{"id":4555,"date":"2007-07-09T11:43:48","date_gmt":"2007-07-09T16:43:48","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/sepiamutiny.com?p=4555"},"modified":"2007-07-19T10:39:48","modified_gmt":"2007-07-19T15:39:48","slug":"corruption_and","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"http:\/\/sepiamutiny.com\/blog\/2007\/07\/09\/corruption_and\/","title":{"rendered":"Corruption and Country Politics…"},"content":{"rendered":"

I’m a big fan of Bryan Caplan & Arnold Kling over at EconLog<\/a> and in particular thought mutineers would be interested in this blogpost<\/a>. Caplan analyzes a paper<\/a> <\/a>from Rafael Di Tella (HBS) and Robert MacCulloch (Princeton) which models the relationship between a country’s perceived level of corruption and its political orientation – <\/p>\n

We find evidence consistent with the hypothesis that governments in poor countries have a more left wing rhetoric than those in OECD countries…The empirical pattern of beliefs within countries is consistent with this explanation: people who perceive corruption to be high in the country are also more likely to lean left ideologically and to declare to support a more intrusive government in economic matters. <\/blockquote>\n

Put simply, more perception of corruption = more likely to be an economic lefty. Bryan brings up the all-too-obvious consequential impact — increasing the role of govt in the economy, particulary in the midst of corruption, should increase the level of corruption overall. Caplan quotes Anne Kreuger<\/a> who coined the term Rent Seeking<\/a> back in 1973 – <\/p>\n

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If the market mechanism is suspect, the inevitable temptation is to resort to greater and greater intervention, thereby increasing the amount of economic activity devoted to rent seeking. As such, a political “vicious circle” may develop. People perceive that the market mechanism does not function in a way compatible with socially approved goals because of competitive rent seeking. A political consensus therefore emerges to intervene further in the market, rent seeking increases, and further intervention results.<\/blockquote>\n

Di Tella and MacCulloch duly note, however, that the Indian electorate <\/strong>seems far more intelligent about this issue and presents a very interesting exception to their general observation – <\/p>\n

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When the analysis is carried out at the individual country level an interesting exception occurs: India. In this country there is a positive and significant correlation between the perception of corruption and placing one’s views on the right end of the political spectrum, not the left.<\/blockquote>\n

Perhaps it’s because Desi’s have been uniquely well acquainted with the combination of <\/p>\n