Via Desipundit, I caught a link to a post by Qalandar on a recent article in the Calcutta Telegraph by Mukul Kesavan.
For those who don’t know, Mukul Kesavan is a pretty accomplished writer — the author of Looking Through Glass, and an interesting little monograph that came out a few years ago, called Secular Common-Sense.
His latest column is about the lingering consequences of the experience of Partition on the thinking of the Indian government regarding its borders. Kesavan is pointing to a kind of paradox in the constitution of the Indian state — it was founded on a principle of pluralism across religious, linguistic, ethnic, and caste differences. But once it was defined as such and those borders were consecrated, if you will, in blood during the Partition, the possibility of allowing one or another territory to secede on the basis of ethnic or religious difference became an impossibility. If you do that, the whole justification for holding the rest of the country together could potentially collapse.
Qalandar raises some questions about the rhetorical stance taken by Kesavan in his piece, and Mukul Kesavan himself actually shows up in the comments to clarify some things. In fact, it’s in the comments to the post that he gives what might be the clearest account of his position:
Pakistan claims Kashmir because as a Muslim state carved out of British India it thinks it has a right to Kashmir as a Muslim majority province. Israel, as a Jewish state, wants to annex large settler blocs of Jews on the West Bank to Israel and in return would be happy to give away bits of Israel that have concentrations of Arabs. Other nations dispute or defend territory on the ground of language. Indian nationalism refused the temptation of a single collective identity; as a result, the republic it created had no way of discriminating between borders that were negotiable and those that were written in stone. Not only were its borders were colonial and therefore arbitrary, being an ideologically pluralist state it couldn’t claim or trade away disputed borderlands going by the nature of the populations settled there. So it decided that every inch of its border was sacred and what it had, it held. (link)
It’s an interesting thesis — one could argue that it might not hold in the case of India’s claims to the Kashmir valley (too much strategic and symbolic value to ever think of letting go). But the northeastern provinces, where secessionism abounds, seem more marginal. And just to reiterate in case anyone misses it: Kesavan isn’t saying that India should just let go of any territory (indeed, he comes out pretty clearly as saying it shouldn’t). Rather, Kesavan is trying to explain why India has held on — and will continue to hold on — so tenaciously.
There’s more to it, but I think I’ll leave it to readers to explore some of the other interesting points made in this discussion, by Qalandar, Mukul Kesavan, and Nitin Pai.
awright guys, gotta take off…my first time on sepia in quite a while, it’s been a blast…
So the solution is to have referenda with super-majorities and guarantees for the rights of the minority group in the new state. That’s hardly an argument against self-determination.
Furthermore, your very argument undermines the basis for Indian Independence as well. That is, the creation of India necessarily created minorities, some of which did not sign on to being part of the new state. The creation of the US did the same, and led to an exodus of as many as 100,000 Tories from the new country.
Isn’t that the basis for the claim to self-determination? The idea that one group should not rule over another? Why restrict that simply to opposition to European Colonial rule?
You can’t argue that India, in trying to hold on to Kashmir, is no different than the British Empire holding on to India. The fundamental difference is that the people of India under British rule had very little political representation in the larger British Empire. There are some realistic problems with political power and representation in Kashmir, but setting all that aside, a Kashmiri, at least in theory, has the same political power as any other citizen in any other state of India. The basic premise of democracy has to include minority reconciliation. You cannot have a democracy in which every political disagreement leads to secession or it would be creating a perpetual downward spiral into ever smaller divisions. Otherwise, what’s to stop Jamshedpur from seceding from India because Tata doesn’t like the idea of some new corporate tax? Obviously there is a really fine distinction between political disagreements that would merit secession and those that wouldn’t.
A super majority doesn’t really give you any greater moral authority than a simple majority. Regardless of what percentage you decide to use, you will still end up creating minority groups and if you then seek to guarantee full rights for that minority, then I fail to see what the practical accomplishment of seceding is in the first place. Would a secular independent Kashmir be any different than if it was still part of India? How would you ensure this guarantee if the majority begins to show a pro-Pakistani tilt?
Ennis:
I see that you like to wander in ‘pony fields’; I think your counter-argument fails both ‘in-principle’ as well as ‘in-practice’. Taking up the latter point first, the ‘theoretical’ resolution you suggest is exactly that; in the real world, I see no takers for super-majority referenda in most secessionist circles, whether in the (urban Sunni Muslim) precincts of the Kashmir Valley or elsewhere.
I find especially laughable your insistence that ‘guarantees’ of minority group rights will do the trick–perhaps you should ask some Kashmiri Pandit residents of the refugee camps in Jammu what they think of such nifty ‘solutions’. Should we (Kashmiri Pandits) trust the people who were instrumental in forcing us to flee the Valley? Btw, I am being quite literal here, since many (if not most) of the actors ca. 1989 are still active today in secessionist politics in J&K.
Even ‘in-principle’, super-majority referenda are not necessarily guaranteed to ensure the assent of all relevant ‘minority’ groups, especially in the extremely complicated ethno-religious landscape of J&K as well as the Northeast. Indeed, these sorts of mechanisms simply are not workable for the complex ethno-religious landscapes found in virtually every state of India.
The INC wasn’t looking to set up an ethno-religious imperium like the British Empire in India, or say, the secessionist faction among Kashmiri Muslims in J&K State, or the Nagas in Nagaland (who wish to rule over all districts in neighboring states that have a substantial Naga population, regardless of the wishes of non-Naga residents). It’s for this reason that the reductio ad absurdum you floated earlier in the thread fails.
Kumar
So sayeth a child who fled his motherland and responsibilities
The gap between theory and practice is large for Kashmir in all the ways that counts. I’m not saying that Kashmir should be independent, I’m just saying that Kashmiris have not been democratically represented in India. Some quotes:
Rigged elections:
Direct rule and human rights violations by both sides:
No matter what you think the proper solution to Kashmir is, you can’t argue that the Kashmiri people have had much of a say in their own affairs for decades.
If India had stayed part of the Raj, it probably would soon have received a large degree of local autonomy. The INC didn’t want that any more, they wanted full independence. Why should a similar demand by some members of territories within India by prima facie illegitimate?
Some excellent points by Camille, particularly in #82 but also in #88. Ennis and I also appear to be on the same page in some aspects, or at least he seems to understand where I’m coming from with regards to my own perspective.
I should reiterate at this point that I’m not specifically talking about Kashmir — which really is a complicated mess of an issue as others have noted — or even necessarily just India.
Nevertheless, this is obviously a complex issue regardless of which part of the world one is discussing, and matters such as the specific reasons for a region wishing to secede from the wider state, the reasons why the state opposes the secession, and indeed the exact reasons and methods by which the region had historically become a part of the wider state in the first place, all need to be considered.
If we are going to talk specifically about India, however (although not necessarily Kashmir), my point is this: There is both a logical and moral disjoint between the fact that a region which voluntarily joined the Union (as per the accession of the former Princely States, for example) would not subsequently be allowed to leave the Union at a later date. At the risk of sounding even more controversial, it’s almost Mafia-like in tone: “Join us if you want to, but remember that once you do, you can never leave”.
Camille,
Since I live in the UK, this is also one of the parallels which has been on my own mind throughout this discussion. There is currently a huge amount of popular & political resistance in Britain to the notion of the country becoming part of a Europe-wide “superstate” governed from Brussels; I believe France and Germany in particular are fond of the idea.
On the flipside, there are also currently serious movements in Britain regarding the dissolution of the 300-year-old formalised United Kingdom (the term used here is “devolution”), due to the desire for Scottish independence. Since this matter is obviously of immediate impact to me, it’s another parallel which has been at the back of my mind during my various comments on this thread. I can understand why some commenters here would object to the secession of any states back in India due to the historical precedents for bloodshed, but if the rationale on the part of others is “India united, at all costs” (not due to legitimate concerns regarding the threat from Pakistan etc, but just for the principle of it), then I wonder if they would also advocate armed military action to prevent the secession of Scotland from the rest of the UK too.
Kumar: Out of curiosity, have the Kashmiri Pandits who got expelled from the Valley moved on or are they still holding on to the belief that they will go back/want to go back.
I have noticed that a lot of Palestinians who themselves or their parents got expelled almost half a century back, still hold on to the belief that they will one day go back to now Israel or atleast want to go back. Though I wonder if that will change if they are all given citizenship of a country because most of them have UN travel documents which makes it near impossible for them to move around.
Also where have most of the Kashmir Pandits moved to?
It’s worth reminding ourselves at this stage in the discussion that a highly chauvinistic form of religious identity politics that verges on the fascist is the default and consistently re-elected norm in Gujarat, and that it has currency throughout India, the hysteria of Hindutva, which posits that 850 million Hindus in India are under threat of extinction and persecution, and that this fascism has significant support in the diaspora. This hysterical identity politics has the benefit of not seeking secession from the Indian Union though, it only seeks to purify and ‘teach minorities a lesson’, so cannot be spun as being unpatriotic, luckily for them. But a full account of this virus should be included in all considerations of India today, especially regarding what presents the gravest threat to secular and liberal democracy in modern India. Remember, Modi and the rest of the ‘burn them alive’ crew are still in power and they feed off hysterical identity politics of the ‘Hinduism Under Danger’ banner every day, and they are feted when tracelling abroad (when they can get a visa)
Yeah, yeah right.. It is “Hindutva” that is the problem in Jammu and Kashmir.. 🙂
Speaking of hysterical and chauvinistic violent religious identity political ideologies with a major base in the diaspora was what I was referring to Ponniyin Selvan – all subjects touched on in this discussion. The only difference is that this particular one holds power in one state and is the default discourse in large parts of India.
Al_Mujahid_for_debauchery
I would think that the desire to go back to J&K is harbored by most KPs to one degree or another. Based on my experience, the intensity of the desire varies of course; I suspect those living in the refugee camps entertain that prospect to a considerably greater degree than those who have been lucky enough to find safe harbor and reconstruct our lives outside the refugee camps.
There are refugee camps in Jammu and New Delhi (which fact alone ought to shame Indian pols, but of course they tend to be a shameless lost); those not living in the camps are in New Delhi, Mumbai and abroad. Of course, I should add that there are numerous exceptions to this tendency; certainly my family which has been fortunate to find a safe harbor in America have not forgotten about our home in Srinagar.
Jai Singh
Your list of possible reasons for being skeptical about secessionism (fears about violence based on past experience, ‘in principle’ opposition to secessionism) doesn’t strike me as an exhaustive list, at least on first reading. Certainly one reason to be quite skeptical about the merits of secessionism is to look at the current conduct of secessionists and their apologists in, say, J&K (forcing Kashmiri Pandits to flee, etc.) or the Northeast (killing those who are ‘ethnically incorrect’). The project of the secessionists in J&K, with which I am unfortunately all too well-acquainted, provides me with ample grounds to be skeptical about their liberal democratic credentials.
Which is to say, that if the secessionist Scots were to engage in the ethnic cleansing of, say, English residents of Scotland, or other forms of terrorism, I would think that military action might well be warranted (if all else fails). Btw, my impression is that the secessionist faction in Scotland act only in the political arena (but do correct me if IÂ’m mistaken on this point).
Advocating for the devile
I am not altogether convinced that, practically speaking, it matters whether secessionist movements are ‘prima facie’ or ‘ultima facie’ illegitimate. Indeed, I wouldn’t phrase it in quite those terms. Rather, I think that (as a matter of fact) the sorts of secessionists who have run amok in India of late tend to peddle ‘prima facie’ illegitimate movements; the key distinction is whether they are genuine liberal democrats or merely ethno-religious imperialists. The INC of yesteryear was not interested in an undiluted ethno-religious power grab, unlike the secessionists in J&K today.
As far as J&K goes, it contains more than secessionist Kashmiri Muslims, as IÂ’m sure you know. The conduct of the secessionist faction towards non-secessionists (Muslim, Hindu or otherwise) can hardly endear it to any liberal democrat; there is simply no evidence (beyond hollow spasms of rhetoric) that minority rights would be respected by the men with the guns (or their apologists) in secessionist circles.
It’s of course true that the gap between the theory and practice of the Indian state is large in J&K, though it is simply not as large as secessionists claim (consider the 2006 rating of J&K state’s political freedom in comparison to PoK or even Pakistan itself by Freedom House, which rates J&K ‘partly free’ while both PoK and Pakistan are rated ‘not free’; btw, Freedom House is hardly an apologist for the Indian state, as even a casual perusal of their report shows).
Nothing on offer by the secessionists would narrow that gap; quite to the contrary, it would create new canyons between ‘theory and practice’. I think it quite justifiable to think the secessionist enterprise in J&K ‘prima facie’ illegitimate.
Regards, Kumar
Kumar – and yet, with American Independence, there was considerable violence against those who were in opposition, both during and after the war. Does that make US independence less legitimate?
As for India – not only was there violence by both sides during partition, but there was also the armed invasions of Kashmir, Sikkim and Goa. The invasion of Goa happened despite a ruling against India in the Hague, and despite a motion by the UN General Assembly that the people of Goa ought to be able to choose their own future.
Most movements have rhetoric that they are the former, and act as if they are the latter. How do you propose to tell? Furthermore, which ethnos is important? The independence movement in India was definitely an assertion of Indian nationalism against the British rather than being a purely neutral liberal movement, is this wrong?
You can add “area” to the lingustic, cultural …etc. The area of what’s India and Pakistan and Bangladesh (i.e the British India) is more than Western Europe and equivalent to the area when you include the east european nations (without Russia but including all of cental Asia and Turkey).
The area of Europe Total 6,000,000 sq. Km (Without Russia but with all of central Asia and Turkey) area of South Asia Total 4,000,000 sq. Km (without Afghanistan and Myanmar)
Great thread BTW.
Advocating for the devile
Perhaps you weigh both rhetoric and action equally, but I do not. In cases where liberal democratic secessionist rhetoric masks ethno-religious killing and ethnic cleansing, I put greater weight on the latter when inferring the intent and likely outcome of secessionist movements. I fear your devil’s brief for Kashmiri secessionists fails on that score—do peruse the Freedom House report on the actions of the secessionists. Their actions are diametrically opposed to the rhetoric they peddle (to outsiders, at least). In contrast, the gap between the Indian state’s actions and rhetoric is far less; indeed, given that reality, it is not surprising that Freedom House rates J&K State’s freedom higher than PoK or Pakistan.
Every group whose fundamental rights are in danger in the new dispensation sought by secessionists is important when weighing the legitimacy of a secessionist movement. The independence movement was certainly an assertion of Indian nationalism but not merely or only that; it was also an attempt to fashion a liberal democratic order, an attempt I judge to have succeeded to a significant degree (despite all the problems with Indian democracy). ‘Nationalist’ movements per se are worthy of respect only to the extent that they talk and act as liberal democrats. Nothing in your comments shows such a distinction is impractical or unprincipled.
I am not one to argue that India (or America) have always and everywhere behaved in accordance with their liberal principles. The gap between theory and practice, then (during American and Indian independence) and now, is far less however compared to those secessionist movements I think are ‘prima facie’ illegitimate.
Btw, this does not mean I agree with your take on every past incident you highlighted, e.g., the accession of J&K State to Inda. It wonÂ’t shock you to learn that I do not think the use of the Indian Army to secure J&K state against Pakistani invasion was unjust; indeed, neither did Kashmiri Muslims of that time in Varmul, among other areas. Their help to the Indian army was crucial in stopping the Pakistani onslaught.
Regards, Kumar
Why does India insist on administering Jammu, Kashmir, and Ladakh together as one state? Doesn’t it just complicate the whole issue? Why not make three states out of it? They have three different languages and cultures. Jammu and Ladakh are majority non-Muslim as well, there’s no question of them going to Pakistan OR becoming independent; then only Kashmir (as a state of its own) would be left to deal with. It would be easier to focus on the “Kashmir” issue for all concerned (India, Pakistan, and the Kashmiris (whether Muslim, Pandit, or Sikh) if everyone’s attention and energy could be focused on that one state, which is where the focus should be.
Amitabh:
Rest assured, the focus of the Pakistani government (and the jihadis in their employ) has been on the mostly Muslim Kashmir valley for the past nearly six decades. However, the principled reluctance (in my view) of the Indian govt. stems from a recognition that partitioning the state seems simple enough only from afar; moreover, any partition (even along the lines you suggested) would likely involve partition based on religion at more than a few places in the state.
And that likelihood is something the Indian government will probably not countenance, given the horrors of Partition and the core principles on which the Indian state is based (i.e., the rejection of the two-nation theory, etc.).
You forgot Kargil, which is a mostly Shia Muslim majority region and entirely untouched by the insurgency affecting the Valley. The belief that J&K state can be relatively easily partitioned overlooks the complicated nature of the actual demographic landscape.
In the Valley itself, where would Gujjar Muslims go, supporters of the Indian state (for the most part), and (mostly) residents of the mountainous areas of the Valley?
What about Kashmiri Pandits? Many Kashmiri Pandits donÂ’t wish to leave their fate in the hands of the men with the guns. Or what about the Shia Muslims of the Valley?
Why shouldnÂ’t the Valley itself be vivisected for the benefit of Gujjar Muslims or Sikhs or KPs? I neednÂ’t add that many secessionists who are enthusiasts for partitioning the state suddenly become reluctant to countenance the partitioning of the Valley.
Outside the Valley, should the Muslim-majority regions of Doda district be partitioned from Jammu and be made a part of the Valley, despite the fact that the Muslims of the Valley and the Doda district have different a different ethnicity and language. All they share is religion, and not surprisingly, the Pakistani govt. and the secessionists in the Valley are eager to grab Doda district.
What about the Hindus of Doda region, especially those in far-flung villages of Doda? Should the GOI complete their ethnic cleansing, begun by the jihadis? Again, I should emphasize that support for the insurgency is is neither wide nor deep among the Muslims of Doda district. Should they also be forced to join the Valley?
ItÂ’s not so easy as it looks: Vivisecting the state would lead to terrible injustice to many people in J&K, even if the GOI overcame its apprehension about religious partition of the state, and managed to effect a minimally bloody vivisection of the state.
Regards, Kumar
Out of curiosity, why are Shia’s of Kargil not involved in insurgency, while the Gilgit-Baltistan (which is part of PoK) are supportive of it, inspite of having Shia majority in many of its areas??
Why do people here use a loaded term like ‘POK’ i.e. Pakistan Occupied Kashmir. Why not use a more neutral term like Pakistan Administered Kashmir or Pakistan Controlled Kashmir. This would of course apply to the Pakistanis as well who use that another loaded term ‘Azad Kashmir’.
As I have stated before, if an average Pakistani was aware of the status of the Kashmiris in the Valley before terrorism took off, the Kashmir movement would lose steam in Pakistan. Most Pakistanis I know hold the belief that Kashmir in the early eighties was in a situation similar to West Bank and Chechnya, a comparison which is beyond ridiculous.
Kumar: Thanks for the reply. I think we need more awareness about the plight of the Kashmiri Pandits.
I concede that PoK is a loaded term, just as “Azad Kashmir” is a loaded term. Neutral term should be PcK, as in controlled. I am however intersted in knowing what is the thinking of the Shia’s of the PcK regarding the whole issue. First of all is it true, that Baltistan has Shia majority??
Kumar,
Agreed. It hasn’t quite reached that point yet, but apparently there has been an escalation in racism towards the English in some quarters of Scotland during recent years. Many English people have commented on the negative way they have been treated there as Scottish nationalism has increased.
Yes, you’re right. However, political activities have made sufficient progress in the last decade to have resulted in the formation of a Scottish Parliament. Wikipedia has an extensive article on the subject here. I think you (and hopefully other commenters here) will find it interesting reading, as a point of comparison with the Indian situation (to some extent).
There is a parallel article on the general subject of Scottish independence here. I believe the actor Sean Connery is also a very vocal supporter of such actions.
Some political experts in the UK think that the political breakaway of Scotland is now inevitable, to be possibly followed by the secession of Wales.
Simple question.. Do you think Hindutva is the problem in Jammu and Kashmir, yes or no ??
Kumar, thanks for your thoughtful and lengthy response. You’re right, there are nuances here that are difficult to appreciate from afar, and perhaps partitioning the region into three states would simply be playing into the hands of Pakistan and the Jihadis. However, even just on the basis that most other states exist in India (primarily on a linguistic and historical/cultural basis) IN THEORY there is still reason to demarcate them. But in terms of realpolitik maybe it’s better not to. Another three questions, if you have the time and inclination to answer: 1)What, in your view, is the solution to the whole Kashmiri mess (i.e. if you were in charge what measures would you (realistically) take? 2)What do you think will ACTUALLY happen to Kashmir over the next 10,20,30 years? 3)What is the current situation of the Kashmiri language? Thanks in advance.
You had to throw that one in, didnt you ? :-))
Yeah, couldn’t resist! Not that the language issue is as important as the human rights issues or even the long-term political issues, of course.
RC: Baltistan theoretically has a Shia majority although that % has drastically gone down in recent years due to the Pakistani army’s attempts to alter the demography of the region. There has been Shia-Sunni tension in recent years, and there is at least one political group — the Balwaristan National Front I believe it is called — that is agitating for full independence for the region. Recall that Baltistan is culturally, linguistically and religiously distinct from “Kashmir” if by the latter we mean the Valley, and their inclusion in Kashmir 1947 was simply a reflection (as with so much else in world history and international or other borders) of the fact that they were part of the territory held by the Dogra Rajput royal family.
I had read opinion polls some years ago suggesting that Muslim Gujjars in Indian Kashmir were majority anti-secession (one wonder if the fact that as OBCs the fact that the NDA government included them with various other OBCs in the category of those eligible for reservations plays a part), and that Kashmiri Shiites were less likely than Sunnis to be pro-secession, although what I recall reading did not contain enough data on the magnitude of the difference in political orientation; although there was a suggestion that as Shiite-Sunni violence in Pakistan had spiralled upward, Shiite support for secession had correspondingly gone down. Finally, it has long been believed by the Indian government (with what justification I have no way of knowing) that Ladakhi Muslims tend to be anti-secession; apparently a highly disproportionate % of Muslim Kashmiris in the army are from Ladakh.
Sorry Kumar, I just read your comment, and I fear I have been needlessly repetitive of your comment.
My KP freind once told me that Shias of Pakistan were more anti-Pakistan military than most Indians can ever be.
RC: that’s not been my experience to be honest; in my experience hostility to Pakistan’s military is more often a function of what ethnic/linguistic group one is a member of than one’s sectarian affiliation. Doesn’t mean your friend is wrong, as I’m loathe to generalize from my experience, but for what it’s worth…
Ponniyin Selvan
Which part of my post did you not understand? Seriously, which part of it did you not comprehend? I can’t be bothered to spoonfeed replies to you. I was not talking specifically about Kashmir, but was responding to wider points and themes touched in this thread. Do you understand, that, yes or no? Simple question.
Its difficult to understand what you are ranting about . . . considering very little semblence of fascism has masterialized from this Hindutva movement. Its quite apparent what you want to do . . . you are looking to construct a Hindu-equivalent of Islamic terrorism. What is Hindutva? In its pure form, I believe it is a very evil ideology, but one that is constantly strengthened when prponents of a civil code, those who firmly oppose the ideology of Jihad and crusade, those who don’t believe Pakistan is a friendly nation, all these are lumped in with the Hindu nationalist group.
I’m sorry Joolz. I’m no “secular, progressive intellectual”, maybe a little dumb. please pardon me. you have to explain a little more. i just wanted a simple yes/no answer for my question.. Do you think Hindutva is the problem in Jammu and Kashmir, yes or no ??If you think this is getting cyclical, let’s leave it at that..
Again, my apologies for being dumb and not “secular progressive” enough to see Hindutva everywhere.