements” over the last 6 years..
@#39
Development or not. Indians and diabetes have gone together. Our diet is almost suicidal. There is really very little low fat options in the Punjabi and Gujarati cuisines. Some gujju dishes like look like they would give a run a car for 100 miles.
GB, your comment is interesting in that it is completely wrong. “progressives” in every country are against globalization, while christian conservatives are very much for it. What’s more, the reason “progressives” are against it is also the reason why Islamic extremists are against it: morality.
Implicit in free trade and globalization is a Christian calvinist morality: you reap what you sow, and you should also be able to reap what you sow. This flies in the face of both “populist” traditionalists, as well as authoritarian/Islamic traditionalists. There are “bitterly fought battles” all right, but it is important to note who is fighting on what side.
To HyperTree @ #31:
You may have misunderstood me when you said this:
I never intended to characterise the views of the faction that calls itself progressive (read left-wing). I just said that concern about the inability of one’s nation to develop is a progressive (in the strictly dictionary, as opposed to the American-politico-rhetorical, sense) concern.
Also — just look at #40 once more — I never said that Christian conservatives are anti-globalisation; I only said that they are, as a group, militant and angst-ridden. Your statement about the Christian Right’s largely pro-globalisation attitude actually supports my last point of #40, viz. one will have to look somewhere other than Economics to explain the Christian Right’s angst (the desire for a more “Christian” Supreme Court, or loud street-corner seminars on Leviticus, among many other things, indicates some angst. . .)
I should have indicated clearly the sense in the word “progressive” was meant in #40. Does this clarification make #40 more interesting or less 😉 ?
To further clarify to HyperTree : the intention of mentioning the Christian Right was to name a group that is engaged in a bitter rearguard action, and to explain that bitterness as a product of the perception that the “Christian way of life” is relentlessly being eroded. Also to tangentially point out that conservative (again, in the British sense) militancy cannot be totally explained by the integrating/not-integrating dynamic.
GB, unarguably all angst cannot be explained by economics or by integration — in particular it will not dictate whether or not the little brother pulls the ponytails of his older sister, and her angst thereof.
Vinod’s point was far less revolutionary, almost a tautology: greater integration and mutually beneficial free trade implies conflicts will be fewer. If I need the older sister’s help in my math hw, I’m probably not going to pull her hair as hard.
As regards my earlier comment: I thought your comment made the following interesting point: that moralities of traditionalists are threatened by globalization, and that this gives rise to conflicts. My point was merely that Christian traditionalists are at home with it, and that it is the morality of the populists (who are anything but traditionalists!) and authoritarians which is threatened by this “culture” of mutual trade and interconnectedness.
To Hypertree @ #43:
Can you explain how “you reap what you sow” flies in the face of “populist traditionalists” please?
Hypertree @ 46
Authoritarians are anti-“free” trade? What is more authoritarian than institutions such as the WTO which are not democratically elected, meet behind closed doors, and whose authority supersedes national sovereignty?
Ancient Chettiars who spread Indian goods (& Indic culture) to SE Asia were Christian Calvinists? Is it morality or the feeling that they can’t win with free trade in the modern world?
As someone who is just 1 generation removed from subsistence/small commercial farming, I applaud the obstinacy of the Indian & Brazilian WTO negotiators. But I just don’t buy the idea that globalization is a Euro-American/Protestant specific compulsion.
Louiecypher: I didn’t mean to imply both ways, that Christian Calvinists alone can have the “free trade” morality. I share your impatience with those who see ethnocentric origins in general moralities.
Harbeer: The authoritarianism comes from the tariff barriers imposed by populists not from the removal of them. I paint with a broad brush here but populist morality derives from proximate effects of sowing, and from a hatred of “powerful” reapers. Neither of these are conducive to the “reap what you sow” morality.