The latest New Yorker is running a scary story on just how close India and Pakistan got to war in 2002 after the Dec. 13, 2001 attack on the Indian Parliament. ‘The Stand-Off’ is written by Steve Coll, author of Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan and Bin Laden. It’s not online yet, but here’s a related interview. Some of the eyebrow-raising details:
- Pakistani nuclear scientists have admitted to meeting with bin Laden; it’s not clear if it was during bin Laden’s U.S.-backed Afghan war phase or afterwards
- The Parliament attackers had a car bomb big enough to kill most of the Indian Parliament. The MPs escaped only by chance, because the Vice Presidential motorcade happened to be blocking the Parliament entrance and the car bomb couldn’t get inside.
- The U.S. pressured India to back off from retaliating so that Pakistan could supply troops to police the Afghanistan border
- The U.S. turned down basing rights offered by India during the Afghanistan bombing so as not to offend Pakistan
- Both countries feel betrayed by the U.S. after the 2002 border standoff: India because Musharraf has reduced but not stopped jihadi groups, and Pakistan because of warming U.S.-India ties
- Disappointed by the political restraint in 2002, the Indian military has adopted a ‘cold start’ doctrine, a rapid reaction plan that kicks in before the U.S. and Britain start applying pressure; this increases the risk of war
- American diplomats think India has an imprecise understanding of what would trigger nuclear escalation; it’s in Pakistan’s interest to convey the impression that that threshold is low
- American analysts think that, like most countries, Pakistan would actually use its nukes if it felt its national survival were threatened
- Under the U.S. interpretation of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, it’s illegal to give nuke safety tech like PALs (coded controllers) to India and Pakistan, even though they reduce the chance of accidental launch
- The Pakistani military says it follows standard procedures to secure its nukes in central locations; they’re most vulnerable to being hijacked once deployed in the field
- American analysts estimate both countries have around 100 nukes, and Israel twice that
The Indians and the Pakistanis have long experience with the West or with Russia coming into their disputes, and they’ve become quite sophisticated… the Indians used American diplomacy to try to coerce Pakistan into reducing its support for jihadi groups. Equally, the Pakistanis used the Americans to put pressure on India to resolve the underlying problem of Kashmir, and also tried to make themselves indispensable to the Americans in Afghanistan. So there was a kind of a multiple-level chess game going on… both India and Pakistan felt quite emotional about these issues even as they were manipulating the chessboard…The Pakistanis, under Musharraf… abandoned their support for the Taliban and they have put some pressure on domestic radical groups. However, Musharraf has not done everything possible to constrain the Kashmiri groups… most outside analysts believe that the Pakistani Army is quietly continuing to aid some of them. I think the generals see Kashmir as a case apart, as something different from the broader war on terrorism, or, at least, as a case that’s full of exceptions from their point of view, and the United States has not fully challenged that view…
Some people on both sides of the border felt that… the experience of having come so close to war… had an effect similar to that of the Cuban missile crisis… and would lead to a new period of restraint… At the same time, there’s evidence that some… learned the wrong lessons… For instance, the Indian military… came away with the lesson that they need to be able to attack quickly after a terrorist event, so they don’t create the time for outside powers to intervene diplomatically. They have started to recommend a new military doctrine called “cold start,” which would allow them to attack across the Pakistan border within days. [Link]
This story blows my mind.
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Even in the U.S., some parts of the nuke security regime are as weak as a $2 bike lock: In the 1960’s, the [PAL] combination locks were installed on the Minuteman ICBMs. However, the Strategic Air Command in Omaha worried that in case of need the codes won’t be available, so they quietly decided to set them to 00000000; checking this combination was even present on the launch checklists. This was not changed until 1977. [Link] |
War is hell, and hell on the economy, but the alternative is worse. It’s likely true that jihadi groups are trying to bait India and Pakistan into war to boost their own recruiting and fundraising. But no federal government can afford not to respond to an attack on the government seat. The first attack is a test. If you don’t respond, you’re marked as weak and you become prey. Since 12/13, there have been the Bangalore campus attack, the Delhi market bombs, the Ayodhya attack and the Army family massacre in Kashmir. It’s only due to luck and lack of jetliners that the death tolls have been low relative to 9/11.
There needed to be an unequivocal strike on the jihadi groups behind 12/13 other than just saber-rattling. It should have been a special forces operation, a missile attack or an air raid on jihadi camps in Kashmir; to prevent escalation, no ground troops and not on the Pakistani mainland. Going forward, the two militaries need to figure out a bright line on nuclear escalation so as to stay on the right side.
And, once again, our short-sighted foreign policy is putting Americans in danger. Our illogical ban on exporting safety technology need to be waived when the recipients already possess nukes. The U.S.’ military alliance with Pakistan is tighter than that with India. And yet this ally has sold nuke tech to North Korea, Iran, Libya, and has some Islamist members in the military who continue to support terrorist groups and the Taliban. Our long-standing preference for military dictatorships, privately-owned companies if you will, is now in conflict with nuclear blowback. Chances are that a large nuke set off in a U.S. city, god forbid, will have passed through the hands of the irresponsible Pakistani military.
Pakistan was not an ‘ally’ when this technology was sold/exchanged (post cold war 90s -2001) So it would be false to characterize our support for their nuclear proliferation. The damage has already been done.
That would be the end of the world. America would have to retaliate. The impulse to retaliate would be too great. And if Pakistan was involved and they retaliated there one thing is for sure – Pakistan would not go out without taking India down with her and lobbing a few bombs over. I think this AQ Khan is going to turn out to be the biggest scumbag behchod in modern history.
I’m terrified!
The first time I ever read the New Yorker consciously (as opposed to absently reading something lying around the house without paying attention to the title of the magazine) was in April of 1993. In some newspaper I read a mention of Seymour Hersh’s March 29 , 1993 article on the almost confrontation between India and Pakistan, and the sale of F-16s. I still remember walking up to the library at my school–which is simply gorgeous in the spring–still remember going up to the magazine rack, and opening the magazine for the article. Somewhere in a box is the photocopy I made of it. I had never heard of Hersh at that point–I’d start American history in the fall–and I don’t think his name particularly stuck with me for many years after. But I can still sea the tacky brown uphosltery on the library chair. The library was almost always empty during lunch hour, and it was such a far walk away rom the rest of the school that it was often all mine. Usually I revelled in this, but I still remember how lonely and scary it suddenly felt. The fear I felt when reading the article, and the bizarre juxtaposition of that fear with the banal, beautiful walk back down to lunch–a riot of mustard flowers, the ripening wild oats–all of that has stuck with me. I hadn’t thought about in a while, but you’ve brought the whole lunchhour rushing back to me.
This article scares the bejeezus out of me!!
You should read the full story. If I recall correctly, a Pakistani general was being interviewed before an Indian audience. The conversation went something like this:
Indian audience: “We’ll fix the Pakistani problem once and for all.” Pakistani general: “Fine, but we’ll wipe out Delhi, Bombay and Calcutta.” Indian audience: “Fine, but our second strike will wipe Pakistan off the map.” Pakistani general: “Fine, but without Delhi, Bombay and Calcutta, you’ll find it hard to live.”
Useless, senseless dick-waving. I bet everyone went home and bragged to their friends about it afterwards.
Saheli,
Seymour Hersh is famous for the My Lai massacre exposure. Some people think that has been his most important contribution, in addition to Abu Gharib
Saheli,
My apologies…Sometimes, I forget you have a degree in journalism.
Yesterday night the wee hours I flipped through pakistani channels and Noor Khan was being interviewed on AryOne(it may have been Geo/ptv) He was the Airforce chief during 65 war. He is going to be on again today for the second part. It was a very good interview as he describes every thing from 1947 independence I found it interesting that he pretty much was saying what the NYtimes labels as the indian line. It is a pakistani held belief that india started the 1965 war. He said it was not true. He said it that it was Ayub khans creation and that he was opposed to it. He also said that the pakistani military keeps kashmir issue inflames as a means to stay in power. He also mentioned that pakistanis beleive that they are stronger than india and are not willing to accept the reality as it is, and therefore they keep engaging in activities which undermine the pakistani wellbeing. It was quite an interesting perspective from a military fella. I am kicking my self for not finishing my myth tv box. this would have been a good thing to record. Again i will be up around 1am today and catch the second part and record it.
No problem Kush–I’ll try to take the forgetting as a compliment, since journalists are supposed to be almost as despised as lawyers. 😉 But yes, I’ve even met Hersh. In the fall of 1993 I took American history and read A Peoples History of the United States, which discusses My Lai and Hersh at some length, but at the time that this article came out I did not know that much about either Vietnam or The New Yorker. 1993 was a long time ago, I have a 12-year-plus continuous subscription to the New Yorker now. 🙂
Manish, that story reminds me of the famous quote from Dallek’s biography of Johnson:
GGK, thanks for the info.
Ahh… I see why it’s called a johnson.
Have a look at the story of Photo Chor – The Real Story of AQ Khan.
“I’ll try to take the forgetting as a compliment, since journalists……..”
Saheli,
It was a compliment
GGK .. good info.
Here is excerpts from a rediff article on the anniversary of the 1965 war
1965 conflict based on the ill-conceived “Operation Gibraltor” was a military blunder by the Pak military brass.
1 Gujudude
“Pakistan was not an ‘ally’ when this technology was sold/exchanged (post cold war 90s -2001) So it would be false to characterize our support for their nuclear proliferation.”
What baloney!
1) Chinese proliferation of uranium enrichment equipment, bomb designs and probably fissile material itself occured in the ’80’s when Pakistan was a staunch US ally. This was in the era when Zia knew Pakistan could do no wrong vis-a-vis the US. I know its a fine point here wheter the US turned a blind eye to Chinese proliferation or Pakistani proliferation. Read up the whole history of Glenn-Symington & Pressler to realize how many times the U.S. President lied to congress to keep the Jihad in Pakistan going.
2) Pakistan may have been sanctioned under the Glenn-Symington since ’91 once George Bush senior declined to issue the certification required under Pressler, but it was still very much an US ally, in particular the millitary-millitary relationship was maintained. Pakistan’s Afghanistan startegy was often in consultation with the US (for instance over the whole UNOCAL pipeline issue). It is only in the ’98-’01 period that the US-Pakistani relationship was very strained.
The important thing to remember that Nuclear Proliferation is a dogma like “liberty”, “freedom” and “free speech”. Like all such dogma it is invoked in the service of US Foreign policy when desired and conviniently ignored when it is not.
Read what I said carefully.
Let me clarify further. I’m not talking about proliferation from China to Pakistan. Pakistan having nuclear technology (just like India does) is a seperate issue than Pakistan feeding the technology to other rouge states like North Korea, Iran, Libya, etc.
When was the volume of the uranium enrichment material (centrifuge technology) sold from Pakistan (time frame)? If most of the nuclear proliferation FROM Pakistan happened when the USA was buddy buddy, well talk about a strategic blunder. Incompetance, not caring enough, underestimating the Pakistanis, whatever the reason. Saying we (USA) were complicit in proliferation to sworn enemies like Iran and DRPK is far different from saying strategically we made bad moves that eventually resulted in Pakistan spreading the germ.
The talk is about Nuclear proliferation, which is the primary concern. Does it make me cringe that the US maintained a close relationship with Pakistan rather than India. Sure, but India maintained close ties with Russia and does to this day, so it is fair game. Each to their own needs and vision. Rules change, the world changes, and losing vigilance or not catching up fast enough to the change in currents results in poor decisions. I assume you are coming from a India centric viewpoint, which is understandable. If not, well, my assumption was wrong. The Americans ‘allowing’ Pakistan to get the bomb is directly related to India’s status as a nuclear capable, but not official nuclear country. Pakistan was giving the US a base to screw the Russians over, US kindly looked the other way when the Chinese gave enough material for Pakistan to level the playing field with India. Both parties got what they needed.
The 1998-2001 time frame is CRUCIAL. Sanctions hurt Pakistan far more than India. The only thing it slowed down for India, really, is it’s Space Program (preventing the Russians from giving cryogenic engine tech.) and the LCA (which was being supplied with GE engines and Lockheed Martin consulting). By disengaging Pakistan, the US lost control of not only Pakistani activities, but the region. Loss of ground based human intelligence was far too damaging. Pakistan was it’s finger in the air gaging which way the wind was blowing.
Now, these are the facts as I understand them to be. If I’m wrong on the factual information (which my conclusions are based upon), I will obviously re-evaluate my position.
The USA had it’s own strategic interests as did India, Pakistan, and the former USSR during the cold war and in hindsight, they logically acted in which their interests would be secured at that time. I’m not debating whether they were the right moves or not, but saying there was a logical pattern to it.
Why is it a seperate issue? when it is the same technology that is doing the rounds. For instance it is the chinese variant of the Soviet Scud which is the basis of the N.Korean NoDong and which was supplied to Iran and Pakistan by the N.Koreans. In Pakistan it is called the Ghauri. In Libya the cache of documents revealed notes taken by Pakistani technologists at a seminar conducted by the Chinese on an old chinese bomb design.
The US Army and intelligence services have a close startegic relationship with the Pakistani Army. This relationship has never been in question over the issue of nuclear proliferation. It does not really matter which exact year what got exchanged, you are being legalistic about this. Now for facts the Pakistan N.Korea nuclear/missle deal is supposed to date from Benazir Bhutto’s time which would probably be early ’90’s.
If the talk is about nuclear proliferation then I dont see how this time period is crucial, could you explain that to me? The A.Q. Khan procurement network was operational from early ’80’s. Pakistan Chinese proliferation is from mid 70’s. Pakistan-N.Kora is from early ’90’s. Pakistan-Libya is from the mid ’90’s atleast.
Significantly all this continued after Sept ’01 as well. So why is ’98-’01 so crucial?
I’ve read in the past (I think it was a book extract in “India Today”) about how close India and Pakistan were to a nuclear confrontation. The common theme in both these stories seems to be how the US stepped in at the last moment and stopped a nulear war. One of the aims of all these stories is to show that the US (and, by extension, all nuclear armed Western nations) is a more “responsible” power. Great powers have not always acted more responsibly than other countries; indeed, the use of a weapon of mass destruction TWICE in Japan by the US bears this fact out. I do not know why Bharat sarkar does not adopt the US slogan “Do like I say, and not like I do.”
Agreed. But the nukes are always the complicating factor since the Pakis are not exactly known for their rationality and restraint.
Presently India seems to be following the war of attrition strategy. Keep absorbing the terrorism while building up enormous offensive capability. There’s going to be a huge contract awarded soon for 100 + aircraft for the Air Force. In 15-20 years, the Fast Breeder program should begin to expolit India’s massive thorium reserves, which would result in a a pretty impressive nuclear arsenal.
We can just keep out spending the Pakis I suppose and hope they keep trying to play catchup and eventually implode aka USSR. Alternatively there may be a WW III in our lifetime.
“The US Army and intelligence services have a close startegic relationship with the Pakistani Army”
This was an on again – off again relationship, which Coll documents in his book (a great read, BTW. Best bhaifota gift I got in a long time). Starting with Bush I and up until 9/11, it was definitely off. This is something the Pakistanis remember, and the lesson they learned from it is that it is best to be indispensible for Washington. So, as long as Al Qaeda and the Taliban can cause unrest in the region, the Pakistanis can say (as they did when the Soviets were around), “Look, we know the region better than anybody. Trust us.”
Problem is – the Cold War is over. As such, India is no longer seen as a toady for Moscow, but instead as an emerging power in its own right. While Pakistan is regionally important, India’s importance is substantially greater, and the U.S. understands this. This was a theme that Dubya was developing before he became president. While he was governor of Texas, living in Austin, he up close saw how linked American and Indian companies became.
I’m no fan of the Pakistani military, but it’s a mistake to say, “the Pakis are not exactly known for their rationality and restraint.” Nothing focuses a nation’s attention as possessing nuclear weapons. Before the Soviets got the bomb, plenty of Americans thought that the Soviets were to driven by an expansionist ideology to be trusted with nuclear weapons. The same was said of China. Having nuclear weapons does not make you a more mature country, but it forces nations to realize the room for mistakes has gotten a lot smaller.
Pakistan’s continuous ineptitude in believing it can settle Kashmir by force is not do to their lack of rationality and restraint, but to the fact that the military has a monopoly on decision-making in that country. In countries where different interest groups can view the same circumstances, and come out with different conclusions – such nations will be are less prone to adventurism.
Among the three nations of interest – India, Pakistan, and the U.S. – no one is going to get everything they want. But when you consider the liklihood of full-blown war between India and Pakistan five years ago and today – this is significantly better situation. India’s economy has grown significantly, and as such has much to lose by going to war. Pakistan is once again chummy with DC, but at a price – meaning, no announcements when cruise missiles hit inside your territory, and no American mediation in Kashmir. The U.S. gets a better than nothing level of cooperation from Islamabad, but its patience is being tested. In 2005, more American troops were killed in Afghanistan than in 2001-2004 combined. I’ll expext more strikes from both cruise missiles, and the occasional crossing of the border by American and Afghan troops in 2006.
You are right, it is the same Russian technology that has made the rounds. But you are missing my point. Each country is ultimately responsible for the technology it weilds. India has had nuclear tech for some time, but it hasn’t sold it on the market (that I know of). Claims are that Pakistani leaders didn’t know about the proliferation, but knowing how vital the technology was, that doesn’t hold much water. My problem is with the assertion that, again, the US was complicit in aiding Pakistan selling nuclear technology, in particular to enemies of the United States, or that the US knew Pakistan was selling centrifuges to its most fanatical enemies and turning a blind eye.
I agree, the missles were aquired in the 90’s, and were being developed while India concurrently worked on its missles. Like I’ve said before, I don’t think the United States had enough heartburn over the fact that Pakistan was aquiring technology for itself.
The network was up and running, and what you state is correct. However the maturity of the tech transfer did not gain critical mass (pardon the pun) until the later 90s.
From Global Security on AQ Khan:
From globalsecurity, on North Korea
Lost time at a crtical phase when the rogue states were ramping up their programs. Had information, that became more concrete around 2000-2001 been brought to light earlier, something could have been done if the United States knew its ‘ally’ was stabbing a giant sword in its back. The degradation of the United States human intellience capcity during 90s has been well documented, coupled with sour relations with Pakistan in the 98-01 time period, it put the US at a disadvantage.
Reading Manish’s post again, I admit I probably read too far into the ‘Ally’ comment. But I’ve seen the arguement used too many times, which essentially translated to,” The US knew Pakistan was giving Koreans and Iranians nuclear weapons tech.” Like I’ve also said above, the USA having a relationship with Pakistan made sense based upon the world environment then. To lay this at the foot of the Americans for being friends with the Pakistan is all monday morning quarterbacking and lessens the irresponsibility of Pakistan’s elected as well as military rulers.
Were American leaders shortsighted and ineffective in recognizing emerging threats to the US during the 90s (Hell even today)? Incredibly. Moral of the story is the enemy of your enemy may be your friend, but don’t give him keys to your home either.
The New Yorker piece is also extremely U.S.-centric to the extent of giving credence to American analysts over the locals. ‘Thar, thar, li’l ladies…’
Doesnt this story make you feel better?
Blast at Pakistan nuclear centre
If you had been to India during the time of the attack on the Parliament you would have seen that there was absolutely no feeling of imminent war. I dont think India ever wanted to invade.
I thought peace marches were preventing war between the two. Hmm…
I dont think either of us has access to information that can prove this conclusively one way or the other. I personally believe that the issue is far more complex.
If we are talking of Pakistani proliferation what is the need to bring India into this, this reveals a deepset “frame of reference” that is propagated by State Department and news media where every thing about Pakistan needs to be followed by something about India and vice-versa. So much so that some Americans believe India-Pakistan is one country (like Bosnia-Herzogovinia).
Why are better relations with Pakistan necessary to stop nuclear proliferation? What about proliferation in the ’89-’98 time frame, why did US-Pak relationship in that period not help in stopping proliferation?
Agreed.
You can talk about India by itself without bringing Pakistan into the picture, however, you almost can’t talk about Pakistan without bringing India into the discussion. Whatever India has done, Pakistan has tried to ‘one up or stay on par’ atleast in military terms. India gets nukes, Pakistan decides to get them. India develops its own missles, Pakistan decides to trade technology on the black market for the missles. It was understandable after Nixon sent the Enterprise battle group into the Bay of Bengal that India didn’t felt it necessary to have an Ace up the sleeve, but still. Pakistan has almost been defined (by its leaders) as “It’s not India, but we have the same stuff, and are their military equal” The national indentity was forged on the very grounds of seperation from India.
Wishful thinking really. Circling back to your first comment, the extent to which this was known (By the USA) is up in the air. But, sooner or later, people were going to find out. Better relations (note: not kissing ass, but maintaining valuable intelligence assets) within Pakistan would have been better IMHO. Personally, I’d rather have both eyes open than one.
Most of my logic is along the lines that the Americans really didn’t know about Pakistani exports until it was too late, and frankly they weren’t paying attention earlier on. As all powerful the US may be, people give it far too much credit for knowing everything and being a part of every conceivable conspiracy. I personally feel that those 4 years would have made a difference. People were catching up to the act, it would have only helped had the US still maintained its intelligence links (not only for nuclear stuff, but on the increasing Jihadi threat as well). By implying this, I’m not stating that the US should have maintained its cold war frost towards India either. The sanctions, when it comes down to it, were fairly ineffective in what they intended to do – to bring India and Pakistan into the NPT and open their nuclear facilities up.
Just think of the power and economy, if India and Pakistan were one. We could have been the number one Super Power in the World beating both China, US and all the European countries.
Steve Coll did an interview about his piece on Wisconsin Public Radio.
Scroll down to the February 10 show to listen to the program.