[Part of an ongoing series on Ramachandra Guha’s India After Gandhi. Last week’s entry can be found here. Next week we will look at Chapter 9, “Redrawing the Boundaries,” on the Language Movements of the 1950s]
With 20-20 hindsight, many people criticize Nehru today for pursuing a foreign policy oriented to “nonalignment” — that is, independence from both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. Here is one of Nehru’s most famous statements articulating that policy, from a speech given at Columbia University:
“The main objectives of that policy are: the pursuit of peace, not through alignment with any major power or group of powers but through an independent approach to each controversial or disputed issue, the liberation of subject peoples, the maintenance of freedom, both national and individual, the elimination of racial discrimination and the elimination of want, disease and ignorance, which afflict the greater part of the world’s population.”
The idealism in that statement is admirable, and still worth thinking about, even if the world order has changed dramatically since Nehru first uttered these words. The idea of taking an “independent approach to each controversial or disputed issue” is one I personally strive for as a writer, and could serve as a helpful corrective to many partisan ideologues — on both the left and the right — who tend to only see the world through one particular ideological filter or the other.
Ideals aside, Nehru’s government did make some serious mistakes in foreign policy in the first few years. One of the significant failures Guha mentions in this chapter involved an inconsistency in the response to two international crises: 1) Anglo-French military action in response to Egypt’s nationalization of the Suez Canal in 1956 (the Suez Crisis), and 2) the Soviet invasion of Hungary following an anti-Communist uprising, also in 1956 (the Hungarian Revolution). India publicly condemned the first act of aggression by western powers, but not the second, which today seems like a clear indication that India was leaning towards the Soviets more than it let on.
Guha suggests there were some internal differences between Nehru and the famous leftist Krishna Menon, who represented India at the U.N., over the Hungary question. Nehru publicly defended Menon’s abstention at the U.N. on the resolution condemning the Soviet invasion of Hungary, but privately he was deeply upset about the invasion. Part of the problem here might have been Nehru’s lack of clarity over the correct course to take, but certainly Krishna Menon’s independent streak must have been a factor as well.
A similar kind of diplomatic confusion was present in India’s relationship with China starting in 1950. Here, the Indian ambassador to China, K.N. Panikkar (who is also very well-known as a historian), seems to have fatally misread Mao Zedong and the personality of Chinese communism:
In May 1950 Panikkar was granted an interview with Mao Zedong, and came away greatly impressed. Mao’s face, he recalled later, was ‘pleasant and benevolent and the look in his eyes is kindly.’ There ‘is no cruelty or hardness either in his eyes or in the expression of his mouth. In fact he gave me the impression of a philosophical mind, a little dreamy but absolutely sure of itself.’ The Chinese leader had ‘experienced many hardships and endured tremendous sufferings,’ yet ‘his face showed no signs of bitterness, cruelty, or sorrow.’ Mao reminded Panikkar of his own boss, Nehru, for ‘both are men of action with dreamy, idealistic temperaments,’ and both ‘may be considered humanists in the broadest sense of the term.’ (176)
And here is Guha’s explanation of the failure:
This would be laughable if it were not so serious. Intellectuals have always been strangely fascinated by powerful men; George Bernard Shaw wrote about Lenin in much the same terms. Yet Shaw was an unaffiliated writer, responsible only to himself. Panikkar was the official representative of his government. What he said and believed would carry considerable weight. And here he was representing one of history’s most ruthless dictators as dreamy, soft, and poetic. (176)
I think Guha has it right on here — and as a side note, this observation about intellectuals who misread charismatic leaders is intriguing. (Are there other examples you can think of?)
Within the Indian administration, Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel at least did see the danger posed by the Chinese, and in November 1950 — just after the Chinese invaded and annexed Tibet — he wrote Nehru a strongly-worded letter to that effect. In hindsight, Sardar Patel’s letter seems incredibly prescient, as it anticipates in some sense the Sino-Indian war of 1962, as well as some of the secessionist movements that continue to plague India along its northeastern border to this very day. The letter is posted in its entirety here, and it is well worth reading. Following are some long extracts:
The Chinese Government has tried to delude us by professions of peaceful intention. My own feeling is that at a crucial period they managed to instill into our Ambassador a false sense of confidence in their so-called desire to settle the Tibetan problem by peaceful means. There can be no doubt that during the period covered by this correspondence the Chinese must have been concentrating for an onslaught on Tibet. The final action of the Chinese, in my judgement, is little short of perfidy. The tragedy of it is that the Tibetans put faith in us; they chose to be guided by us; and we have been unable to get them out of the meshes of Chinese diplomacy or Chinese malevolence. From the latest position, it appears that we shall not be able to rescue the Dalai Lama. Our Ambassador has been at great pains to find an explanation or justification for Chinese policy and actions. As the External Affairs Ministry remarked in one of their telegrams, there was a lack of firmness and unnecessary apology in one or two representations that he made to the Chinese Government on our behalf. It is impossible to imagine any sensible person believing in the so-called threat to China from Anglo-American machinations in Tibet. Therefore, if the Chinese put faith in this, they must have distrusted us so completely as to have taken us as tools or stooges of Anglo-American diplomacy or strategy. This feeling, if genuinely entertained by the Chinese in spite of your direct approaches to them, indicates that even though we regard ourselves as the friends of China, the Chinese do not regard us as their friends. (link)
One of the really tragic consequences of the Indian failure to read Chinese intentions correctly at this point is the impact it would have on Tibet and its ancient culture — which would later be marked by the Chinese for forcible merger into the mainstream of China. It’s not India’s fault, of course — it is China’s fault — but one does wonder if things might have played out differently had Nehru played his cards differently, or if someone other than K.N. Panikkar had been ambassador at the time.
More from Sardar Patel’s letter:
In the background of this, we have to consider what new situation now faces us as a result of the disappearance of Tibet, as we knew it, and the expansion of China almost up to our gates. Throughout history we have seldom been worried about our north-east frontier. The Himalayas have been regarded as an impenetrable barrier against any threat from the north. We had a friendly Tibet which gave us no trouble. The Chinese were divided. . . . China is no longer divided. It is united and strong. All along the Himalayas in the north and north-east, we have on our side of the frontier a population ethnologically and culturally not different from Tibetans and Mongoloids. The undefined state of the frontier and the existence on our side of a population with its affinities to the Tibetans or Chinese have all the elements of the potential trouble between China and ourselves.Recent and bitter history also tells us that Communism is no shield against imperialism and that the communists are as good or as bad imperialists as any other. Chinese ambitions in this respect not only cover the Himalayan slopes on our side but also include the important part of Assam. They have their ambitions in Burma also. Burma has the added difficulty that it has no McMahon Line round which to build up even the semblance of an agreement. Chinese irredentism and communist imperialism are different from the expansionism or imperialism of the western powers. The former has a cloak of ideology which makes it ten times more dangerous. In the guise of ideological expansion lie concealed racial, national or historical claims. The danger from the north and north-east, therefore, becomes both communist and imperialist. (link)
And finally, Patel assesses the potential impact on the various border regions, all of which are in some sense in a gray area ethnically and nationally with regards to China and India:
Let us also consider the political conditions on this potentially troublesome frontier. Our northern and north-eastern approaches consist of Nepal, Bhutan, Sikkim, Darjeeling and the tribal areas in Assam. From the point of view of communication, there are weak spots. Continuous defensive lines do not exist. There is almost an unlimited scope for infiltration. Police protection is limited to a very small number of passes. There, too, our outposts do not seem to be fully manned. The contact of these areas with us is by no means close and intimate. The people inhabiting these portions have no established loyalty or devotion to India. Even Darjeeling and Kalimpong areas are not free from pro-Mongoloid prejudices. During the last three years, we have not been able to make any appreciable approaches to the Nagas and other hill tribes in Assam. European missionaries and other visitors had been in touch with them, but their influence was in no way friendly to India or Indians. In Sikkim, there was political ferment some time ago. It is quite possible that discontent is smouldering there. Bhutan is comparatively quiet, but its affinity with Tibetans would be a handicap. Nepal has a weak oligarchic regime based almost entirely on force: it is in conflict with a turbulent element of the population as well as with enlightened ideas of the modern age. In these circumstances, to make people alive to the new danger or to make them defensively strong is a very difficult task indeed and that difficulty can be got over only by enlightened firmness, strength and a clear line of policy. (link)
From earlier posts on Guha’s book, I know there are many readers who feel frustrated with Nehru’s foreign policy errors from the 1950s and 60s. To some extent I’m inclined to be forgiving; things were happening very fast, and there really was no historical precedent for what Mao did with Communist China. Some of Nehru’s close associates from the Nationalist movement (i.e., Krishna Menon) were oriented to Marxism/Communism as part of their anti-Imperialist intellectual orientation, and were as a result extremely reluctant to see that an “anti-Imperialist” revolution might not be exactly what it’s cracked up to be.
Sardar Patel, on the other hand, was able to reverse the prevalent orthodoxy, and see — clearly and, as we now know, correctly — that Communism could potentially be as ruthlessly “Imperial” an ideology as European colonialism itself. In effect, he was one of the few politicians of his era who was actually able to perform in practice (“an independent approach to each controversial or disputed issue”) the values that Nehru preached in his speeches.
Great post and elucidation Amardeep. As with all your posts about the earlier chapters of the book by Guha.
It’s great to revisit those times through your impartial analysis of the book, and those times. The Sardar’s clarity of thought and astuteness is astounding today, particularly when you regard the historical baggage and political atmosphere that our political class had at that time.
Must be my lucky day….. not reading the book but your posts are informative enough… Read Guha’s “Savaging the Civilized ” though……
Very well written Amardeep. In regard to your above comment, I am more inclined to believe that leaders often carry a psychopathic streak which helps them lie or browbeat or smoothtalk their way through life. A parallel that I would draw is the recent meeting between Pres Bush and Vladimir Putin. What was the line used by Pres Bush- i looked into his eyes, window to his heart, etc.
Recent reports suggest the whole scene was choreographed by the russians. Putin is an ex-KGB handler and he knows how to manipulate people. He pulled a story about discovering religion while walking on the bank of a lake in Kiev – all to gain the trust of a President who is, to take a kind perspective, is somewhat idealistic and has strong belief in Christian principles.
Amardeep, very nice post, on which I’m sure I’ll have much to say later. Permit me to pick a very tiny nit right now.
I don’t know if Guha also made the mistake, but there are two Panikkars – K.M. (also famous as ‘Sardar’ Panikkar) and K.N.. Both were historians, K.N. being famous primarily as a historian, but K.M was the diplomat to China.
I often get the feeling that Patel is the leader many Indians project the remorse over the well intentioned actions of their governments in the first decade of independence. Patel may have had more working for him than the “pragmatism” often ascribed to him – namely, with Gandhi and Bose gone, he was probably the only person who could take a contrarian stand to Nehru while not having to worry about their standing. Even Guha indicates that officials in the Foreign Service were wise to CHina’s strategic interests in Kashmir/Assam.
I was particularly intrigued by Guha’s exploration of the India-Pakistan wrangling over water in the Indus river/tributary system – somethign that gets overlooked due to the usual focus on Kashmir.
Nothing much new about the Portuguese and French colonies post-independence. Was hoping for more here.
The conclusion of the chapter shows Guha to be an admirer of Nehru, and even able to see him through the lens of the times – I’d go a bit further than Guha to say that Nehru was probably considered more of a daring innovator in hiis time than the romantic idealist he is remembered as today.
Great post Amardeep; more and more I’m inclined to buy this book and read along…
Jawaharlal Nehru didn’t care about [ethnically Chinese] people.
Throughout history we have seldom been worried about our north-east frontier
I used ot htink that this was because the (hostile) mountains acted as a natural boundary between the two regions. Still, there was a great deal of active exchange – Amartya Sen has some interesting things to say about this in The Argumentative Indian.
A point that interests me is that through out history there has been such an active movement of people from Central Asia to the subcontinent (“Aryans”, Huns, Mongols) – a pattern that as dried up in more recent history because of the reconfiguration of power in the subcontinent (British colonialism).
So the geographical determinants are only part of the story – I think that 19th centry political configurations had a more direct influence on how India-China relations would proceed. Indeed this was directly responsible for the border dispute between India and China in the 60s.
but there are two Panikkars
That confused me too – thanks for the clarification 🙂
Although I vaguely knew about the early idealistic days of NAM, it was nice to read Guha’s “nonaligned†take.
The NAM I remember was a third world carnival. Scumbags and tyrants from impoverished countries would come to town (usually w/ 10 limo deep entourage), make grand proclamations and generally waste taxpayers’ money. India Today described one of these events as, “Mickey Mouse Talks Bigâ€.
One of the really tragic consequences of the Indian failure to read Chinese intentions correctly at this point is the impact it would have on Tibet and its ancient culture
I read Chapter 8 with great interest too.
But let me give a slightly different take:
India understood China’s intentions, and emerging regional power sometimes in late 50s (past the initial romanticism of Long March, and Chinese experiment). Historically, China is very assertive about its territorial claims – be it in Tibet, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Vietnam, and India. Durand Line has always been a very touch issue.
Even Guha claims that while China and India were being openly cuddly, China was quietly moving in Askai Chin, and India was consolidating its position in Northeast, so it wasn’t as “Bhai Bhai”
The problem arouse in disparity of power, by late 50s, China had emerged quite powerful, had spent enormous amounts on militarization, making paved roads in Himalayas, intense garrisification along the Durand Line. On the other hand India, after Tibet incursion, they could easily read the tea leaves but had limited resources that could match the Chinese buildup, and made a massive mistake in their “outpost policy“. After Tibet invasion, India made these outposts all along the Himalayas, which were essentially indefensible, and poorly manned, but out of sheer desperation and nervousness. Some of them were 5-10 miles north of Durand Line, and that upset China quite a bit.
The people of the Northeast are not “ethnically Chinese”. Some speak Sino-Tibetan languages but that does not make them Chinese. But your point is taken, people from the Northeast are not seen as being fully Indian by many people on the street (let’s save this for another thread)
Louiecypher, just so you know I inserted that term, “ethnically Chinese” in TheTrickMan’s comment — in place of an ethnic slur (you can probably guess which one). The comment was supposed to be a joke I think — and also a (misplaced) reference to Kanye West’s comment about George Bush.
Correction: I meant MacMohan Line instead of Durand Line
MacMohan Line = Chinese Border
Durand Line = Afghanistan/ Pakistan (and once undivided India) Border
Thanks Amardeep, I missed that. Anyway, it is odd how Sardar Patel assumed that people of a similar phenotype would naturally lean towards the Chinese. There are definitely groups that are Vajrayana Buddhist who look to the Dalai Lama, but I can’t think of any group that would feel anything for the PROC other than as an “enemy of my enemy” type of thing
Amardeep, Every chapter of Guha so far has several crucial gaps. Since these are for the most part it common knowledge. Since many SM’ers may not know these, why not mention them up front, so that there will be more informed discussions?
Some things that should have been mentioned in this chapter: 1) India’s being offered a permanent seat in the United Nations and Nehru’s turning it down — Relevant since securing a permanent seat and the enormous power it brings has been a primary goal of our foreign policy for quite some time now. 2) Mao’s contempt for Nehru, the fact that he found Nehru insufferable and resented Nehru’s attempt to present himself as the face of Asia. 3) The US Atoms for peace and Food for Peace program in India and other measures of US support. Some relevant background for the US drift towards an anti –India policy. 4) Biju Paknaik’s role in Indonesia – his actions seem pretty cool even today.
Amardeep,
Along with everyone else, I am thoroughly enjoying following this book via the posts. Unfortunately, it wasn’t available at any Moscow bookstores, but I am having a friend ferry it over in his luggage next week, so I can play along as of early December. When Guha is over, you’re going to pick another book to do this little game with, right? Maybe something on India before independence, or something else. Just give some notice so those of us out in nowhere can scare up the book in time!
Buster
This is why I hold Nehru more responsible. I have brought this up in earlier entries too. Nehru was a well read man. He should have known about the dangers of one man holding power for too long. He was Prime Minister too long. He didn’t do enough to encourage a robust succession of leadership. So when someone like him blunders on foreign policy, there is not going to be enough people challenging the Nehruvians Conventional Wisdom on such issues. I also feel like Nehru, with his education in Britain, probably felt a little too overconfident in his views. It’s too bad Patel’s words weren’t heeded more.
As far as China, I think they are more dangerous than Russia right now. The former USSR was bloated and would succumb to false prestige where they would fund their movement. I get the feeling CHina does not give a shit. They are like a machine, building amoral alliances, looking out for any slight justification to take over a land, not to colonialize it, but to swallow it and chew it back up as a 100% Chinese territory if they feel like there was any inkling that land was Chinese in the last 2000 years. They will support the Burmas and the Sudans, not because it expands the influence of the Chinese name, but because it is profitable for them to do so. And the bigger they grow, the more powerless it is for the US or India to stop them.
China’s past actions have made it India’s largest threat. How prudent Indian leaders are to this threat today will determine its economic success in the future. There is no doubt in my mind that the Chinese believe that there can only be one true superpower in Asia and it will take military(direct or via Pakistan) and economic measures to achieve its goal. Hopefully, Indian foreign policy towards Pakistan takes more from Patel’s beliefs than Nehru’s.
should read Indian foreign policy towards China
The more one reads of Patel, the more one’s respect for him grows.
Is his wisdom/common-sense and his being a self-made man related? Nehru was of course born with a silver spoon in his mouth.
Personally, I prefer to think of Nehru as someone who “was born on third place and went through life thinking he scored a triple 🙂 “
I think you are being a little harsh on Nehru. If you disregard his nepotism (Vijaylashmi pandit), promotion of incompetent sycophants , dismantling of tried and tested polices of the old India office of the British Empire, his arrogant and hypocritical treatment of a helpful and friendly (at the time) superpower, and the whole selling the interests of Indians to win a popularity contest with leftists and TPLACs thing, he had a wonderful foreign policy.
Amardeep: I have been a silent reader of your posts on this subject. Let me congratulate you on well balanced and thoughtful discourse. Since we are speaking about Sardar Patel, I thought I would chime in. I read somewhere long time ago, that even when Gandhi was alive, Sardar Patel was worried about China’s growing malicious ambitions, and he tried to bring this to Nehru’s attention, but in vain. He finally discussed this issue with Purushhotamdas Tandon [any relations Kush?], and tried to convince Nehru regards to this matter. But as someone has noted that, Nehru was riding high and was in no mood to forsee the inevitable consequences. I would even say that When China attacked India, Nehru was in a state of shock – which ultimately lead to his death. Just my two cents worth. Carry on…….
Good link Dizzydesi. I too have read similar stuff about Nehru. The guy had some good points. But damn, I love that quote of a guy who was born on third base and thought he hit a triple. Ha ha. The guy should have been a diplomat. That was his perfect calling. And I mean that in a good way.
Purushhotamdas Tandon [any relations Kush?]
Not directly.
But one of his grandsons is my cousin brother-in-law.
I think PN Tandon and Nehru did not get along for many reasons even both of them were from Allahabad – Guha in his book goes into details of PNT and Nehru standoff, Rajendra Prasad, Sardar Patel, and all.
I think Nehru had some inkling after Tibet, he gave a speech in Calcutta in 1956 or so, where he soothed everyone, by saying he trusted Chou En-Lai assertion that McMohan Line question can be resolved peacefully, and there is no imminent war. 1962 was a rude shock to him, no doubt, and it did lead to his heart attack.
I also think India even it wanted could have not matched Chinese militarization in 1950s. It had too many problems at hand.
I meant: PDT (PD Tandon)
Actually, this is not only a ethnic/social issue or an issue about how ‘Indians’ deal with people who have noticeably different facial features or skin pigments, though as you say, that is also an interesting issue that should be discussed separately.
The question is also why people who have never lived under a unitary governance structure based in the Gangetic plain at any point in history should suddenly decide to be OK with it merely because ‘India’ comes into being, and, as the British leave, they end up in ‘Assam’ and not in ‘Burma’ ?
The problem was compounded because, although ‘India’ came into being, and the Sovereign Democratic Republic refers to itself by the same name that the British called their South Asian Empire – the multiple and overlapping sovereignties (and suzerainties, tributaries, other subnational structures) that were characteristic of that Empire suddenly ceased to exist, and the only sovereignty was the unitary state of India.
Here I once again fault Nehru. Having realized – and in fact having written about it in ‘Discovery of India’ – that federations were the wave of the future – he nevertheless proceeded to set India up as a unitary state. In DoI, he mentions the ‘great transnational federations’ of the Soviet Union – but when it comes to India he forgets that even the Soviet Union retained the nominal sovereignties of the constituent units – Ukraine survived as Ukraine, Kazakhstan as Kazakhstan. And the British in India, just like the Mughals before them – were also essentially operating a multi-level federation.
But the vision of India that developed under Nehru, most distinctly as far as the people of the North East were concerned, but also elsewhere in India – was one in which he was replacing a relatively enlightened empire that believed in multiple overlapping sovereignties and allegiances – with another less enlightened empire he himself led, that demanded absolute, unquestioned and undivided allegiance.
The Indian North East really does feel like a different country, and not only because the people there look different – it is really far away from New Delhi, in a different geoclimatic zone, and although there are some economic interests like tea and oil & gas, and a hinterland/metropolis relationship with Calcutta – for the most part, there is very little religio-cultural-linguistic commonality with the Gangetic plain. There is some evidence that Assam was ruled by the Mughal empire, but the hill states and tribes were probably more a part of Burma, or Tibet, either de facto or de jure. When things are this far from Delhi, a unitary state is the wrong national structure – manifestly so.
And while Sardar Patel might have seen things a little clearly – having seen the problem:
his strong unionistic instinct did not allow him to suggest a possible solution – India as a confederation of autonomous sovereignties – which was the fact on the ground pre-1950 – but to shoehorn every constituent into the unitary straitjacket, and then point out that it didn’t fit.
The North East was the locus where the contradictions of this flawed conception of the internal polity – created a conflict with China, just as the same contradictions also created problems in Kashmir and Punjab and a long-running conflict with Pakistan.
Anyway, I am beginning to see some hope, though currently faint – Indians now see the contradictions both in their national conception and in their governance structures more clearly; the PM is talking about federalism; the President of the Swiss Confederation was in New Delhi; the concept of a transnational economic union is increasingly being mentioned; a free trade area in South Asia may come about, and non-zero-sum games may be contemplated. A federated South Asia may yet arrive, nay, return, not too far in the future.
this observation about intellectuals who misread charismatic leaders is intriguing. (Are there other examples you can think of?)
There are hazaar examples – the leading one is von Heisenberg (of Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle fame)*. von Heisenberg would be considered in top 10 intellectuals of 20th century.
Not only a lot of German intellectuals were fascinated by Hitler – they were some Americans too (Charles Lindbergh, Henry Ford) or Duke of Windsor (now there was backroom politics regarding abdication, since Kaisers and British royal family are close cousins). If you ever to Ellie Weisel’s talk, he always raises the point of intellectuals being too much fascinated by charismatic despots.
*People like Heisenberg, von Braun, Rommel (in his case, he was a German General/ Field Marshall) one make an argument that they were German patriots first, and foremost, and never openly toed line with him, but never opposed (Rommel did later, and was ordered to commit suicide).
There are examples for Mussolini too.
Mushie the Paki ?
melbourne desi #28, are you calling abhi an intellectual? 😛
kush, at least with lindbergh, there were clear anti-semitic reasons for his support of hitler, so i wouldn’t call it a misreading. don’t know the story with ford though, and i think calling the duke of windsor an intellectual is quite an overstatement 🙂 the story of heisenberg is quite murky – it is sometimes said that he might have actually played interference in germany’s quest for the bomb, but this might just be a favorable rewriting.
After reading Sardar Patel’s quote, it struck me that while the west looked on non-aligned India as a stooge of the Soviet Union, the Chinese (and possibly the Soviets) regarded India as an Anglo-American puppet. Ah, the joys of being non-aligned! Get bashed by both sides. Still, I would not exchange non-alignment for a second of being “aligned”. Look at what happened to most Third World countries that participated on one side or the other of the Cold War – they ended up as complete basket cases. Angola, Afghanistan, and – Pakistan. Non-alignment meant that we struggled to buy decent fridges while Karachi was awash in Mercedes, but our growth was authentic and not fuelled by Cold War subsidies from some patron. Also, non-alignment meant that peace was the assumed “normal” not war as it was in Cold War participant countries. And that gave us crucial space to develop our democratic institutions (even if imperfectly and incompletely).
frida kahlo was such a stanch stalinist she ended up betraying trotsky. picasso’s stalinism rarely gets mentioned too. sartre managed to visit the ussr and proclaim it freer thatn the US. Nehru actually had similar things to say about the USSR and china, proving his useful naivete was not restricted to foreign policy.
of course paul de mann and martin heideger’s reputations took huge hits after their nazism was revealed. unfortunatley the same cannot be said of kahlo, picasso, sartre, and nehru
Nehru actually had similar things to say about the USSR and china, proving his useful naivete was not restricted to foreign policy.
Sir Manju,
Nehru had words of admiration for USSR, so did legions of Fabian Socialists, which had Cambridge as their hub.
unfortunatley the same cannot be said of kahlo, picasso, sartre, and nehru
However, Nehru never went on singing paeans for Stalin or Lenin. Now for Picasso, you are conveniently forgetting what Franco and his men did to Spain, and communists/ socialist were fighting him.
I think you are a sound byte king, with often context removed.
not forgetting. i just know the differnce between a fellow travler and a realpolick (“he may be a bastard, but he is our bastard”) pragmatist.
I believe Abhi has a PhD from UCLA – I suppose that makes him an intellectual 😉
Tagore, among others.
[link]
The infatuation lasted only two months though. [link]
Kush Tandon Thank god for Nehru’s hard hitting and clear analysis of Lenin:
There was no doubt or vagueness in Lenin’s mind. His were the penetrating eyes which detected the moods of the masses ; the clear head which could apply and adapt well-thought out principles to changing situations ; the inflexible will which held on to the course he had mapped out, regardless of consequences. It is not many years since he died, and already Lenin has become a mighty tradition, not only in his native Russia but in the world at large. As time passes he grows greater; he has become one of the chosen company of the world’s immortals — P.J. Nehru
No … definately does not sound like a paean to me :-).
Amardeep
Yes Amardeep that was a reference to Kanye West, maybe misplaced…. Anyways to let you know.. in India, the ‘c’ word you censored, does not refer to “ethnically Chinese” people, it refers to people from the north east, Darjeeling, Sikkim or Nepal or anybody who can trace their roots to these areas and along with ”Chinese and ‘Bahadur’, its the worst kinda word you can throw at a North East Indian.
India weeps for the Tibetans. How we failed them is something we’ll have to live with forever. And of course Burma and Aung Saan too today. I really hope we’re doing something under the covers for the Burmese.
Sharmishta, good post! Very true.
There is an alternative to both being non-aligned and or choosing a side….it is possible to be aligned with your own interests.
Arjun in #39
You may find this interesting.
Amardeep, u have got the wrong person, it was KM Pannikar who was the ambassador of China and not Dr KN Pannikar, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kavalam_Madhava_Panikkar
In the 1950s, when Non-Alignment was given official form in Bandung in 1955, I was an undergraduate in India. The leading figures in that movement were Nehru, Nasser, Sukarno, and Tito. The American reaction to Nehru’s international stance was divided. President Eisenhower (1953-60) said explicitly that India, situated as it was, could pursue no other policy. (Ike had been President of Columbia University.)But John Foster Dulles, his Secretary of State, an ideological Cold Warrior, thought Nehru’s position downright immoral since the struggle was between godless totalitarianism and democracy (the latter usually called the free world). Domestically, it was the age of the vigorous prosecution of suspected Communist sympathizers in high places in America. A characteristic Indian reaction may be inferred from one of my teachers calling our attention to a cartoon of Dulles with the caption “Dull, Duller, Dulles”.
Wow. You are old and lived through quite a momentous period. Other than Nehru, Nasser, Sukarno and Tito are dictators. Even Nehru could be called as a “democratic” dictator. 🙂
I think “non-alignment” allowed India to play both sides. In that way, it is beneficial other than being a lap dog of either of the two.
I don’t know how “non-aligned” India really was. India’s foreign policy was always heavily tilted towards the Soviet Union, and India turned a blind eye to the Soviet atrocities both within USSR and outside, this continued till the collapse of Soviet Union. Even to this day, much of Indian media (Hindu, for example) is critical of US policies but is mum about Putin’s power grab.I mean how “non-aligned” could an organization be that had Castro in it. I hardly remember reading anything critical about the Soviet Union when I was in India.
To be fair to Nehru, socialism was regarded as the great hope of the 20th century, he was not alone in making those assumptions. Unfortunately for India, he has been proven wrong by history. What is sad is how much of the Indian left and media still clings to those discredited ideas.
Great series Amardeep, keep up the good work! and here is wishing all mutineers a very happy Diwali
Ardy, thanks for that link. I understand that India can’t overtly do anything because that would push Burma’s junta into China’s embrace resulting in Chinese ships plying the Bay of Bengal again – a horrifying scenario. That’s why I was saying I hope there’s undercover support.
Whats more there was actual empirical evidence for this. Within a generation the soviet union had transformed itself from a largely agricultural european backwater to almost a first world country. that level and pace of economic development was unprecedented in the history of known human civilization. true it had done this through a virtual genocide by basically killing/wiping off large populations of large and medium landowners under stalin, but the third world leaders were (for various reasons) completely blind to the means used. incidentally the japanese had done something similar during their occupation of korea (and some analysts ascribe south korean economic dynamism later to the almost complete absence of large or medium sized feudal landowners); for a comparison imagine if the british had basically killed off all the zamindars of india instead of forming a coalition with them (as they actually did); no feudal structures, no landowners, no thakurs and bhumihars of bihar, u.p. and m.p. would have definitely led to a bourgeois revolution later. but the way for the more literal and obtuse readers–of whom there are, thankfully, very few on this board, this is only a thought experiment and does not imply any normative comment or content whatsoever
Thanks, Amardep, great Choti Diwali post! What surprised me was to read that after Mountbatten suggested the UN resolve the Kashmir dispute, Nehru actually expressed disappointment that the UN turned out to be an arm of American foreign policy.
I wonder what would Nehru have thought about the US-Indo N-deal? Laju K.
http://www.lajuk.blogspot.com
–> (My speculation) Nehru, sympathised with USSR even if he maintained “non-aligned” perception. He mentions in Discovery of India, “The practical achievements of the Soviet Union were also tremendously impressive. Often I disliked or did not understand some development there and it seemed to me to be too closely concerned with the opportunism of the moment or the power politics of the day. But despite all these developments and possible distortions of the original passion for human betterment, I had no doubt that the Soviet Revolution had advanced human society by a great leap and had lit a bright flame which could not be smothered, and that it had laid foundations for that new civilization towards which the world could advance. I am too much of an individualist and believer in personal freedom to like overmuch regimentation. Yet it seemed to me obvious that in a complex social structure individual freedom had to be limited, and perhaps the only way to read personal freedom was through some such limitation in the social sphere. The lesser liberties may often need limitation in the interest of the larger freedom.“
Musharraf could have used Nehru’s quotes, in addition to Lincoln, when he announced his emergency rule.
–> Didnt Guha mention in his book about Patel, as home minister of the newly independent India, keeping tabs on muslim civil servants with regard to their allegiance ? Or is it in some other book ?
–> Hindsight is so comfortable, isnt it ? Yes, he was in power for quite some time. It wasnt as if he was jailing political opposition(like his ’eminent’ daughter did) and subverting democracy to hold onto power. He got elected by the people as the leader. If Nehru indeed was overconfident in his views, what were other political leaders doing, not bringing him down a notch ? Sucking their thumbs ?
–> Since this is hindsight analysis, wouldnt you think Nehru did good not to follow USSR’s federation model, so India didnt end up as scattered pieces of a jigsaw puzzle 50 years later ? And Nehru wasnt a dictator to consider his Discovery of India as the basic template for future governance of India. DOI laid out his ideas but to extend it to his governance model as the future PM, is a huge leap.
–> And lay waste to sacrifices made by people of India and Pakistan, to go in precisely the opposite direction, in 1947 ?
–> Willing to look over facts for a catchy phrase ?