Noah Feldman on U.S. Policy in Pakistan

The question comes up again and again when I talk to friends and colleagues about U.S. foreign policy. The question is most urgent when discussing the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, but equally valid when the topic is the Indo-U.S. Nuclear deal, or even what is happening right now in Myanmar.

The question is this: is the U.S. acting in ways that are true to the credo of supporting and spreading democracy around the world, or does it merely do this when it is clearly in its own interests? Is present-day U.S. foreign policy governed by a “realist” philosophy (do what you have to do) or an “idealist” one (spread democracy)?

Noah Feldman has a think piece on this in a recent New York Times Magazine, where he gives special attention to the situation in Pakistan. To begin with, this is how Feldman frames the question:

As ideal and slogan, though, the creed of exporting democracy differs from the creed of expanding empire in one important respect: When we fail to follow it, we look hypocritical. An empire that extends itself selectively is just being prudent about its own limitations. A republic that supports democratization selectively is another matter. President Bush’s recent speech to the United Nations, in which he assailed seven repressive regimes, was worthy of applause — but it also opened the door to the fair criticism that he was silent about the dozens of places where the United States colludes with dictators of varying degrees of nastiness. (link)

The obvious examples of “realist” collusion are Saudi Arabia and Egypt, where the U.S. hasn’t pressured for democratization, since in these cases more “democracy” might mean more anti-American Islamists. Regarding Burma/Myanmar, President Bush recently took a strong stance of condemnation, but in Feldman’s view this may not be especially convincing:

The problem is that our support for dictators in some countries tends to undermine our ability to encourage democracy elsewhere, because it sends the message that we may change our tune the moment an immediate interest alters our calculations. The monks of Yangon have put their lives on the line; if our embrace of their cause is conditional on, say, our not needing any favors from the ruling junta this week, why should they trust us? Double standards are not merely hypocritical, but something much worse in international affairs: ineffective. (link)

In Feldman’s analysis, the U.S. support for Pervez Musharraf is a little trickier. Feldman actually sees the recent presidential election in Pakistan, and Musharraf’s pledge to resign as Chief of Staff of the Army, as signs that democracy is working:

Under these circumstances, the best option is to pursue a chastened version of the democratization doctrine — one that makes no exceptions for friends while also recognizing that building durable institutions may do more good than holding snap elections. In Pakistan, the Supreme Court, buoyed by the national association of lawyers, pressured Musharraf into promising to resign his powerful position as army chief of staff and demilitarize the presidency. That kind of bravery deserves our support — especially because it reminds us that strong and functioning institutions are the preconditions to successful democracy; without them, elections may actually make things worse. (link)

Feldman doesn’t get very specific about the various ways Musharraf has suppressed the voices of his political opponents in recent weeks, and doesn’t mention the fact that the opposition parties in last week’s presidential elections abstained their votes (admittedly, the fact that they merely abstained, rather than walk out, was a kind of victory of Musharraf).

Rather, the focus is on the institutions — and Feldman does seem to have a point that the Supreme Court has emerged as one viable counterweight to Musharraf’s executive authority. Institutions like a free media (which Pakistan has), an independent legislature (which it doesn’t have, at present), courts, and political parties are in some ways as important as elections when thinking about what makes a real, sustainable democracy. (Fareed Zakaria makes much the same point in his book, The Future of Freedom)

Still, I’m not sure I can agree with Feldman’s characterization of Musharraf’s actions as “brave” — nor do I think that the ongoing U.S. support for Musharraf’s government is a good thing. A great deal will depend on whether Musharraf’s resignation from the Army is real or just a sybmolic show (as I put it in an earlier post, a mere “change of clothes”), and also on what happens if and when a newly constituted Pakistani Parliament acts in ways that Musharraf doesn’t like.

19 thoughts on “Noah Feldman on U.S. Policy in Pakistan

  1. I have seen some Pakistani political shows on youtube and Pakistani journalists on tv are more self-critical of Pakistan and Musharraf than the US media is about US leaders/US. Though the one sacred cow they wont touch is Islam.

  2. The obvious examples of “realist” collusion are Saudi Arabia and Egypt, where the U.S. hasn’t pressured for democratization, since in these cases more “democracy” might mean more anti-American Islamists.

    I wouldn’t say “hasn’t pressured”, but rather hasn’t pressured in any way other than diplomatically.

    One key difference between SA/Egypt and Burma is, in my opinion, that the strongest opposition in SA/Egypt are seen as less democratic than the current ruling parties, whereas Burma has Aung San Suu Kyi.

  3. One key difference between SA/Egypt and Burma is, in my opinion, that the strongest opposition in SA/Egypt are seen as less democratic than the current ruling parties, whereas Burma has Aung San Suu Kyi.

    i think you mean less liberal, not less democratic. though i would like a clarification (e.g., do you meant that islamists in those nations reject multi-party representative democracy?).

  4. IMO, the US has always behaved as an empire. Whether you consider it’s actions in South America, the Middle East or in Asia – lip service is paid to the ideals of democracy but the actions are more indicative of policies than speech. Also the idea of democracy :- for the people, by the people & of the people has been confused with Capitalism with a big C. If the governments are Capitalistic (allowing US companies to rape the land & it’s resources) then US govt will support that govt with absolutely NO regard to whether that govt is a dictatorship or a thugocracy.

  5. The question is this: is the U.S. acting in ways that are true to the credo of supporting and spreading democracy around the world, or does it merely do this when it is clearly in its own interests?

    Have we been hibernating for the last 60 yrs?? US is driven by its own selfish (realistic) interests. The talk of democracy, freedom yada yada yada are just part of public relations exercise & convenience to perpetuate one’s own goals.

  6. US policy is a complex compromise between often competing strategic interests, and between short and long term objectives, as well as between different Departments. The Pentagon has its priorities, State Department and Congress have theirs. I expect the Pentagon talks to Musharraf all the time, but recently State and Congress talked to him – and here is a report on how that went and how it is being perceived.

    In the short term, the US does want the Pakistan Army to help it fight and finish the Taliban (This past week 50 Pak Army troops died in clashes. Plus there are 300 Pak Army POWs – if you can call them that – held by Taliban over the past month.). To make sure the Army keeps at it, the US prefers Musharraf to be in charge. At the same time, there is the legitimacy issue, both internally and in terms of external perceptions like Noah Feldman’s.

    Hence the re-entry of Benazir. But that might appear too much like picking favorites, so Nawaz Sharif may also be let back in time for the national assembly elections. There might thus be a real ‘national reconciliation’, to support which, an Ordinance was passed by Musharraf just last week, where all corruption cases pending against politicians for actions before Oct 12, 1999 (when Mush took over) were to be allowed to lapse. I also believe that the Pak national elections of 2008 will be among the fairest ever to be held in Pakistan – a coalition in which no party (the three main ones are PML-Q, PML-N and PPP) emerges with a parliamentary majority – will likely both reflect the popular will and be quite convenient for Musharraf himself, so there is no need to ‘rig’ them. (I also think there might be elections in India in 2008 over the nuclear deal, and a similar result is likely, with no clear majority, just like now).

    There are also things that the international community would like Musharraf to do that he doesn’t want to do – like authorize the IAEA to interview AQ Khan, and give coalition forces official permission to enter the border areas (since the border is not fully demarcated nor recognized by Afghanistan, this is just a way for him to use the sovereignty excuse to do nothing). It is thought that by weakening Musharraf’s hold on the government, these things could be facilitated.

    And as Urmila notes upthread, an empire has many objectives to meet, and many internal and external constituencies to satisfy – so incremental change, within constraints, but hopefully moving toward a strategic goal – is always going to be how things play out. In terms of Pakistan, we will likely see a gradual decline in the overall role of the Army in political life, a strengthening of liberal civil society vis-a-vis religious forces, and hopefully greater trade and techno-economic interaction with India (at least). Sometimes incremental change like this can have better and longer-term impacts than sudden and abrupt changes. So it is all very principled, but in this case it goes beyond just supporting dictators – the dynamic that has been set in play actually weakens him a little, while not so much that the implementation of tactical military goals is jeopardized.

  7. if musharraf doesn’t continue to be army chief, i am so, like, unfriending him on facebook. benazir, wanna make franship wid me????

  8. An interesting and long discussion to be had here, one that I have difficulty in articulating by written word alone (please forgive my late night rambling)…

    For me the difficulty seems to ride with the idea of “exporting democracy” and whether it is the duty or even appropriate for the US (or any external power) to impose upon a sovereign nation. Another question is, if you want to bring democracy to other undemocratic nations then whose model are you going to give them? There are so many different models of voting used in the democratic world not to mention the types of governments created – each unique to the political pressures and requirements of the area.

    I think (and I am far from being even faintly knowledgeable about these thing) that you’re have something there, Amardeep, with the building of instuitions that may lead to democracy such as a free press, judicial system etc … It is far more productive to provide the soft tools to assist a people in their own path towards democracy rather than impose democracy by force. It may take longer to build, but one would hope that the infrastructure would be strong enough to handle the perils of government by popular choice or, indeed, the long process of finding out which form of government is going to work for the people.

  9. I think Feldman makes very relevant observations though I don’t think he is bringing anything new to the table. The fact that US foreign policy for long has been called hypocritical is not new nor is the fact that this hypocrisy in the eyes of the world makes it ineffective and unconvincing especially when the US beats the democracy anthem in a post cold war world. What I would have liked to see is an analysis of the reasons for the same. The democracy and freedom card works well within the US to justify it’s actions in places like Iraq (and others of the past) and for the President to maintain support for his actions. But then realpolitik dictates actions in Saudi Arabia and such and thus on the International stage the same rhetoric does not work. The US may be better served just admitting that practicalities dictate it’s foreign policy and giving up the idealism driven feel good card for good. Isn’t that what China does and I like it’s prospects as a superpower and especially the economic power it exerts now. After all money may not be the only king, but money definitely is one of the top dogs in the world of global politics. This hypocrisy also allows for more anger in places that don’t like the US, especially the middle east along with its unqualified support for Israel (I think we discussed the book on the Jewish Lobby a few days back?) and makes things tougher for the US.

  10. For me the difficulty seems to ride with the idea of “exporting democracy” and whether it is the duty or even appropriate for the US (or any external power) to impose upon a sovereign nation.

    oh, it’s not democracy the us wants to export, it’s just ruling powers they like. between a democratically elected hamas and a tyrannical saudi prince, the us knows what it wants.

  11. The thing with hegemons is that they’re always there, everywhere, whether you know it, or not. In a nice, peaceful, self-organizing, totally-efficient and beneficient world, with multiple poles, there may be no hegemons. But since we do not live in quite such a world, both the dictators and the democracies owe something to the hegemon’s global outlook and policies. Sometimes, hegemons prefer to deal with the way things are, but just by doing so, they strengthen whatever the thing there is at that time.

    So we can’t pretend that time starts today, and that the US is “imposing” democracy. Imposition is usually an exception, especially of democracy (it’s more usual with dictatorships). What I see happening in Pakistan is a slow nudging of all the actors in the country toward a more liberal and more democratic outcome. The US is correcting for its own tacit and explicit support of past dictatorships. If total “democracy” brings religious fundamentalists into power today (even if in reaction to something else the US did in the past or is doing somewhere else today) – I would prefer the former slower, controlled sequence of actions to a sudden ‘imposition’.

  12. The US may be better served just admitting that practicalities dictate it’s foreign policy and giving up the idealism driven feel good card for good. Isn’t that what China does

    Er … yes … China … that great nation which has free judiciary free press free speech human rights cheap labour and manufacturing costs. China who every single western government wants to be friends with and have a free trade agreement with … Ardy, of course you are completely right – sadly, I think there are many western governments who are secretly jealous of the power that the PRC can wield … when you’re China you don’t have to worry about being called a hypocrite, or correcting you past decisions, you just don’t care.

  13. For me the difficulty seems to ride with the idea of “exporting democracy” and whether it is the duty or even appropriate for the US (or any external power) to impose upon a sovereign nation.

    Uuntil recent times, the spread of democracy had been limited mostly to ex-communist countries (Poland, Russia, ex-USSR republics). For them, the ‘leap of faith’ (no pun intended) to separate church and state was not a huge step.

    Islamic countries, which more or less represent all the remaining non-democratic countries in the world (minus China of course) are inherently unable to take this step. And until you have a parallel form of authority, and that to one that is unaccountable to anyone, you will never get democracy. Unless you count the sham in Saudi Arabia and other gulf countries. That’s why the US will fail in Iraq on this front, it’ll fail in Afghanistan, and it’ll fail in Pakistan, if it tries.

    I believe that democracy is fundamentally the only way for civilized people to live in civilized societies. Of course each country will have its own flavor (parliamentary vs presidential elections, point of division between state and federal power, etc.) but that’s hardly the point. The main issue is that none of this works without actually giving this elected body true authority.

  14. Mostly all countries have a realist foreign policy, you gotta look out for your own interests. What is wrong with that? So I see no contradiction between the US supporting the Burmese monks on one hand and the Suadi royal family on the other hand.When the US beats the “spread freedom and democracy” drum, you have to be naive to belive they really mean it.

  15. The idea that the US or any other country for that matter ever does anything in foreign relations for purely altruistic reasons is a joke. “Spreading democracy, liberating the people”, these are all propaganda tools to gain public approval, or they’re side effects of a more selfish goal.

  16. Pakistan is one really effed up country. I lived there for almost two years and always was amused by the billboards that read “Unity through Faith” (or something like that) which was sarcastically copied for the movie V for Vendetta, but was also very depressed about the hopeless situation of the Pakistani people due to the incredible government corruption. I was there when Musharraf took power and the people came out of their houses to cheer the declaration of martial law. So be it.

    You can’t “spread democracy” when you don’t practice it.

    America is not a democracy. It was never intended to be one. It is a republic with LIMITED democratic principles. The founding fathers wrote regularly about the dangers of democracy, seeing it as nothing more than “tyranny by the majority.” In fact, democracy in its purest form is no more morally superior than many other forms of government.

    Government, ALL government, is inherently evil. Any plans to expand the size or scope of government by intervening in the affairs of other nations (nations that American bureaucrats and politicians scarcely understand), even under the supposedly rosy notion of “spreading democracy,” should never be seen as idealistic or morally superior, but rather for what it truly is: a really effing bad idea that is going to cost taxpayers WAY more money than they ever imagined.

    The solution to Pakistan affairs is to let the Pakistanis fix it themselves. Securing American borders with a strong national defense is the morally superior course of action – keeping us safe at home, while allowing other countries to sort out their own problems.

    This was the majority view of American foreign policy pre-Woodrow Wilson. He was the first to speak of “spreading democracy.” Sure, McKinley and others took wayward trips across the Atlantic and Pacific to expand American interests, but always without popular support. Only after Wilson did it seem logical and morally right to “spread democracy.” Since then, the world is no more democratic, and no more safe.

  17. carrot & stick…that is the best policy for democracy. carrot is for personal interests and stick is for higher ideals( mostly via ngos, film stars etc. and occassional sanctions) e.g. policies reg. china, saudi arabia, egypt, pakistan etc. Note as in the article posted in the news tab even the sanctions announced by the west doesn’t include existing investment so the French company Total and U.S.-owned Chevron, through its takeover of Unocal can still operate in the country.

    there is an endless list of dual track policy:

    CTBT for prohibiting nuclear weapons testing not ratified by US
    Ottawa treaty to ban the use of landmines not signed by US Depleted uranium not banned by US Basel treaty for banning shipment of toxic goods not ratified by US Kyoto treaty for curbing greehouse gas emissions not signed by US

    So as you see dual track policy emerges when “complicated issues ” necessitate intersection of realpolitik with higher ideals.